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Abstract 
 
In the last four decades, one of the fastest-growing fields of research in 
economics has been the contractual theory of the firm developed in Coase’s 
(1937) footsteps. Yet despite what otherwise seems to be a genuine success 
story the question of the nature of the firm remains an empirical and 
theoretical challenge, painfully illustrated by the lack of consensus regarding 
the definition and boundaries of the firm. The argument of this thesis is that 
many thorny questions that plague the literature, including issues related to 
ownership, boundaries, and intra-firm authority, are due to the fact that 
contractual theorists of the firm have generally overlooked a key legal feature 
of the economic system, without which theories of the firm are like Hamlet 
without the Prince.  
An elementary institutional fact about firms and markets is that in order 
to become a fully operational firm in a modern market economy, an 
entrepreneur or an association of resource owners need to go through a 
registration or incorporation procedure by which the legal system creates a 
separate legal person or legal entity in which ownership rights over assets 
used in production are vested, in whose name contracts are made, and thanks 
to which the firm has standing in court. With this assignment of legal 
personality, the legal system creates the efficiency-enhancing nexus for 
contracts that literally carries the organizational framework of the firm, and 
secures its continuity by locking-in the founders’ committed capital, thereby 
allowing them to pledge assets, raise finance and do business in the firm’s 
own name. 
Given the basic principle that only legal persons may own property and 
have the capacity to contract, and the implication that legally enforceable 
contracts can only exist between legal persons, it is something of a paradox 
that the notion of legal personality is absent from the prevailing narrative in 
the contractual theory of the firm. The thesis examines the reasons behind 
this state of affairs, and identifies alongside the widespread view among 
economists that firms can be defined with little or no reference to law, 
particularly statutory law, the lasting influence of Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) ambiguous dismissal of legal personality as a legal fiction that 
unavoidably leads to misleading reification. 
In order to disentangle the issues involved, the thesis puts this argument 
into historical perspective, and suggests that much can be learned from the 
corporate personality controversy that in the past has addressed the same 
questions. As the overview of the history of this debate reveals, the category 
mistakes that Jensen and Meckling presented as inevitable can be easily 
avoided once the meaning and functions of legal personality are properly 
understood. The thesis dispels enduring misunderstandings surrounding the 
notion of personhood, and proposes a legally-grounded view of the nature 
and boundaries of the firm that recognizes in law’s provision of legal entity 
status a fundamental institutional support for the firm while fitting the overall 
Coasean narrative. 
  
  
For Nina
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold. 
Yeats (1934 [1920]: 211) 
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Chapter 1. The firm as a challenge 
What is a firm? Since … the beginning of the 
1970s much progress has been made, yet 
despite the important literature on the 
subject, this question remains an empirical as 
well as theoretical challenge. 
 Garrouste and Saussier (2005: 179) 
It is customary to begin a discussion of the theory of the firm developed 
since the 1970s with the observation that the “black box” of standard 
neoclassical economics had finally been opened. At long last, the argument 
goes, the textbook depiction of the profit-maximizing firm as a set of 
production possibilities, which simply assumed that firms exist and had no 
need to consider internal organization, had given way to a new line of inquiry 
that sought to explain how and why firms come about in the first place, how 
they are organized, and what determines the optimal perimeter of their 
activities. The theory of the firn developed to answer these questions has 
been described not only as “one of the fastest-growing areas in applied 
 2 
microeconomics” (Klein, 1999: 463) but also as a “big business” (Gibbons, 
2005: 200). Not surprisingly, all of this literature’s foundational articles are 
highly cited and feature in Kim, Morse and Zingales’s (2006) ranking of 
“what has mattered” in economics since 1970. 
Significantly, in addition to the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
attributed to Coase in 1991, Williamson, the other towering figure of the 
field, shared the Nobel Prize in 2009 for his work on the boundaries of the 
firm that has led to further theoretical refinements by followers and critics 
alike, as well as to an impressive amount of empirical work. The overall 
result, according to Masten’s (2002: 432) discussion of modern evidence on 
the firm, is that “much more is known about the determinants of 
organizational form now” than ever before. However, despite what otherwise 
seems to be a genuine success story the question of the nature of the fi rm 
remains an “empirical as well as a theoretical challenge,” as Garrouste and 
Saussier (2005: 178) were recently obliged to concede. This introductory 
chapter proposes an overview of the success and failure in the theory of the 
firm literature (1.1), before presenting the aims and scope of the thesis (1.2), 
and summarizing its structure (1.3). 
1.1 Success and failure in the theory of the firm 
In his landmark work, Markets and Hierarchies, Williamson (1975: 20) 
claimed that “in the beginning there were markets.” This heuristic dictum 
captures with a Biblical ring the widespread view of the agenda of an 
economic theory of institutions: start, in an institution-free world, viewed as 
 3 
a sort of Hobbesian “state of nature,” with self-interested human beings 
possessing a “propensity to exchange” (Smith, 1937 [1776]: 13), and attempt 
to explain the endogenous emergence of the key institutions of social order, 
such as money, property, contract, law, courts, firms, and states. Whether 
developed in the game-theoretic language of Schotter’s (1981) Economic 
Theory of Social Institutions, or in the non-formalized style of Williamson’s 
(1985a) Economic Institutions of Capitalism and Barzel’s (2002) A Theory of 
the State, research carried out according to this agenda was described by 
Williamson (1975: 1) as the “new institutional economics.”1  
One of the ideas successfully promoted by Coase (1960) and other early 
new institutional economists is that institutions of various kinds are 
necessarily irrelevant in the zero transaction cost world of conventional price 
theory. In this “strange world” (Furubotn and Richter, 1998: 8) of perfect 
information and costless exchange, bargaining always ensures allocative 
efficiency, irrespective of the institutional setting within which exchanges  
take place. Neither initial allocations of property rights, nor specific types of 
liability rules, nor indeed the structure of law itself, make a difference to the 
final outcome. By contrast, according to the Coasean narrative, the real world 
does not fit into this neat picture. Positive information and transaction costs 
are pervasive, and may sometimes be sufficiently high to outweigh the 
                                                 
1
 According to Klein (1999: 456), new institut ional economics is “an 
interdisciplinary enterprise” that “borrows liberally from various social -science disciplines” 
in order to “understand the institutions of social, political and commercial life” while 
retaining economics as “its primary language.” See Ménard and Shirley (2005), and 
Brousseau and Glachant (2008), for recent comprehensive overviews of this tradition.  
 4 
benefits of certain transactions, thus preventing allocative efficiency. This 
means that transaction cost-reducing institutions of various kinds can be 
efficiency-enhancing, and that the comparative economic analysis of 
alternative institutional arrangements is justified.  
The contractual theory of the firm plays a prominent role within the 
new institutional economics given that “perhaps the most important 
adaptation to the existence of transaction costs is the emergence of the firm” 
(Coase, 1988a: 7). Unlike the firm of conventional price theory, the 
efficiency of the contractually-viewed firm is not a question of production 
possibility frontiers and optimal responses to exogenous price and cost 
variations. To the extent that combining the resources of several owners for 
production always “involves a partial or outright transfer of property rights 
through a contract” (Cheung, 1970: 50), efficiency implies that a set of 
agreements that no one will wish to change is somehow reached. Joint output 
value cannot be maximized without such a set of agreements.
2
 For the 
“contractual man” described by Williamson (1985a: 43ff), the efficient 
“governance of contractual relations” (Williamson, 1979a) implies designing 
institutional arrangements that improve coordination by aligning incentives 
and reducing the risks involved, thereby reducing the costs of exchange.    
The fact that one observes several types of associations or 
organizational forms implies competition between various forms of 
contractual arrangements between resource owners. As Alchian (1984: 47, 
emphasis in original) put it, “competition occurs in forms of organization and 
                                                 
2
 Such a set of agreements corresponds to a “nexus of strategies” played by rational 
agents (Dow, 2004: 525).   
 5 
contracts.” Those forms that pass the “market survival test,” viewed along 
the lines of Alchian’s (1950) “natural selection” argument, reduce or 
minimize costs not only compared to stand-alone producers but also 
compared to other conceivable forms of organization (Jensen, 1983: 331). In 
the long run, in other words, the observed distribution between typical 
economic forms of the firm (e.g., capitalist or cooperative) and typical legal 
forms of the firm (e.g., partnership or corporation) is the result of 
competitive market forces. On this view, the forms best suited to a large 
variety of needs and circumstances tend to perform better than alternatives, 
and through a process of “propagation by imitation” (Demsetz, 1996: 489) 
tend to ultimately survive.
3
  
One such form of contractual arrangement involves the delegation by 
resource owners “to a central agent, for some period of time, specific rights 
to direct their assets in production in return for a payment” (Eggertsson, 
1990: 48; see also Pejovich, 1990: 53). The general consensus is that in 
situations “where economic agents cooperate with one another not through a 
system of explicit contracts that bind each to every other member of the 
group but through a system of bilateral contracts in which each comes to an 
agreement with a ‘single contractual agent’, the essential ingredient of ‘the 
firm’ is present” (Ricketts, 2002: 3). This is the “nature of the firm” 
                                                 
3
 New institutional economists generally agree with Jensen (1983: 322) that “as a 
result of the subtle interaction of the continual striving by purposeful individuals and the 
natural selection properties of the environment, extremely complicated and sophisticated 
institutions and practices can arise.” See Vromen (1995: 56ff) for a detailed discussion of 
the new institutional economists’ conception of the evolution of efficient organizational 
forms. 
 6 
originally theorized by Coase (1937), that later grew into Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) depiction of the “classical capitalist firm,” from which 
follows Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) famous definition of the firm as a 
“nexus of contracts.”4 All contractual theories of the firm are explicit or 
implicit variations on this pivotal idea.
5
 
The Coasean theory of the firm is based not only on the presence of this 
efficiency-enhancing central contractual agent but also on the claim that the 
system of contractual relations thus organized creates an “island of conscious 
power” (Coase, 1937: 388) that distinguishes the firm from ordinary market 
contracting, and can help explain the distribution of activities between firms 
and markets. Taking the first claim for granted, contractual theorists have 
concentrated mainly on the second claim, and debates have accordingly 
focused on the distinguishing mark of the firm. More precisely, the bulk of 
the literature has been concerned with the related question of the 
determinants of firm boundaries. Yet despite four decades of work on a 
clearly identified set of questions, there is neither a “unique” account of firm 
boundaries nor a “unified” theory of the firm (Garrouste and Saussier, 2008: 
36). Instead, “many competing theoretical frameworks coexist, with only 
                                                 
4
 Although there is a continuity between Coase’s question (“why firms?”), Alchian 
and Demsetz’s question (“why capitalist firms?”), and Jensen and Meckling’s question 
(“why corporations?”), these are not exactly the same questions.  
5
 Describing these developments, Furubotn and Richter (1998: 326) observed that 
“the firm is now viewed as a nexus of contracts that regulate the nonmarket transactions 
between resource owners who form … a private enterprise.” This view has become so 
widespread that certain introductory texts (e.g., Wittman, 2006: 332) simply state that the 
firm is a nexus of contracts as a matter of fact, without further specification or explanation.  
 7 
partial answers concerning the nature of the firm, its boundaries, and its 
internal organization” (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005: 194).    
In fact, after substantial advances in the 1970s and 1980s, progress has 
considerably slowed down since the early 1990s, and in the last decade or so 
there has been no significant progress at all.
6
 Unfortunately, Eggertsson’s 
(1990: 158) observation, that the lack of standardized vocabulary and careful 
definitions “makes it difficult to see whether we are dealing with overlapping 
or competing theories,” still rings true today.  In this context, Gibbons’s 
(2005: 227ff) effort to nest several existing theories of firm boundaries 
within a formalized “integrative framework,” the primary functions of which 
are “to differentiate among the theories by clarifying their distinctions,” and 
to allow the progressive integration of additional contractual explanations, is 
a significant step forward. However, although the integration of existing 
approaches is important, progress in the field is likely to involve “breaking 
loose” (Gibbons, 2005: 238), at least partially, from the contractual 
paradigm. Some sort of “new foundations” (Zingales, 2000) are needed.   
The view that progress can be made if a previously neglected element is 
taken into account is hardly novel, and has been expressed by some of the 
leading theorists of the firm at least since the late 1980s. Coase (1988d: 38) 
himself had complained that a regrettable consequence of the “undue 
emphasis … on the choice of contractual arrangements” is that “economists 
have tended to neglect the main activity of a firm, running a business.” More 
                                                 
6
 As if to illustrate this point the editors of the second edition of the New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics chose to reproduce the entry on the theory of the firm (Archibald, 
2008) from the previous edition (Archibald, 1987). 
 8 
research was needed, Demsetz (1988a: 157) had similarly argued, on the 
production, maintenance and use of knowledge, while for Milgrom and 
Roberts (1988: 450) “evolutionary considerations” related to changing 
technology deserved significantly more attention. These suggestions were 
welcomed by economists working outside the contractual tradition (e.g., 
Winter, 1988; Langlois, 1988; Teece, 1988), but twenty years later, as Foss 
and Klein’s (2008: 442) assessment concluded, none of these elements had 
really found their way into the contractual theory of the firm.
7
 The 
advancement of this agenda is not the object of this thesis, the aims of which 
are far more modest.  
1.2 Aims and scope of the thesis 
Although the aims of this thesis are not as ambitious as the proposal to 
integrate contractual and evolutionary perspectives on the firm, the 
implications may be at least as important.
8
 The argument is that by taking 
Coase’s first claim for granted and focusing exclusively on Coase’s second 
                                                 
7
 Outside the contractual theory of the firm, these and other issues became central in 
the strategic management literature (e.g., Nelson, 1991; Conner, 1991; Barney, 1996; Grant, 
1996; Madhok, 1996; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Phelan and Lewin, 2000). See also 
the related literature on entrepreneurship (e.g., Casson, 2005; Langlois, 2007 a; Foss and 
Klein, 2012).  
8
 See Foss (1993a) and Hodgson (1998a, 1998b) for a comparison of the contractual 
and evolutionary perspectives on the firm. 
 9 
claim, contractual theorists have generally overlooked a key legal feature of 
the firm, without which theories of the firm are like Hamlet without the 
Prince. This vexing blind spot is revealed in Holmström’s (1999: 75) 
inability to provide a “well-developed explanation of asset ownership by 
firms” that would allow him to account for “one of the most significant and 
robust empirical regularities to be explained by any theory of the firm,” 
namely that “economic contracts are made with firms, not their  employees or 
owners.” Holmström is justifiably puzzled because this significant and robust 
empirical regularity is at odds with the explicit or implicit assumption made 
in the theory of the firm literature, that the efficiency-enhancing central 
contractual agent is a flesh-and-blood human being (e.g., “entrepreneur,” 
“owner,” “employer”) or a group of such human beings (e.g., “owners,” 
“management”).   
A case can be made for the fact that, along with other thorny questions 
that plague the literature, Holmström’s puzzle vanishes as soon as this 
erroneous conception regarding the identity of the efficiency-enhancing 
central contractual agent is discarded. The elementary institutional fact that 
most theorists of the firm have overlooked is that in order to become a fully 
operational firm in a modern market economy, an entrepreneur or an 
association of resource owners need to go through a formal registration or 
incorporation procedure.
9
 The outcome is this constitutive procedure is the 
                                                 
9
 The expressions “registration” and “incorporation” are used synonymously 
throughout this thesis to designate the constitutive procedure by which the firm founders 
apply for and obtain the official recognition of the firm’s existence by the legal system. 
Although there are some variations both between common law and civil law jurisductions, 
and within each kind of jurisdiction, these differences are minor. The principle that the firm 
 
 10 
creation by the legal system of a distinct “legal person” in which ownership 
rights over assets used in production are vested, and in whose name contracts 
are made (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000a: 390; Hodgson, 2002: 56; Gindis, 
2007: 272; Pagano, 2010: 118; Deakin, 2012a: 115).
10
 With this assignment 
of legal personality, that Spulber (2009a: 152) has appositely described as a 
“foundational shift,” the legal system creates a “nexus for contracts” 
(Hansmann, 2013: 892, emphasis in original) and secures its continuity by 
“locking-in” the founders’ committed capital (Blair, 2004: 45), thereby 
allowing them to pledge assets, raise finance, and do business in the firm’s 
own name.    
Given the basic principle to be found in any jurisdiction that only legal 
persons may own property and have the capacity to contract, and the 
implication that legally enforceable contracts can only exist between legal 
persons (Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 518; Robé, 2011: 3; Kornhauser and 
MacLeod, 2013: 918), it is something of a paradox that the notion of legal 
personality is absent from the prevailing narrative in the contractual theory of 
the firm. This is the “nexus paradox” identified in this thesis. In part, this 
state of affairs is imputable to the widespread reluctance among economists 
to rely on legal concepts of the firm, and to sustained efforts to define the 
firm with little or no reference to law. Little has changed since Masten (1988: 
                                                                                                                                     
only really comes into existence as a result of this constitutive procedure is the same in all 
jurisdictions.   
10
 The expressions “legal person” (or “juridical person”) and “legal entity” are used 
synonymously throughout this thesis, as are the expressions “legal personality” (or 
“juridical personality”) and “legal entity status.”  
 11 
185) observed that “economists have either downplayed or rejected outright 
the role of the law in defining the firm.” But the main reason for the 
conspicuous absence of legal personality is the lasting influence of Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) dismissal of the notion as an inconsequential “legal 
fiction” in one of the most highly-cited articles published in economics since 
1970.
11
 
Indeed, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976: 311) definition of the firm as a 
“legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
among individuals,” where by legal fiction is meant “the artificial construct 
under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310, n.12), is as celebrated as their immediate 
rejection of the “personalization” of the firm. Their warning against the 
anthropomorphic fallacies implied in discussions of the firm’s “objectives” 
or “responsibilities” conveyed the idea that there is something “unnatural” 
about the legal personality of firms. Although their ambiguous argument fails 
by any standard of rigourous analysis, this interpretation seems to have stuck, 
perhaps because Jensen and Meckling’s (1976: 311) view that “it makes little 
or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are ‘inside’ the firm … 
from those things that are ‘outside’ of it” was perceived to be an implication 
of their definition of the firm. Given the literature’s focus on boundaries, 
Jensen and Meckling’s article came to be much cited but little used, to 
paraphrase Coase (1972: 63), except as a convenient foil, and the concept of 
                                                 
11
 In addition to being the third most-cited article in economics (Kim, Morse and 
Zingales, 2006: 192), Jensen and Meckling (1976) is the third most -cited article in finance 
published since 1974 (Chung, Cox and Mitchell, 2001: 107).   
 12 
legal personality disappeared from the theoretical narrative as furtively as it 
had appeared.
12
 
The thesis shows that the fears distilled by Jensen and Meckling are 
unfounded once the meaning and functions of legal personality are properly 
understood. In order to disentangle the issues involved, it contextualizes 
Jensen and Meckling’s claims, revealing that their rhetoric was an anti-
regulatory response to criticism of corporate America best represented by 
Nader, Green and Seligman’s (1976a) call for federal legislation to “tame the 
giant corporation.” Nader and his followers considered that key attributes of 
corporations, particularly legal personality, are privileges conceded by the 
state, and used this to justify further regulation. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
357) countered this reasoning by showing that, far from being state creations, 
private corporations, like other institutional arrangements, are the product of 
market forces, and took this to imply that regulations that increase costs for 
the human beings involved can only diminish the corporation’s chances of 
survival (Meckling and Jensen, 1977: 40; Jensen and Meckling, 1978: 32).  
The explicit link between legal personality, misleading 
anthropomorphism and disputable political ends was picked up and amplified 
in the rising literature devoted to the economic analysis of corporate law 
(e.g., Hessen, 1979a; 1979b; Posner and Scott, 1980; Klein, 1980, 1982; 
Fischel, 1982a; Baysinger and Butler, 1985a; Butler, 1989; Easterbrook, 
1989; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989; 1991; Butler and Ribstein, 1995). In 
the process these ideas were accorded “the weight of scientific truth ,” as 
                                                 
12
 Until very recently no contractual theorist of the firm even mentioned the concept 
of legal personality. Today, exceptions include Spulber (2009a) and Van den Steen (2010).   
 13 
Bratton (1989a: 409) observed, in what Kornhauser (1989: 1449) described 
as a “revolution [that] swept the legal theory of the corporation.” For years, 
as a result, anyone interested in both the theory of the firm and the topic of 
legal personality would have found little else on the subject in the law and 
economics literature.
13
 Yet none of these ideas were quite as scientific or 
revolutionary as it might have seemed. In fact, the 1970s and 1980s debate 
was a replica of an ancient dispute about the nature and origins of “corporate 
personality,” a dispute going back to Roman law that has been recurring ever 
since (Iwai, 1999: 584; Avi-Yonah, 2005: 771; Gindis, 2009: 26).
14
   
Notwithstanding important differences of context and emphasis, 
essentially the same debate structured discussions of both early corporate 
forms (monasteries, universities, charities, municipalities, guilds) and 
modern corporate forms (associations, trade unions, poli tical parties, business 
corporations). The thesis surveys the history of this debate, that Iwai (2007: 
243) referred to as “one of the most celebrated controversies in legal theory 
and legal philosophy,” demonstrating that theorists of the firm have much to 
learn from the “corporate personality controversy” of the past. In doing so it 
identifies the insights that can be used to dispel the numerous enduring 
                                                 
13
 Within this literature, alongside Blair and Stout’s (1999) initial attempt to 
rehabilitate legal personality, legal entity status plays several important “functional” roles 
in the relatively recent work on corporate law and “organizational law” more generally 
developed by Hansmann and Kraakman (2000a, 2000b, 2004), and  others. See Armour, 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2009) for a general overview.  
14
 The expression “corporate personality” normally refers to the legal personality of 
various corporate forms, and is sometimes misleadingly called “artificial personality” to 
mark the difference with the “natural personality” of human beings.  
 14 
misconceptions and equivocations surrounding the notion of legal 
personality. In a nutshell, the aim of the thesis is to use these insights to 
propose a legally-grounded view of the nature and boundaries of the firm that 
fits the Coasean narrative while recognizing in law’s provision of legal entity 
status a fundamental institutional support for the firm. The aim, in short, is to 
have Hamlet with the Prince. The thesis is structured in the following 
manner. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins with a discussion of the theory of the firm literature. More 
precisely, Chapters 2 and 3 highlight the debates surrounding the boundaries 
of the firm that have resulted from the focus on Coase’s second claim, while 
using as a thread the issue of the identity of the central contractual agent . 
Contrary to other reviews, where the accent is mainly on different details in 
various models (e.g., Foss, Lando and Thomsen, 1999; Garrouste and 
Saussier, 2005; Gibbons, 2005), the thesis highlights the general thrust and 
overall continuity of the basic Coasean narrative.
15
 Chapter 2 outlines the 
                                                 
15
 For the sake of overall coherence, some relatively minor contributions to the 
contractual theory of the firm, for example Baker, Gibbons and Murphy’s (1999, 2002) 
“implicit contracts” approach, have been excluded. Although it is a major contribution to 
the contractual paradigm, the so-called “positive agency theory” introduced by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and futher developed by Fama and Jensen (see Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b) is also excluded because, as Foss (2000: xxxvi) rightly observed, 
“principal-agent theories are not theories of the firm per se” and are not designed to answer 
 
 15 
foundations of the field, constrating Coase’s (1937) original setup based on a 
sharp distinction between firms and markets (2.1) with Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) influential objection that firms should be viewed as kinds 
of markets (2.2). It then addresses the problems raised by Richardson (1972) 
and others, according to which the traditional distinction between firms and 
markets may be too simplistic, as well as Cheung’s (1983) argument that the 
very idea of drawing the boundaries of the firm may be nonsensical (2.3). 
Overall, as will be clear from Chapter 2, a consensus on the nature and 
boundaries of the firm was not reached after this first wave of comparative 
institutional analysis.    
The reactions to these problems are discussed in Chapter 3 that focuses 
on the three main efforts to reclaim firm boundaries. Based on Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian’s (1978) discussion of asset specificity, the new turn 
in the theory of the firm narrative owes much to Williamson’s (1979a) efforts 
to advance comparative institutional analysis by suggesting that the 
distribution of transactions between firms, markets, and other possibilities 
tends to match the characteristics of transactions, particularly the associated 
levels of relationship-specific investments (3.1). A similar theme was 
explored in Grossman and Hart’s (1986) formal model of firm boundaries 
based on the role played by nonhuman asset ownership (3.2). Concluding 
these efforts is Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) extension of the discussion to 
human capital-intensive firms in which many of the institutional 
arrangements that proved to be useful in physical capital-intensive firms may 
need to be revised (3.3). Curiously, it will be argued, this extension brings 
                                                                                                                                     
Coase’s questions.    
 16 
the difficulties of defining the nature and boundaries of the firm back to the 
center stage. 
In the following Chapters 4 and 5 the gap in the Coasean narrative is 
addressed by linking Coase’s first claim about the efficiency-enhancing 
properties of a central contractual agent and the issue of legal personality. 
Chapter 4 begins by assessing the numerous conceptual and definitional 
problems that afflict the theory of the firm literature (4.1). The difficulties 
involved in defining the boundaries of the firm are shown to be at least in 
part the result of the highly ambiguous uses of other key terms, such as 
“market” and “transaction costs,” and a preliminary case for using business 
registration to identify the firm is made. Chapter 4 then argues that 
Holmström’s (1999) puzzle and other unanswered questions regarding 
ownership, boundaries and the sources of intra-firm authority, can be 
resolved by recognizing that the central contractual agent is the legal person 
created for the firm founders by the legal system, rather than a human being 
or a group of human beings (4.2). The influence of Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) vigorous rejection of legal personality as leading to anthropomorphic 
fallacies and state regulation of private business, an accusation intended to 
discredit Nader and other social critics, is discussed next (4.3). This critique, 
as will become clear in the remainder of the thesis, is far from conclusive.        
In Chapter 5 the dismissal of legal personality is put into perspective 
and related to the corporate personality controversy of the past. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the old theory of corporations as state creations, 
precisely the conception that Nader attempted to resurrect, contrasting it with 
the approach introduced by Morawetz (1882) and others after the 
proliferation of general incorporation laws. On this view, that is strikingly 
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similar to Jensen and Meckling’s contractual approach, corporations are 
privately created associations of shareholders (5.1). Both approaches are then 
contrasted with Gierke’s (1900) theory of “real corporate personality,” that 
also emphasized the private origins of corporations while succumbing to 
anthropormorphic fallacies, but which was in turn purged from the latter 
claims by a new generation of British corporate theorists working around 
Maitland (5.2). Finally, the chapter considers parallel discussions in America, 
where Freund (1897) provided the earliest “rational study” of the value of 
corporate personality, to borrow Holmes’s (1897: 1001) expression (5.3). 
Overall, these considerations reveal that the notion of legal personality does 
not necessarily imply anthropomorphism and disputable calls for state control 
of private business.  
Concluding the thesis, Chapter 6 uses these insights to make sense of 
recurring misunderstandings surrounding the notion of personhood, and 
proposes a legally-grounded view of the nature and boundaries of the firm 
that recognises the functional role and economic value of legal personality. 
When legal personality is understood as “the reference point for the enabling 
framework expressed economically as a nexus of contracts” (Schanze, 2006: 
73) that literally carries the organizational structure of the firm (see Deakin, 
2012a: 115; 2012b: 352) and allows it “to rank as a unit in the legal scheme,” 
as Carr (1905: 185) put it long ago, most if not all of the undesirable 
emotional equivocations can be discarded (6.1). A legally-grounded view of 
the kind suggested here not only allows us to have Hamlet with the Prince in 
order to further our understanding of the institutional structure of production 
(6.2) but also helps formulate future research agendas (6.3). To the extent 
that the argument of this thesis is successful, then all that it will have done, 
to paraphrase Coase (1992: 713), is “to urge the inclusion in our analysis of 
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features of the economic system so obvious that … they have tended to be 
overlooked.”   
 19 
 
Chapter 2. From dichotomy to continuum 
The issues surrounding what has been called 
“the firm” and the scope of economic 
behavior encompassed by Coase’s thesis are 
far from resolved. 
 Cheung (1983: 2) 
Developed in Coase’s footsteps, the original contributions to the contractual 
theory of the firm discussed in this chapter revolve around two distinct views 
of firms and markets: the “dichotomy thesis” and the “continuum thesis.” 
According to the former, there are important differences between firms and 
markets, and firms are viewed as properly distinct from markets. In other 
words, intra-firm relations are seen as inherently different from inter-firm 
relations, implying that the mechanism coordinating individual behaviour 
within firms is quite different from the coordinating mechanism to be found 
outside the firm. Given that outside the firm the price system coordinates 
exchange, the theoretical problem is to demonstrate how an alternative mode 
of coordination replaces the price system within the firm. Having identified 
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these alternative modes, dichotomy theorists proceed to define the conditions 
under which firms are to be preferred to markets, or vice versa. At the 
margin, one is then able to draw the boundaries of the firm.  
Hence Coase (1937) and other dichotomy theorists, most notably 
Williamson (1975), have focused on the relative advantages of firms and 
markets by comparing internal employment relations and external 
commercial contracts, or by considering the motivations behind the “make-
or-buy” decision of vertical integration (2.1). This view of the boundaries of 
the firm is exactly what proponents of the continuum thesis deny based on 
several important arguments. One of these stems from Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) claim that firms are essentially kinds of markets (2.2). The 
other, related, critique is that it may be difficult to identify the firm in non-
arbitrary ways among the broad spectrum of contractual arrangements that  
individuals choose to adopt (2.3). What is at stake here is crucial, since the 
debate is really about the proper definition of the firm. Curiously, facing this 
difficult problem, a number of key theorists sidestep definitional matters 
altogether, and accept Cheung’s (1983) strong arguments against the use of 
the term “firm.”  
2.1 Firms versus markets 
Williamson’s (1975: 20) dictum, “in the beginning there were markets,” 
implies that firms and similar social institutions arise in a market economy in 
response to various shortcomings of the market allocation of scarce 
resources. Significantly, the “markets and hierarchies” research program  
 21 
associated principally with Williamson (1971, 1973, 1975), and the 
contractual theory of the firm more generally, took shape in the context of 
the rising literature on “market failure” and “non-market allocation” (e.g., 
Kahn, 1966; Arrow, 1969; Radner, 1970; Akerlof, 1970; Spence and 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Hurwicz, 1973), a context in which Coase’s (1972: 73) 
agenda-setting proposal for research in industrial organization reminded 
economists that “market arrangements are the alternative to organization 
within the firm.” In fact, as Coase (1937) had famously argued in “The 
Nature of the Firm,” an article widely considered to be the first to propose 
the analytical framework that defines the field today, “the distinguishing 
mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 
389).
16
 
Contrary to his contemporaries, who focused on the cost and supply 
curves inherited from Marshallian microeconomics and on Robinson’s (1933) 
extension of the discussion to imperfect competition (see Williams, 1978; 
Moss, 1984), Coase’s (1937) aims were to account for the existence of firms 
in a market economy, to specify the determinants of the size of the firm, and 
to explain the distribution of activities between firms and markets. 
Developing his argument in three steps, Coase first introduced the previously 
unacknowledged disadvantage of the market, namely the “cost of using the 
price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 390). He then explained the presence of the 
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 This argument about the nature of the firm was only really rediscovered in the 
1960s, after Coase’s (1960) discussion of social costs had made an impact (see Kitch, 1983: 
202; Coase, 1988d: 33; Barzel and Kochin, 1992: 21). Nonetheless, at the dawn of the 
1970s, Coase (1972: 63) could only observe that it was “much cited but l ittle used.” 
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firm in a market economy by identifying the reasons for the firm’s cost 
advantage over the market. Finally, he explained the determinants of the 
firm’s size and the distribution of activities between the firm and the market 
by identifying the conditions that set the efficient boundary of the firm. The 
overall analysis, according to Coase (1937: 386-387), therefore became 
“tractable” by the most “powerful instrument of economic analysis,” namely, 
marginal substitution.
17
  
Coase’s major innovation was his claim that  recourse to the price 
system, even in the most mundane of its forms, is never costless.
18
 
“Marketing costs,” as Coase (1937: 392) called them, are necessarily 
incurred in all market transactions, and are pervasive at every stage of the 
contractual process since they include: the costs of discovering the relevant 
prices, the costs of negotiating, the costs of concluding separate contracts for 
each exchange transaction (see Coase, 1937: 390-391), as well as the costs of 
inspecting the execution of the contractual terms, as Coase (1960: 15) later 
added.
19
 Although this argument was born in the context of Coase’s 
discussion of the firm, its importance is not limited to the theory of the firm. 
                                                 
17
 With the exception of Rajan and Zingales’s approach discussed in Chapter 3, all 
contractual theories of the firm proceed in this manner.  
18
 A somewhat similar idea was introduced by Hicks (1935) in the field of monetary 
economics to explain the demand for money (see Klaes, 2000a: 193ff).    
19
 Based on Coase’s work, Dahlman (1979: 147-148) provided the classic typology of 
transaction costs as (a) search and information costs, (b) bargaining and decision costs, and 
(c) policing and enforcement costs, corresponding to successive stages of the contractual 
process. 
 23 
Indeed, the discussion of the effects of positive “transaction costs,” as they 
came to be called, is the hallmark of new institutional economics, and has 
fundamentally changed economic theory since the 1960s.
20
 Coase’s role in 
this genuine revolution within economic theory cannot be understated (see 
Kitch, 1983; Medema, 1995; Landes and Lahr-Pastor, 2011). 
As Coase (1959: 27; 1960: 8) famously demonstrated, in the world of 
conventional price theory that assumes zero transaction costs, property rights, 
liability rules, and legal rules more generally are necessarily irrelevant, 
simply because resources tend to gravitate to their most valued uses through 
costless bargaining.
21
 In Coase’s (1960: 15) words, if “market transactions 
are costless … a rearrangement of rights will always take  place if it would 
lead to an increase in the value of production.” Given this state of affairs, the 
distibution of economic activities between firms and markets is irrelevant and 
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 Early uses of the notion of transaction costs include Malmgren (1961: 401), 
Sosnick (1961: 1351), Kessel and Alchian (1962: 522), Demsetz (1964: 12), Lees and Rice 
(1965: 143), Arrow (1965: 155), and Alchian (1965a: 820). By the 1970s, the notion had 
been introduced into general equilibrium models (e.g., Foley, 1970; Hahn, 1971).  
Interestingly, as Klaes (2000b: 569) has pointed out, Coase did not use the expression 
“transaction costs” before 1974 (see Coase, 1974a: 494). 
21
 Stigler (1966: 113) famously called this result the “Coase theorem”, although his 
formulation was different (see Medema, 1999: 213). One of the clearest forumations is 
arguably Calabresi’s (1968: 68, emphasis in original): “if people are rational, bargains are 
costless, and there are no legal impediments to bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis 
occur to the point where bargains can no longer improve the situation.” The importance of 
this argument about costly exchange is that it reveals the “missing chapter” of pre-Coasean 
exchange theory (Hirshleifer, 1973). Detailed discussions of the Coase theorem can be 
found in Farber (1997), and Medema and Zerbe (1999).  
 24 
unimportant.
22
 On the other hand, once it is realized that various market 
“operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to 
prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the 
pricing system worked without cost” (Coase, 1960: 15), it becomes clear that 
property rights, liability rules, and the distibution of activities between firms 
and markets, can affect efficiency and are thus highly relevant to the 
economist’s inquiry.  
On several occasions throughout his long career, Coase explained what 
he saw as the most fundamental flaw of conventional economic theory, that 
he disapprovingly labelled “blackboard economics” (Coase, 1964: 194; 
1988c: 28ff; 1992: 714). Blackboard economics, with its excessive 
commitment to the frictionless or zero transaction cost world of competitive 
price theory, Coase (1960: 43) argued, has prevented economists from 
comparing real institutional alternatives, all of which contain imperfections. 
As Demsetz (1969a: 1-2, 19-20) put it, picking up on Coase’s idea, when 
economists compare the ideal, perfect, costless market to some empirically 
observed institutional arrangement they are committing a “nirvana fallacy,” 
that ultimately leads them to misguided policy prescriptions. On the contrary, 
Demsetz argued, the proper economic analysis of institutions developed in 
Coase’s footsteps needs to adopt the “comparative institutional approach”  
where imperfect institutional arrangements are compared with one another.  In 
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 If markets lead to a perfectly efficient allocation of resources, the existence of 
firms and other institutions is “redundant, or worse, inefficient” (McManus, 1972: 37).  
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general, this methodological strategy is characteristic of the new institutional 
economics (see Williamson, 1979a: 261).
23
 
The second part of Coase’s theory of the nature of the firm is set in this 
new framework of a positive transaction costs world – the only world 
economists should be concerned with, since it is the only world that actually 
exists – where it becomes possible to identify the transaction cost-
economizing role of the firm. After all, if firms, along with other institutions, 
were unable to reduce costs compared to the market, there would be no 
economic justification for their existence. Given Coase’s (1937: 389) claim 
that within the firm the price mechanism is superseded, the theoretical 
challenge he faced was to explain not only how individual behavior is 
coordinated in the absence of the coordinating role usually assumed by the 
price system, but also how this alternative mode of coordination allows the 
reduction of transaction costs. This latter question is fundamental for all the 
theorists of the firm discussed hereafter, even for those who deny Coase’s 
dichotomy thesis.  
For Coase (1937: 388), quoting Robertson’s (1923: 85) colorful phrase, 
a theory of the firm needs to explain why “we find ‘islands of conscious 
power in th[e] ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter 
coagulating in a pail of buttermilk’.” In terms that Coase himse lf did not use, 
why do we observe the “visible hand” of management given the efficiency-
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 Coase argued that blackboard economics is “pointless” (Coase, 1984: 230), even 
when it is carried out with “great ingenuity” (Coase, 1988c: 28), because the world it 
depicts “lives in the minds of economists but not on earth” (Coase, 1992: 714). See Mäki 
(1998) for a detailed discussion of Coase’s criticism of unrealistic economic theory.  
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enhancing power of the “invisible hand” of markets?24 Like most economists 
of his day, who were discussing the nature of the entrepreneurial function 
(e.g., Knight, 1921; Robinson, 1934; Kaldor, 1934), Coase (1937: 393) 
defined the firm as a “system of relationships that comes into existence when 
the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.”25 The novelty of 
Coase’s answer was his suggestion that when production is carried out “by 
forming an organisation and allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to 
direct resources, certain marketing costs are saved” (Coase, 1937: 392). 
Firms, Coase argued, are viable because they reduce the number of 
transactions necessary for the organization of production, thereby reducing 
the associated transaction costs. Coase (1937: 391) explained: 
Contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but 
they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the 
owner thereof) does not have to make a series of 
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 Coase’s question needs to be set against the background of the so-called “socialist 
calculation” debate of the 1920s and 1930s that revolved around the relative efficiency of 
centralized planning as opposed to decentralized markets. Citing Hayek (1933) on these two 
kinds of order, Coase (1937: 387) observed that “in searching for a definition of a firm” the 
question that needs to be addressed is whether “economic planning” can improve on “what 
is already done by the price mechanism.” See Coase (1988b: 8; 1992: 715) on how the 
debates spawned by the Russian Revolution influenced his thinking. Interestingly, Cheung 
(1982a:39) later pointed out that some “sophisticated observers” of China have defended its 
centralized system “in almost exactly the same terms that Coase and his followers use to 
explain the firm.”  
25
 Knight (1921: 268) called “cephalization” this centralization of decision-making 
and control.  
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contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating 
within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, it this 
co-operation were as a direct result of the working of 
the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is 
substituted one.
26
 
In more formal terms, once activities are centralized under the administrative 
authority of an entrepreneur, it is easy to see that, above a certain number of 
factor owners, the number of contracts needed to organize the production 
process is reduced. Indeed, if every one of n independent resource owners 
has to contract with every other owner (n – 1), which would be case in the 
open market, the total number of commercial contracts is n(n – 1)/2. Clearly, 
when an entrepreneur acts as the sole central contracting party, assuming that 
the entrepreneur is one of the n owners, only n – 1 individual contracts 
linking each remaining owner to the entrepreneur are necessary. For any n  
3, this number is strictly less than n(n – 1)/2. The greater the number of 
owners involved the greater the reduction in necessary contracts.
27
 As Coase 
(1988d: 39) later observed, the emergence of the firm leads to “much less 
complicated contractual arrangements.”28 By reducing the associated 
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 As Coase (1960: 16) clarified: “within the firm individual bargains between the 
various cooperating factors of production are eliminated and for a marke t transaction is 
substituted an administrative decision. The rearrangement of production then takes place 
without the need for bargains between the owners of the factors of production.”  
27
 Related formulations can be found in Williamson (1975: 46), Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992: 331), and Spulber (1999: 263-264).  
28
 Arrow’s (1974: 68ff) discussion of information and communication costs in 
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transaction costs, such an arrangement is unambiguously efficiency-
enhancing.  
On Coase’s view, efficiency is also enhanced because the nature of the 
unique contract that ties each resource owner to the entrepreneur is quite 
distinct from the typical commercial or sales contract  to be found in ordinary 
market exchange. Specifically, Coase argued, under the terms of this contract 
the owner of a factor of production reliquishes some autonomy and accepts 
the entrepreneur’s authority, “within certain limits,” on a long-term basis in 
exchange for some defined remuneration (Coase, 1937: 391). Given their 
unspecified duration, he continued, such contracts “only state the limits to 
the powers of the entrepreneur” (Coase, 1937: 391), and are “expressed in 
general terms, the exact details left until a later date” (Coase, 1937: 392).29 
Accordingly, Coase (1937: 403-404) concluded, since these contracts bear a 
strong resemblance to the “legal concept of ‘employer and employee’,” the 
suggested theory of the firm is “realistic in that it corresponds to what is 
meant by the firm in the real world” (Coase, 1937: 386).30  
                                                                                                                                     
organizations likewise underlined the efficiency-enhancing properties of centralization. 
This line of comparative institutional analysis was pursued by Bolton and Dewatripont 
(1994), Laffont and Martimort (1997), and Dessein (2002).  
29
 In modern language, one would say that these contracts are “incomplete.”  
30
 Following Coase, many economists have argued that employment relations, where 
subordinates obey their superiors’ orders, are essential to the definition of the firm. 
Inevitabley, this raises the “Hobbesian question” of the theory of the firm: why would a free 
and sovereign individual, an owner of a valuable resource, accept  the authority of some 
other agent, even if the limits of that authority are stipulated by contract? Coase was 
somewhat vague. A standard economic answer is that, to the extent that one observes 
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Interestingly, Coase (1988c: 37) later saw this insistence on long-term 
employment contracts as the main weakness of his 1937 article. Instead, he 
formulated another way of looking at the economizing role of the firm. The 
emergence of the firm, he observed, leads to “the substitution of interfirm for 
factor-factor transactions and of firm-consumer for factor-consumer 
transactions” (Coase, 1988c: 39). To see why firm-consumer transactions 
reduce costs in comparison to factor-consumer transactions, one needs only 
to think of the number of contracts necessary for an exchange to occur when 
a consumer needs to negotiate with a large number of stand-alone factors 
(i.e., specialized agents producing for others) for each component and their 
assemblage, and to compare this with a situation in which the consumer can 
contract with a representative of a coalition of resource owners, a central 
agent, for the complete commodity.
31
 Overall, for Coase, the emergence of a 
central contracting party simplifies not only internal relations between 
resource owners (Coase, 1937) but also external relations between third 
parties and the group of resource owners as a whole (Coase, 1988c).  
                                                                                                                                     
superior-subordinate relations, (a) the interests of each subordinate must be served at least 
as well as elsewhere, and (b) there must be some “area of acceptance” (Simon, 1951: 294) 
or “zone of indifference” (Barnard, 1938: 167ff) within which subordinates indifferently 
carry out their superiors’ orders. It is also  clear that (c) the superior’s authority will tend to 
be exercised within that zone given the subordinate’s exit rights. For related discussions of 
the employment relation, see March and Simon (1958: 90ff), Williamson, Wachter and 
Harris (1975: 268ff), and Williamson (1975: 71ff; 1985a: 218-219). A more general 
overview of the notion of “Hobbesian hierarchy” in economics and political science is 
provided by Lake (2009). 
31
 This point is discussed in more detail by Eggertsson (1990: 162-163). 
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Coase presented the third and final part of his argument in the form of a 
question: if the firm has these efficiency-enhancing properties, why is not all 
production carried out within one big firm (Coase, 1937: 394)? In other 
words, why are there markets?
32
 The firm’s size will tend to grow, Coase 
reasoned, as long as it is worthwhile to internalize a transaction previously 
organized by two or more entrepreneurs, that is, as long as the benefits of 
vertical integration outweith the costs of the corresponding market 
transactions. Inevitably, however, as additional transactions are brought 
within the scope of the entrepreneur’s authority the costs of internal 
organization will tend to rise as a function of the size of the firm (Coase, 
1937: 395),
33
 and this is what will ultimately determine the efficient 
boundaries of the firm: boundaries will tend to be set at those points at which 
the costs of using the price system are equal to the cost of internal 
organization.
34
 Accordingly, Coase (1937: 404) concluded, “the principle of 
                                                 
32
 Williamson (1985a: 132-133) called this a “chronic puzzle,” while Stiglitz (1991: 
18) dubbed this the “centralization paradox.”  
33
 Coase (1937: 395-396) accepted the then standard neoclassical explanation that the 
size of the firm is limited by the “diministhing returns  to management” (e.g., by the 
tendency of the entrepreneur to make mistakes as the number of transaction to be organized 
increases). Put differently, administrative or bureaucratic costs limit the size of the firm. 
However, contrary to his contemporaries who ignored transaction costs, Coase’s (1937: 
403) account of the boundaries of the firm demonstrated how a theory of the firm could 
address the relative costs and benefits of both firms and markets.  
34
 Coase (1972: 64) argued that the organization of industry is determined not just by 
technological factors but also by considerations of this kind.  
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marginalism works smoothly,” and the analysis is not only realistic but also 
“tractable.”   
Coase’s followers extended and refined the analysis. The most 
important subsequent writer working within Coase’s dichotomy framework is 
unquestionably Williamson, whose early discussions of vertical integration or 
the “make-or-buy” decision (Williamson, 1971: 114; 1973: 316) and the 
employment relationship (Williamson, Wachter and Harris, 1975: 260) were 
explicitly couched in a comparative institutional framework. Williamson’s 
(1975) Markets and Hierarchies included applications of the basic 
framework based on the twin notions of “market failure” and “organizational 
failure” to a new set of questions, including antitrust, market structure, 
organizational innovation, and much more.
35
 Notwithstanding important 
differences with both Coase and Williamson, Arrow’s (1974) Limits of 
Organization, that presents firms as “means of achiving the benefits of 
collective action in situations in which the price system fails” (Arrow, 1974: 
33), was also written in the spirit of the dichotomy thesis.  
Instead of discussing Williamson’s contributions to the dichotomy 
paradigm, as would seem natural at this point, a rarely noticed aspect of 
Coase’s theory needs to be brought to the center stage. As we have seen, the 
most crucial aspect of the efficiency-enhancing structure of the firm is that 
contractual relations between resource owners are not really contractual 
relations between resource owners. Instead of having to contract with each 
other, resource owners “joining” the firm need only to contract with the 
                                                 
35
 See Williamson and Ouchi (1981) on the origins, implications and prospects of the 
research programme. 
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entrepreneur. At no point, however, does Coase specify the identity of the 
agent, among the n resource owners, who is to take on the role of the 
entrepreneur, thus acting as the central contracting party that coordinates 
production. Indeed, Coase does not even say if the entrepreneur is one of the 
n original resource owners.
36
 Coase simply says that, for understandable 
efficiency reasons, one agent needs to be the central contract party, and that 
agent can be called the “entrepreneur.”  
Generally speaking, for the Coasean setup to work, it does not really 
matter whether it is the provider of capital or the provider of labor that acts 
as the entrepreneur. This leads Cheung (1987: 56) to observe that “it is not 
clear whether it is the entrepreneur who employs the workers or the workers 
who employ the entrepreneur.”37 It follows that Coase’s setup is consistent 
with the standard neoclassical logic famously captured by Samuelson (1957: 
894), that in competitive markets “it really doesn’t matter who hires whom: 
so have labor hire ‘capital’.” As is well known, this observation, among 
others things, spawned considerable reactions from neo-Marxist or “radical” 
political economists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to 
economists belonging to what Lindbeck (1971: 2) called the “New Left 
movement,” the Smithian account of the efficient division of labor implicit in 
Samuelson’s statement is historically absurd. Indeed, they argued, capital 
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 If the entrepreneur is not one of the original n resource owners then n(n – 1)/2 is 
strictly greater n individual contracts for every n > 3.  
37
 As Ellerman (2007: 16) commented, “anyone, by becoming the hiring party, the 
nexus of the hiring contracts, can become the firm.”  
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hires labor for reasons that have less to do with efficiency than with the 
capitalists’ thirst for power and control.  
Expressing this “radical challenge” to orthodoxy (see Franklin and 
Tabb, 1974; Cain, 1974, 1975), Marglin (1974) re-examined the move from 
the putting-out system to the factory system during the nineteenth century, 
demonstrating that centralized organization of production has always been 
designed to ensure the entrepreneur’s essential role in the production process , 
thereby guaranteeing him a share of the pie. Moreoever, since the 
centralization of workers in large factories allowed greater control of labor 
by facilitating supervision and punishment, the purpose of the factory system 
was to increase the entrepreneur’s share of the pie (see Marglin, 1974: 95).38 
Although, as Lindbeck (1971: 1, emphasis in original) pointed out, “it is 
rather improper to refer to the economics of the New Left,” since “this 
movement has no well-defined and unified economic policy program,” 
radicals did generally converge on the defense of more “socialist” forms of 
organization of the production process in which labor hires capital.
39
 Like 
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 For the radicals, the process of “depriving the workers of control of product and 
process” (Marglin, 1974: 62) had already begun with the passage from the completely 
decentralized craft production system that prevailed before the industrial revolution to the 
putting-out system, a decentralized organization of domestic workshop production that was 
centrally controlled by a capitalist-merchant who had interposed himself between the 
workers and the market, thereby pocketing the proceeds. The passage from the putting -out 
system to the factory system, centrally controlled by a new breed of capitalist -industrialists, 
was merely the more advanced stage of this historical process.   
39
 The New Left literature includes Edwards et al. (1970), Edwards, Reich and 
Weisskopf (1972), Sherman (1972), Braverman (1974), Bowles and Gintis (1975), Gintis 
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Ward (1967), Vanek (1970) and other proponents of “market socialism,” 
radicals viewed worker cooperatives and other “democractic” decision-
making schemes as viable alternatives to “capitalist” firms.  
An important part of the identity of the contractual theory of the firm 
comes from this debate with the radicals (see Putterman, 1986: 25). 
Prominent new institutionalists, including Furubotn and Pejovich (1972), 
Williamson (1975), and Jensen and Meckling (1979), responded that 
hierarchy and more generally “capitalist” firms, in which capital hires labor 
and not the other way around, are relatively more efficient.
40
 Adopting a 
comparative institutional approach, Pejovich (1976), Williamson (1980), De 
Alessi (1980), Furubotn (1981), and many others, argued that labor-managed 
firms are plagued by the so-called “tragedy of the commons,” to use Hardin’s 
(1968) celebrated expression: where property is owned in common by 
workers, each worker has the incentive to “shirk” or to “free-ride,” since a 
rational individual can reduce effort without a proportional income reduction 
(see Pejovich, 1990: 193ff; Eggertsson, 1990: 165ff; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 294ff). For new institutionalists, externalities of this kind are greatly 
reduced by the institution of private property rights.
41
 
                                                                                                                                     
(1976), Edwards (1979), Reich and Devine (1981), Barr (1981), Bowles (1985), Bowles and 
Gintis (1986), and Ellerman (1992). 
40
 Detailed historical rebuttals of the radicals’ account of the Industrial Revolution 
were also provided by members of the so-called “New Economic History” movement, such 
as Clark (1984) and Landes (1986). 
41
 See Dow and Putterman (1999, 2000) for summaries of the debate on “why capital 
hires labor,” and Dow (2003) for a recent defense of the worker-controlled firm. 
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2.2 Firms as markets 
In “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization,” written  in 
the midst of the debate with the radicals, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 784) 
pointed out that Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm was silent on ownership 
issues, and that this made it difficult to apply it in a straightforward manner 
to the capitalist firm. Accordingly, Alchian and Demsetz’s aim was to update 
and focus the theory.
42
 In the process, leading to what is arguably the second 
most important contribution to the contractual theory of the firm,  Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) explicitly denied nearly all of the essential features of the 
firm highlighted by Coase. Overturning Coase’s main claim, Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972: 795) presented “the firm and the ordinary market as 
competing types of markets,” and argued that market transactions were not 
eliminated within the firm. This objection to the dichotomy thesis has had a 
lasting influence on the theory of the firm.
43
  
                                                 
42
 In this sense Alchian and Demsetz’s article can be seen as an implicit response to 
the radical challenge along the lines of Lindbeck’s (1972: 682) call to “prove to the New 
Left … that traditional economics is a powerful tool for understanding fundamental 
problems” related to ownership and power . Interesingly, both Arrow (1974: 15-16) and 
Williamson (1975: 45) explicitly contextualized their discussions of the efficiency of 
hierarchy as a response to the New Left’s critique of authori ty. 
43
 In addition to its twelth position in Kim, Morse and Zingales’s (2006) study of 
what has mattered in economics since 1970, Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) paper is listed in 
the “Top 20 Articles” published in the American Economic Review over the first century of 
its existence (Arrow et al., 2011). 
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In a heavily-cited passage, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 777) observed 
that “the firm … has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action 
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting 
between any two people.” In fact, they explained, an “employer” has no more 
“authority” over an “employee” than a customer has over a grocer. Given that 
“the employee can terminate the contract as readily as can the employer,” 
they continued, “long-term contracts … are not an essential attribute of the 
firm” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 783). On the contrary, “employers” and 
“employees” are constantly renegotiating the terms of their interaction 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777). In all cases worth considering agents are 
free to take their business elsewhere, and the power to withhold future 
business, whether exercised by an unsatisfied customer or an unsatisfied 
employee, is the only meaningful type of “power” or “punishment.”44  
Nevertheless, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 783-784) argued that their 
view of the firm is “not necessarily inconsistent with Coase’s ,” and proposed 
to “[take] a step down the path pointed out by Coase.”  The main problem 
with Coase, they pointed out, is that his focus on transaction costs led him to 
ignore the fact that other types of costs may account for the emergence of the 
firm. Importantly, economizing on the internal “costs of managing” may 
confer an advantage to the firm at given levels of market transaction costs 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 783), indicating that the comparative 
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 Of course, this argument assumes competitive markets where buyers and sellers 
(be it of labor services or of bread) have numerous trading alternatives. The argument also 
assumes that buyers and sellers are interchangeable, that is, that there is nothing specific 
about particular trading partners that may change the nature of their relations, alter their 
alternatives, and hence affect their incentives.  
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institutional analysis of firms and markets needs to include both external 
market transaction costs and internal management costs.
45
 The upshot is that 
taking these costs into account helps explain why firms come in a variety of 
forms of organization (e.g., corporations, partnerships, profit-sharing firms, 
socialist firms), and how the reduction in transaction costs can lead to the 
expansion of the firm, as evidenced by the move from the putting-out system 
to the factory system (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 784). Coase’s theory 
cannot accomplish any of these tasks.  
For all their dissatisfaction with Coase, the key element of Coase’s 
theory of the nature of the firm was retained and given new meaning by 
Alchian and Demsetz. This is the idea of a central contractual agent.  The 
significant difference between intra-firm relationships (a grocer and his 
employee) and ordinary market contracting (a grocer and his customer), they 
hypothesized, lies in a “team use of inputs and a centralized position of some 
party in the contractual arrangements of all other inputs” (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 778, emphasis in original). The theoretical challenge is to 
explain why, “instead of multilateral contracts among all the joint inputs’ 
owners, a central common party to a set of bilateral contracts facilitates 
efficient organization of the joint inputs in team production” (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 794).  
Generally speaking, as Alchian and Demsetz explained, for owners of 
inputs or factors of production to choose to join forces the joint ouput, or the 
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 Demsetz (1988a: 146-147; 1997: 426; 2008: 107) repeatedly observed that it is 
important to distinguish the costs of using the price system from the costs of using the 
firm’s internal management system.  
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gain from cooperative behavior, needs to be greater than the sum of the 
outputs that would have otherwise been obtained. A “team” is a special case 
of cooperative behavior producing such a superadditive output, but in which 
individual contributions to the joint output cannot be easily detected.
46
 
Indeed, contrary to the team’s observable joint output sold in the market, 
team member effort is private information that may be very costly to detect. 
It follows that each input owner has an “incentive to shirk” (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 780): free-riding, or under-investment in effort, may very 
well arise because agents realize that their effort can be reduced without a 
proportional income loss.
47
 This difficulty to establish a correlation between 
efforts and rewards characteristic of team production situations contrasts with 
markets that more often than not allow, according to Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972: 778), a “high correlation between rewards and productivity.”48 
It is important to notice that the problem described by Alchian and 
Demsetz is a variation on the tragedy of the commons: team members are 
tempted to reduce their individual effort in order to maximize their share of a 
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 In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972: 779) words, “the production function is not 
separable.” 
47
 Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 780) pointed out that “if detecting such behavior were 
costless, neither party would have an incentive to shirk.”  
48
 As Demsetz (1967: 356) had argued, a great part of the success of markets lies in 
the fact that they effectively concentrate costs and benefits on the relevant resource owners, 
meaning that incentives to use resources efficiently are stronger in markets. This view of 
markets was developped in Coase’s (1960) footsteps by Alchian (1965a, 1967), Demsetz 
(1964, 1966), and others. See also Alchian’s (1969a) discussion of resource unemployment 
resulting from information costs. 
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given, common pie. Of course, like in the tragedy of the commons situation, 
if all team members reduce effort, the pie will tend to disappear  altogether, as 
will the rationale for the team’s existence. In such circumstances, a 
“multitude of bilateral exchange of separable individual outputs” (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972: 780) would be preferred to team production. 
Accordingly, viable teams will tend to be formed only when the possibility of 
shirking is somehow reduced. It follows that team production situations 
justify some form of management, “viewed basically as one of organization 
among people” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 779), and that this is the crucial 
source of management costs ignored by Coase. From this point of view, it is 
not so much the “the costs of spontaneously negotiating contracts in the 
markets” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 782) but “the costs of metering or 
ascertaining the marginal products of the team’s members [that calls] forth 
new organizations and procedures” (Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 780).49 
For Alchian and Demsetz, in the presence of positive “measurement 
costs,” as they came to be called (e.g., McManus, 1975: 340; Klein, 1980: 
362; Barzel, 1982: 48), it makes economic sense for “someone to specialize 
as a monitor to check the input performance of team members” (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 781), provided that the monitor is given the “incentive not to 
shirk as a monitor” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 782), and that the joint 
output value thus produced is large enough to cover the costs of managing 
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 Alchian’s (1965b: 34) earlier discussion of the managerial theory of the firm 
associated with Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964) had already emphasized the 
importance of the “costs to the stockholders of detecting and policing the manager’s 
behaviour and effectiveness.”  
 40 
the team.
50
 From this perspective, they argued, the obvious efficiency-
enhancing contractual arrangement between team members is to attribute 
“residual claimant status,” that is, “title to the net earnings of the team, net of 
payment to other inputs,” to the monitor (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 782).51  
The monitor’s disciplining role will be even more effective, they 
continued, if the monitor-residual claimant is granted the right to 
“unilaterally terminate the membership of any other member without 
terminating the team itself or his assocation with the team”  (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 782-783). Clearly, a contractual arrangement of this kind 
implies that the monitor-residual claimant is “the central party common to all 
contracts” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 783). The identity of the central 
contracting agent is further revealed by adding the right to change team 
membership, the right to expand or reduce team size, and the right to sell this 
entire bundle of rights. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 783, emphasis in 
original) put it: “it is this entire bundle of rights … that defines the 
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 The “moral hazard” explanation of economic organization developed by 
Holmström (1979, 1982) builds on Alchian and Demsetz, but can be traced bac k to Knight 
(1921). Knight’s views were considered but set aside by Coase (1937: 394), who believed 
that Knight thought it “impossible to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the 
firm,” precisely what Coase went on to attempt. Discussions o f Knight’s theory of the firm 
can be found in Barzel (1987a), Demsetz (1988b), Langlois and Cosgel (1993), and Foss 
(1993b). A comparison between Coase and Knight is provided in Boudreaux and Holcombe 
(1989), and Demsetz (1995).  
51
 Residual income helps identify the entrepreneur for Knight (1921: 271ff). On 
Barzel’s (1987b) interpretation, residual income is the “entrepreneur’s reward for self -
policing.” See also Demsetz (1988b). 
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ownership (or the employer) of the classical (capitalist, free-enterprise) 
firm.” The firm’s “owner” is the agent in whose hands has been assembled a 
specific bundle of rights, among which the roles of central contracting party 
and residual claimant.  
Arguably, for this coalescence of rights to arise, team members need to 
realize that it is in their interest to relinquish some of their claims on the joint 
output value. In fact, the contractual arrangement is precisely the transfer of 
some of the property rights composing each member’s bundle of rights to the 
central agent known as the “owner.”52 To the extent that one should only 
observe such a transfer of rights when the expected benefits outweigh the 
costs, the additional value resulting from the definition of a new bundle of 
rights must be greater than both the management costs created by the 
shirking problem and the costs of specifying the new property rights 
structure. As Demsetz (1967: 350) had famously explained, new “property 
rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization 
become larger than the costs of internalization.”53 If, generally speaking, the 
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 This line of reasoning is a consequence of Alchian’s (1965a: 818ff) and Demsetz’s 
(1967: 347) earlier work on property as a partitionable bundle of rights that may be 
temporarily or permanently assigned to other persons. Cheung (1968, 1969, 1970) is 
another important contributor to this tradition building on Coase (1960). A consis e 
overview of the property rights paradigm is provided by Alchian and Demsetz (1973).  
53
 Alchian (1969b: 353) similarly explained: “if the value of some right … rises … 
the costs of specification, identification and assignment of rights become more worth 
incurring.” Kleinsorge called this insight “Demsetz’s thesis” (Ashley, Kleinsorge and 
Kunreuther, 1967: 377), and it has since become known as the “Demsetz thesis.” Although 
it is generally attributed to Demsetz (1967), the thesis also appeared in Demsetz (1 964: 19). 
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assignment of the rights and liabilities associated with private property 
systems overcomes the tragedy of the commons situation, then Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) explanation of the rise of the capitalist firm, with its  
specific rights structure designed to discipline team members and to realize 
the benefits of team production, is a case in point.  
The view that Alchian and Demsetz ultimately hold is that the capitalist 
firm is the long-run outcome of market forces. Given Alchian’s (1950) 
important evolutionary argument, the owner’s right to unilaterally alter the 
membership of the team without affecting the other contracts is fundamental 
since it allows the owner to progressively compose efficient teams in a trial -
and-error process (see Alchian, 1950: 219). As Alchian (1984: 35) later 
explained, forming teams is “a process of sampling among potential members 
of a team, the contractual relations, and the environment.” The design of 
institutional arrangements, as Demsetz (1969b: 7) put it, should “encourage 
experimentation without overly insulating these experiments from the 
ultimate test of survival” in the marketplace (see also Demsetz, 1969a: 20). 
Since transferability or saleability of rights is a vital part of the definition of 
markets,
54
 and therefore an additional incentive to manage resources 
efficienctly (see Demsetz, 1966: 62; Alchian, 1967: 375), the right to sell the 
entire bundle of rights is of utmost importance because it creates the 
conditions for a “market for firms.”   
                                                                                                                                     
See Merrill (2002), and especially Lueck and Miceli (2007: 209ff). Interestingly, Demsetz 
(2011a, 2011b) has recently raised doubts about the validity of this explanation.  
54
 In Jensen and Meckling’s (1992: 257) words, the rights assignment problem is 
solved by alienability in markets. 
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The presence of information asymmetries, however, may reduce the 
effectiveness of the disciplining power this market, since potential buyers of 
the bundle of rights associated with the firm’s ownership compete in markets 
that may not adequately price the firm’s value.55 Alchian’s (1967: 374) view, 
that “insiders may know more than outsiders,” is in fact exactly what Alchian 
and Demsetz’s account of input monitoring had explained. To the extent that 
it is costly to measure insider performance, they explained, employees can 
act inefficiently, and this is why the emergence of a monitor specialized in 
detecting deviant behavior enhances efficiency. By definition, then, the 
monitor “acquires special superior information about th[e] productive 
talents” of inputs, and uses this additional knowledge as a “basis for superior 
decisions about efficient or profitable combinations of those heterogeneous 
resources” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 793). Arguably, this is the main 
source of team productivity. Both Demsetz (1988a: 152; 1995: 17) and 
Alchian (1991: 233) later observed that the failure to discuss in more detail 
the source of team productivity was the main weakness of their 1972 paper.  
Instead, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) concluded from the preceding that 
contractual relations within the firm do not differ “in the slightest degree 
from ordinary market contracting between any two people.” There is simply a 
sales contract. The employer “sells” the superior information obtained from 
monitoring employee-inputs “as he aids them in ascertaining good input 
combinations for team activity” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 793), and “the 
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 Nonetheless, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 788) accepted Manne’s (1965, 1967) 
analysis of the disciplining power of the “market for corporate control” that acts as an 
additional constraint on managerial shirking (see also Alchian, 1969b: 344ff).  
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employee ‘orders’ the owner of the team to pay him money in the same sense 
that the employer directs the team member to perform certain acts” (Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972: 783). The firm, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 793) 
inferred, should be properly viewed as a “highly specialized surrogate 
market,” that is, as a “specialized market institution for collecting, collating, 
and selling input information.” Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 794-795) 
concluded with a “highly conjectural but possibly significant interpretation”: 
As a consequence of the flow of information to the 
central party (employer), the firm takes on the 
characteristic of an efficient market in that information 
about the productive characteristics of a large set of 
specific inputs is now more cheaply available … Inputs 
compete with each other within and via a firm rather 
than solely across markets as conventionally conceived. 
Emphasis on interfirm competition obscures intra-firm 
competition among inputs … The firm is a device for 
enhancing competition among sets of inputs resources 
as well as a device for more efficiently rewarding the 
inputs. In contrast to markets and cities which can be 
viewed as publicly or nonowned market places, the firm 
can be considered a privately owned market; if so, we 
could consider the firm and the ordinary market as 
competing types of markets, competition between 
 45 
private property markets and public or communal 
markets.
56
 
In one short article, Alchian and Demsetz defined the essence of the 
contractual theory of the firm. In the process, they provided a theoretical 
framewok that could be used to defend the so-called classical capitalist firm. 
In a nutshell, the centralized contractual structure constitutive of ownership 
is said to be efficient, and its relative efficiency, compared with other types 
of organizational forms, is the result of competitive market forces.
57
 
Externalities are best internalized by markets, and more precisely by the 
specification and assignment of rights. New specifications and assignments 
are literaly extensions of the market. Given that within the firm externalities 
are also internalized by the specification and assignment of rights, firms are a 
special type of market. They are “market-like.” From this perspective, as 
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 Defining firms as surrogate markets, Alchian and Demsetz explicitly challenged 
Coase’s dichotomy thesis but also tacitly suggested a contractual interpretation of 
Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) notions of “internal labor marke ts” developed within the 
“market segmentation” approach promoted by the New Left (see Reich, Gordon and 
Edwards, 1973). Contrary to Doeringer and Piore’s (1971: 1) definition of an internal labor 
market as “an administrative unit within which the pricing and allocation of labor is 
governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures,” Alchian and Demsetz discounted 
administrative rules and emphasized interal competition within firms instead. 
57
 As Holmtröm and Tirole (1989: 67) observed, “the limited extent of partnerships 
and cooperatives in our economy lends some support to the owner -monitor model, since 
free-riding could be a big problem in these organizations.” From this point of view, 
Holmström (1982: 325, 327) suggested that the Alchian and Demsetz model is about how 
efficiency is restored when the shirking-ridden labor-managed firm (but also the 
partnership) changes into a capitalist firm.  
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Alchian (2006 [1978]: 643) later clarified, “a firm is not an alternative to the 
market … Rather it is a result of contractual activity in the market.”58  
Contrary to appearances, the question of the identity of the central 
contractual agent is not fully resolved in Alchian and Demsetz’s story. Like 
Coase, they simply argued that, for understandable efficiency reasons, one 
agent needs to specialize in monitoring and assume the rights of ownership, 
thereby becoming the employer. Presumably, one of the original team 
members assumes these roles, but this does not really matter for their 
account. In the words of Alchian and Allen (1977: 206, emphasis in original), 
“there is no difference … between fishermen renting the boat or the boat 
owner hiring fishermen as employees.”59 This led Holmström and Tirole 
(1989: 69) to point out that “nothing would preclude the monitor from being 
an employee of a separate firm with a service contract that specifies his 
reward as the residual output. Similarly with workers. They could be 
monitored and paid as independent agents rather than employees.” 
Holmström and Tirole refer to this apparent irrelevance of institutional or 
legal setting for contracts as the problem of “organizational anonymity.”  
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 Nevertheless, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) did not conclude that it is impossible to 
set the efficient boundary of the firm, that is, to make their analysis “tractable” in Coase’s 
sense. In a perfectly Coasean spirit, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 794, n.18) observed, albeit 
in a footnote: “presumably, at some size of the firm, specialized knowledge about inputs 
becomes as expensive to transmit across divisions of the firms as it does across markets to 
other firms.” This argument was later developed by Demsetz (1995: 34ff).  
59
 This is also the case in Cheung’s (1983: 8) example of Chinese riverboat -pulling 
teams that hire monitors to wield the whip: the monitor may be any one of the team 
members, who possibly take turns, but may also not belong the original team at all.  
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2.3 Lost in the continuum 
The organizational anonymity problem reveals the difficulties involved in 
identifying firm boundaries that arises in the more general discussion of the 
nature of the firm. Arguably, it should make a difference whether the monitor 
or any other agent are part of one firm or another, but the extent of this 
difference, if meaningful at all, has yet to be established. As we have seen, 
Coase’s (1937) dichotomy thesis provided criteria for setting boundaries 
between firms and markets, but Alchian and Demsetz (1972) challenged this 
view by arguing that firms are kinds of markets. A related critique of Coase 
emerged in other key contributions to the contractual theory of the firm 
during the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, it was increasingly argued on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds that Coase’s dichotomy “may often be too 
simplistic,” as Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978: 326) put it. Barzel (1989: 
52) later summed up this position by declaring that Coase’s analysis relies on 
a “false dichotomy,” that is, it limits the analysis to a binary choice where in 
fact the set of choices is much greater.
60
 
Richardson (1972: 883), an early proponent of this new view, began by 
confessing that he, too, “was once in the habit of telling pupils that firms 
might be envisaged as islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market 
relations.” One can only regret such a habit, he continued, since this “simple 
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 See Barzel (2003) for a more recent overview of the argument. Other significant 
statements of this view can be found in Eggertsson (1990: 49ff), Milgrom and Robert 
(1992: 20, 561ff), Furubotn and Richter (1998: 274ff), Spulber (1999: 346), and Werin 
(2003: 25ff). 
 48 
story, based as it is on a dichotomy between firm and market,” overlooks the 
existence of a “dense network of co-operation and affiliation by which firms 
are inter-related.” Firms, Richardson explained, are hardly “islands,” and 
much of what is usually subsumed under “markets” is actually interfirm 
cooperation on a more or less long-term basis (Richardson, 1972: 884).
61
 It 
follows that the lens of dichotomy is misleading (Richardson, 1972: 895). 
Given that it is clearly a mistake to “imagine that reality exhibits a sharp line 
of distinction” between alternative modes of coordinating economic activity, 
Richardson (1972: 887) concluded, we would be better served if we realized 
that “what confronts us is a continuum.”62  
The “continuum thesis” next appeared in cognate form when Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978) similarly underlined that short-term contracts 
of the kind that market transactions are normally associated with are far from 
the only alternative to employment relations and vertical integration. Indeed, 
as Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978: 302) pointed out, various forms of 
long-term contractual relations are typically among the observed alternatives 
to the expansion of the firm, “although there is clearly a continuum here.”  
From this perspective, they reasoned, if unified ownership obtained through 
vertical integration is to be found at one extreme of the continuum, one can 
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 In a related discussion, Blois (1972: 253ff) observed that many firms try to develop 
special relationships with suppliers in order to reap the advantages of vertical integration 
“without the assuming the risks or rigidity of ownership.”  
62
 Although the dichotomy thesis was clearly the framework of Markets and 
Hierarchies, Williamson (1975: 106-109) briefly addressed the issue of intermediate forms 
of economic organization raised by Richardson (1972) and others. By the end of the decade, 
Williamson (1979a) proposed a revised framework taking these new aspects into account.  
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easily picture long-term contracts as being “closer” to the firm along the 
continuum than short-term contracts.
63
 Shortly after, Cohen (1979: 587) took 
the argument an additional step forward by suggesting that there is in actual 
fact “a range of possible degrees of firm-ness of the contractual arrangement” 
along the continuum.
64 
 
Although in his proposal for research in industrial organization, Coase 
(1972: 73) had similarly emphasized the need to study “contractual 
arrangements between firms,” including in this category long-term contracts, 
leasing, licensing, and franchising, Coase was already aware of the difficulty 
of drawing boundaries between firms and markets in “The Nature of the 
Firm.” Of course, Coase (1937: 392, n.1) had observed, “it is not possible to 
draw a hard and fast line which determines whether there is a firm or not. 
They may be more or less direction.” Coase therefore accepted, somewhat 
inconsistently, that there may be potentially numerous situtations in which 
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 Alchian here withdrew one part of the argument made in Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972), namely that constantly renegotiated short-term contracts characterize both firms and 
markets. In fact, as Alchian (1984: 38) later explained, “long -term contracts are a necessary 
attribute of the coalition called a firm.” See also Alchian (2006 [1983]: 264), Alchian and 
Woodward (1987: 130; 1988: 70), as well as Demsetz’s (1988a: 155 -156; 1995: 21, 32) 
later emphasis on “continuity of association.” Strikingly, this was already Alchian’s 
(1969b: 348) position: “the firm is a surrogate of the marketplace, but differs in that longer -
term general service contracts exist without continuous renegotiations.”  
64
 Eccles (1981: 342) similarly argued that “pure markets and pure hierarchies are at 
opposite ends of a continuum of contracting modes.” Likewise, for Milgrom and Roberts 
(1988: 456), “there is a multidimensional spectrum of institutional arrangements with 
simple, discrete markets markets and tightly managed hierarchies at two of the extremes.”  
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the entrepreneur’s authority to direct the actions of others may not fully 
replace the coordinating role of the price system.
65
 Indeed, Coase (1937: 388) 
acknowledged that “the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded 
varies greatly.” It follows that even for the founder of the dichotomy thesis, 
as Masten (1988: 182) observed, “the distinction between the firm and the 
market appears to be more a matter of degree than kind, the existence of the 
firm depending of the amount of direction accorded the manager in the 
contract.”66  
In his article, “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Cheung (1983: 2) 
claimed that the inconsistency in Coase (1937) vanishes once it is realized 
that his theory of the firm is not exactly a “theory of the firm” but is actually 
a theory of contractual choice. In fact, Cheung (1983: 3) explained, it is 
difficult to see Coase in a different light since “Coase d[id] not define ‘the 
firm’.” Nor did he originally have the clear view of markets, transaction costs 
and property rights that took shape in the 1960s following Coase’s important 
contributions (see Coase, 1960). Lacking the appropriate tools, Coase was 
unable to see the analytical limitations of his own setup.  If the later Coase is 
to be used to save the earlier Coase, Cheung argued, the defective 
terminology of the latter needs to be discarded. According to Cheung’s 
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 This seemed to be clear at least in matters of transfer pricing (see Eccles and 
White, 1988; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Walker and Poppo, 1991).  
66
 Coase (1990: 11) attempted to overcome this difficulty by replacing his earlier 
insistence on authority by new considerations regarding the firm’s internal accounting 
system: “the accounting system … takes the place of the price system of the market.” This 
idea was not picked up or developed elsewhere since. 
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(1983: 10, emphasis in original) re-interpretation, “it is not quite correct to 
say that a ‘firm’ supersedes ‘the market.’ Rather, one type of contract 
supersedes another type.”  
To see why this is the case, it is only necessary to restate how property 
rights, transaction costs, and contracts are related. Cheung’s straightforward 
line of reasoning can be readily derived from the basic principles of the 
economic theory of property rights, namely that “every question of pricing is 
a question of property rights” (Alchian, 1967: 370), and that “it is the value 
of the rights that determines the value of what is exchanged”  (Demsetz, 1967: 
347). On this view, since “the transactions conducted in the market place 
entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual 
contracting parties” (Cheung, 1969: 23; see also Cheung, 1970: 50), it is 
clear that the transaction costs incurred in exchange are the costs of 
establishing and maintaining property rights through “a wide variety of 
contractual arrangements” (Cheung, 1983: 4). Indeed, across the  available 
“spectrum of alternative contractual arrangements” (Cheung, 1974: 63), the 
level of transaction costs will depend on the difficulty of pricing or 
measuring individual behavior.
67
  
Accepting the simple fact that individuals craft contractual 
arrangements as they see fit, what counts analytically, Cheung (1983: 10; 
1987: 56; 1992: 56) continued, is not whether a given contractual 
arrangement is “a firm,” as Coase had wrongly assumed, but rather how the 
contractual arrangement deals with pricing or measurement problems. Since 
every individual is an input owner who enters into various contractual 
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 A restatement of this view can be found in Allen (1991, 1998). 
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relations with others, and transfers of rights are more often than not “a matter 
of degree” (Cheung, 1983: 5), there seems to be no particular reason to 
reserve the label “firm” to one set of relations to the exclusion of others. 
Indeed, Cheung (1983: 17) reasoned, “according to one’s view a ‘firm’ may 
be as small as a contractual relationship between two input owners or, if the 
chain of contracts is allowed to spread, as big as the whole economy.” In 
most cases one might wish to consider, Cheung’s (1983: 17) concluded, there 
are simply too many counter-examples to any proposed definition of “the 
firm,” and no clear or indisputable answers to questions regarding whether a 
given contractual arrangement is “one firm or two firms”  can be 
unequivocally provided. Cheung (1992: 56) summed up this position: 
Whereas contracts can be separately counted or 
identified, except for some unusual cases a firm cannot 
in any economic sense be separately identified. This is 
because most economic activities in a free-enterprise 
society are chained by contracts, and as such it is 
difficult to tell where a firm begins and where it ends. In 
the usual case, therefore, the size of the firm is 
indeterminate because there is no cut-off point … It 
follows that if we cannot in any meaningful economic 
sense identify “firms” as separate entities, we do not 
know what a firm is when we see one in the real world.  
Cheung’s argument that it is impossible to provide identity criteria for the 
firm not only discredited the terminology inherited from Coase’s dichotomy 
thesis but also overturned Holmström and Tirole’s (1989) concern with 
Alchian and Demsetz’s story. For Cheung, the irrelevance of the institutional 
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or legal setting for contracts is a theoretical advantage rather than a source of 
analytical weakness. From this point of view, Cheung (1983: 17) claimed that 
tax considerations, business registration procedures and other legal 
requirements are irrelevant to the economist’s inquiry.  
Quite unusually, Cheung explicitly rejected the view that contractual 
centralization helps identify the firm. Indeed, Cheung never used the 
expression “nexus of contracts” introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
305-311), regardless of the fact that this “new definition” of the firm does not 
convey the sharp distinctions that he found so objectionable.
68
 On the 
contrary, instead of restricting the analysis to joint production situations, 
employment relations or any other specific contractual arrangement, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976: 310) had pointed out that “contractual relations are the 
essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, 
creditors, etc.” It follows, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311) explained, that 
“it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are ‘inside’ 
the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are ‘outside’ of 
it.” Employees, from this point of view, are no more “inside” or “outside” the 
firm than are customers, suppliers, creditors or shareholders.  
Like Cheung, Demsetz (1988a: 155) rejected attempts to introduce 
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 Cheung (1983: 17) pointed out that franchising schemes, subcontracting 
arrangements, and corporate groups, for instance, all have central contractual agents but are 
usually viewed as contractual relations between different “firms.” The franchising case was 
similarly used by Rubin (1978: 232) to deny that there is a “clear -cut division between what 
is and what is not a firm,” and to argue that “the definition of the franchisee as a separate 
firm, rather than as a part of the franchisor, is a legal and not an economic distinction.”  
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various “legal notions of what a firm is and what it is not,” and argued that it 
is time to realize that “our thinking has been hostage to ‘the firm’” (Demsetz, 
1992: 28). Nevertheless, Demsetz (1992: 28, emphasis in original) observed, 
although “there is no specific set of contractual agreements that defines the 
firm,” for the purpose of economic analysis, “we can describe sets of 
contracts as being more or less firm-like once we agree as to what firm-like 
means.” Contrary to Cheung, Demsetz (1988a: 155ff; 1995: 33ff) turned to 
the basic Coasean narrative, and suggested that a “firm-like” contractual 
arrangement must be one that involves a central contractual agent, for in the 
absence of such an agent the opportunity to economize on transactions would 
be foregone.
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 Although both Alchian and Demsetz fully accepted Jensen and 
Meckling’s label for the central contractual agent (Alchian, 1984: 46; 
Alchian and Woodward, 1987: 111; 1988: 70; Demsetz, 1988a: 154ff; 1992: 
27ff; 1995: 33-34),
70
 Cheung’s main argument remained remarkably 
unaffected for Alchian. 
Indeed, observed Alchian, the striking similarity between families, 
churches, holding companies, professional sports leagues, cooperatives, 
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 Demsetz (1995: 33-34) compared a situation in which “X enters into a contract 
with Y, and Y subcontracts parts of the task to Z” with one in which “X contracts bilaterally 
with both Y and Z,” and concluded that “the second arrangement involv[ing] centrality of 
contracting [is] of a sort that we associate with firmlike organization.”  
70
 By the late 1980s, the expression “nexus of contracts,” originally associated with 
the positive agency theory of Jensen, Meckling, Fama and others (see Fama, 1980: 293; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983a: 302; Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 6; Jensen and Ruback, 1983: 
43), was well established in the theory of the firm literature, particularly with its adoption 
by Alchian and Demsetz.   
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groups of franchisees, not-for-profit foundations, and so on, is that they are 
all contractual in essence (Alchian, 1984: 39; 1987: 232; Alchian and 
Woodward, 1987: 134; 1988: 76). Of course, he continued, there is a sense in 
which “the firm is distinguished from the other coalitions by its particular 
objective,” namely the “increased market value  of the group’s activities” 
(Alchian, 1987: 232), but to the extent that this means that a large number of 
social arrangements fall under the category of “firm,” it is “of little value to 
try to define the firm as any particular one of them” (Alchian and Woodward, 
1987: 134). Ultimately, Alchian (1984: 39) argued, “it makes no difference” 
(see also Alchian, 2006 [1983]: 268), and the only useful questions are: “why 
the various types of contractual arrangements are made,” and “what are the 
consequences” (Alchian and Woodward, 1987: 134; see also Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988: 76).
71
 In this context, Alchian (1987: 234) concluded, “the 
‘Firm’ is dead.”  
The news of the firm’s death as a useful analytical category spread 
quickly. In this context, clearly conducive to relaxed definitions, an 
increasing number of empirical accounts of “quasi-firms” (e.g., Eccles, 1981) 
and “quasi-integration” (e.g., Monteverde and Teece, 1982) proliferated in 
the literature.
72
 Observing the variety of forms of economic organization 
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 Alchian and Woodward (1987: 134) lamented the fact that “many economists, 
lawyers, and judges, despite the dictum that ‘substance, not form’ counts, nevertheless 
answer a question regarding how an organization ought to be allowed to operate by 
deciding whether or not the organization ‘is’ a ‘firm’.”  
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 The sentiment that the traditional boundaries of firm were not only difficult to 
determine but also increasingly porous and “fading” (Picot, Ripperger and Wolff, 1996) 
grew with the emergence and widespread adoption of the new information and 
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between the polar cases of the “pure” firm and the “pure” market, many 
economists accepted Cheung’s (1983: 3) observation that “we do not know 
what the firm is – nor is it vital to know.” Alchian’s (2006 [1983]: 266) 
opinion, that “the concept of a ‘firm’ [i]s vacuous and without analytical 
use,” may very well be correct, they reasoned, since the empirical analysis of 
specific types of contractual relations in specific industries (e.g., Masten, 
1984; Walker and Weber, 1984; Palay, 1984; Anderson and Schmittlein, 
1984; Joskow, 1985) could more often than not be carried out without an 
analytically precise definition of the firm.   
                                                                                                                                     
communication technologies in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 3. Reclaiming boundaries 
A firm’s nonhuman assets … simply 
represent the glue that keeps the firm 
together … If such assets do not exist, then it 
is not clear what keeps the firm together … 
One would expect firms without at least some 
significant nonhuman assets to be flimsy and 
unstable entities, constantly subject to the 
possibility of break-up or dissolution. 
 Hart (1995: 57-58) 
Gibbons (2005) pointed out that a key implication of the continuum thesis is 
that one necessarily denies that integration between two firms changes 
anything. In fact, since firms are said to be little more than convenient and 
ultimately artibitrarily-defined labels for contracting relations, as Gibbons 
(2005: 231, emphasis in original) explained, “this approach can be seen as 
denying that integration is anything (besides a label).” Dissatisfaction with 
the continuum thesis and its various implications pushed the theory of the 
 58 
firm in various directions, all of which attempted to provide a more 
satisfactory account of the boundaries of the firm. In an effort to restate the 
theoretical and empirical importance of firm boundaries, several leading 
theorists argued that “integration gives greater control (over something),”  as 
Gibbons (2005: 231) put it. The sheer volume of theoretical and empirical 
work on firm boundaries made it clear that reports of the firm’s death were 
greatly exaggerated. This chapter presents a synthesis of the three most 
important attempts to reclaim the boundaries of the firm.    
The main approach is Williamson’s (1979a, 1985a) transaction cost 
economics, that owes much to Klein, Crawford and Alchian’s (1978) 
hypothesis that vertical integration may be a rational reaction to contractual 
hazards that arise when parties need to make high levels of “relationship-
specific investments.” Significantly, in response to the well-received 
criticisms addressed by continuum theorists, Williamson proposed to take 
comparative institutional analysis a crucial step forward by suggesting that 
asset specificity levels determine the distribution of transactions between 
markets, interfirm cooperation, and firms (3.1). At the same time, Grossman 
and Hart’s (1986) dichotomy setup presented a formal model of the firm as a 
collection of nonhuman assets in order to provide a straightforward view of 
firm boundaries and the associated allocation of power (3.2). This approach, 
however, was criticized for its incapacity to explain the nature and 
boundaries of the new human capital-intensive firm. Addressing this 
problem, Rajan and Zingales (1998) provided the requisite new foundations 
for the theory of the firm, based on a more general view of power (3.3).  
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3.1 The fundamental transformation 
As we have seen, in Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) story the argument that 
there is no form of power, fiat or authority within firms is based on the 
assumption of competitive markets in which each party has numerous trading 
opportunities. Pursuing his favorite comparison, Alchian (1984: 37-38) 
observed: “If an employee doesn’t care at all whether the firm disappears, 
because the alternatives elsewhere are just as good – which is the way a 
customer may regard the presence of a grocery store – then in what useful 
sense is the employee any more regarded as a member of the coalition than a 
customer should be so regarded? None at all. What counts is the loss one 
experiences in the event one must leave the coalition.” For individuals, be 
they employees or customers, to experience some loss upon exiting a 
relation, a team or a coalition, there must clearly be something specific about 
belonging to that relation, team or coalition.  
Arguably, the basic setup of competition between interchangeable 
individuals is profoundly changed when some or all team members choose to 
specialize, that is, to commit or invest resources that are specific to the 
coalition. Indeed, each individual’s opportunity set is altered by these 
“specific investments” that create, according to Klein, Crawford and Alchian 
(1978: 298), “quasi-rents,” defined as any excess value above their next best 
use value (see also Alchian, 2006 [1983]: 644; 1984: 37; Alchian and 
Woodward, 1987: 113). In addition, as Alchian and Woodward (1988: 67) 
put it, interspecific resources produce a “composite quasi-rent,” namely “that 
portion of the quasi-rent which depends on continued association with some 
other specific, currently associated resources.” It follows that for composite 
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quasi-rents to exist, let alone be maximized, individuals need to accept the 
sunk or non-recoverable costs of specialization.
73
 
The main problem that arises in this situation is that those contributing 
to the composite quasi-rent realize that they run the risk of being “held-up” 
by other team members, as Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978: 302) 
explained, building on the terminology introduced by Goldberg (1976a: 439; 
1977: 257). Since team members are constantly “competing, even while 
cooperating, when they act in ways designed to increase their individual 
shares of the group total” (Alchian, 1984: 36), given the presence of 
measurement costs, composite quasi-rents are clearly expropriable through 
“ex post opportunistic behavior.” For instance, some individuals may 
threaten to withhold effort in order to obtain a greater part of the surplus. 
Anticipating such problems, rational agents will tend to make “less specific 
investments [in order] to avoid being ‘locked-in’” (Klein, Crawford and 
Alchain, 1978: 301), that is, being captive of the hold-up power of others.   
Although minimal contractual performance is to some extent ensured by 
market forces (see Klein and Leffler, 1981), the under-investment problem 
undermines efficiency, since the opportunity to maximize the joint surplus is 
foregone. Fortunately, various contractual solutions may help mitigate, albeit 
imperfectly, this problem. In fact, as Alchian (1984: 37) observed, 
“anticipation of expropriability of quasi-rent will motivate pre-investment 
protective contractual arrangements.” From this point of view, individuals 
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 This analysis builds on Becker’s (1975: 26ff) classic distinction between general 
training and firm-specific training. A concise presentation of the argument is provided in 
Milgrom and Roberts’s (1992: 329ff) textbook.  
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are more likely to become team members by investing in relationship-specific 
exchange if the protective contractual arrangements designed to deal with the 
hold-up problem are perceived as “credible commitments,” to use 
Williamson’s (1983a) expression.74 Accordingly, Alchian and Woodward 
(1988: 70) acknowledged that they “can think of neither significant nor 
interesting cases where teamwork does not create dependencies calling for 
contractual restraints.”  
Vertical integration, the strongest of contractual solutions involving 
unified ownership, will be used when other contractual restraints, typically 
embodied in long-term contracts, do not yield the expected results. Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978: 307) summarized this view with a testable 
hypothesis: “the lower the appropriable specialized quasi-rents, the most 
likely that transactors will rely on a contractual relationships other than 
common ownership,” while “integration by common or joint ownership is 
more likely the higher the appropriable specialized quasi-rents.” For Alchian 
(1982a: 238), this is in fact the basic rationale for most if not all of the 
relevant issues a theory of the firm should address: “‘Expropriable specific 
quasi-rent’ … is [no] trivial matter [since] the principal rationale for the 
employer-employee status, for the existence of firms, and perhaps for many 
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 This is the motivation behind Barzel’s (1987b) argument on capital commitments 
by the entrepreneur-residual claimant. On Barzel’s (1987b: 103) view, “in order to persuade 
others to work for him [the entrepreneur] will commit capital  of his own to the venture,” 
and form contracts such that the value of this capital will fall if he reneges on his promise 
of dividing the surplus according to performance. 
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other kinds of economic organization, rests on this specificity of investment 
value.”75   
These considerations are at the heart of Williamson’s (1979a, 1985a, 
1988a, 1991, 1996) “transaction cost economics” analysis of the intermediate 
products market. More precisely, asset specificity plays a key role in 
Williamson’s (1979a: 238ff) discussion of the important cost-bearing 
consequences of the “economics of idiosyncrasy,” that Williamson (1985: 
61ff), in Economic Institutions of Capitalism, appropriately called the 
“fundamental transformation” (see also Williamson, 1986a: 80ff; 1988b: 
77ff; 1989: 144ff; 1993a: 40; 1996: 60ff; 2002a: 176). In a nutshell, 
                                                 
75
 Contrary to Alchian’s (2006 [1983]: 262) claim that “without specificity the enti ty 
we typically call a firm would not have evolved,” Coase (1988c: 42 -43) rejected the view 
that the main explanatory factors of economic organization are asset specificity and 
opportunism. Relatedly, Coase also objected to this explanation of what was alr eady 
becoming the paradigmatic case for studies of contractual hazards and vertical integration, 
namely the 1926 case of the integration of Fisher Body by General Motors introduced in 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978: 308ff). Klein (1988: 200ff; 1996: 445 ff) subsequently 
reformulated his explanation, but Coase (2000: 15) again rejected what he called the 
“prevailing view” on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Interestingly, Klein’s (2000) 
response made it clear that the debate was really about competing views of the nature of the 
firm, while Coase (2006) criticized Klein’s empirical work. Although still somewhat active, 
Coase has not yet reacted to Klein’s (2007) latest response. The General Motors -Fisher 
Body case has been depicted as one of the “colorful fables” that illustrate key points of 
economic theory (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000: 67), and Spulber (2002: 4ff) has 
included it in the family of “myths of market failure,” alongside Cheung’s (1973) “fable of 
the bees” that illustrates externalities, Coase’s (1974b) “fable of the lighthouse” that 
allegorizes public goods, or Leibowitz and Margolis’s (1990) “fable of the keys” 
illuminating technological lock-in.   
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Williamson argued, as specific investments are being made, ex ante large-
number bidding markets tend to be transformed into small-numbers 
bargaining, and eventually into bilateral monopoly situations.
76
 In this 
context, to the extent that the “organizational imperative” (Williamson, 
1985a: 32) is to safeguard transactions from the contractual hazards that arise 
with the possibility of  opportunistic behaviour,
77
 special “governance 
structures” – defined by Williamson (1979a: 239) as “institutional matrices” 
in which transactions are negotiated and executed (see also Williamson, 
1996: 378) – will tend to supplant standard market exchange when 
“transaction-specific values are great” (Williamson, 1979a: 244-245).78  
Arguably, Williamson hypothesized, efficiency is enhanced if 
“transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance 
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 See Williamson (1975: 27) for an earlier discussion of small number situations,  
and Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975: 256ff) for a preliminary discussion of “task 
idiosyncracies.”   
77
 On Williamson’s (1979a: 234) view, “opportunism is a central concept in the study 
of transaction costs,” and indeed “the world of contract in the absence of opportunism is 
uninteresting” (Williamson, 1998a: 704). Williamson (1985a: 51, n.8; 1993c: 101) justified 
his use of the broader term “opportunism” as opposed to the more common term “moral 
hazard” by the fact that opportunism is a less technical  term that includes both ex ante 
adverse selection and ex post moral hazard, and is relevant at the recontracting stage: 
opportunistic behavior is the more general category when considering “incomplete 
contracting in its entirety” (Williamson, 1990d: 189; 1996a: 9; 2005: 388).  
78
 It is clear that parties will increase specificity levels only if the governance costs 
are more than offset by the increased value of additional specificity levels. This is a 
variation on the Demsetz thesis. 
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structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating 
(mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way” (Williamson, 1991: 277; see 
also Williamson, 1998b: 77; 1993a: 40; 2000: 599; 2002b: 441; 2005a: 378; 
2005b: 5). With this “discriminating alignment hypothesis,” that involves 
“dimensionalizing” and matching transactions and  governance structures, 
Williamson took comparative institutional analysis a crucial step forward in 
line with Simon’s (1978: 6) observation that, “as economics expands beyond 
its central core of price theory … its central concern [becomes] a much more 
qualitative institutional analysis, in which discrete structural  alternatives are 
compared.” In the process, Williamson also responded to the concern that the 
firm-market dichotomy may be a false dichotomy. Consequently, his own 
earlier dichotomy analysis was revised to include, “between” markets and 
hierarchies, a large variety of contractual arrangements and “intermediate 
modes of organization” (Williamson, 1979a: 234), later dubbed “hybrid 
forms” (Williamson, 1988a: 88; 1991: 269).79  
Williamson introduced an innovative argument to support his claim that 
“each viable form of governance – market, hybrid, and hierarchy – is defined 
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 Contrary to some continuum theorists who rejected the usefulness of the concept of 
“firm” as an analytical category, Williamson argued that the distinction between firms and 
markets remains central. Indeed, the very notion of “hybrids” implies the analytical 
usefulness of the polar forms (see Williamson, 1975: 109). Contrary to his earlier 
contention that “transactions of the middle kind” are very difficult to organize and hence 
tend to be unstable, Williamson gradually became persuaded that such transactions are quite 
common (see Williamson, 1985a: 83). See Ménard (2009) on the evolution of Williamson’s 
theory of hybrid forms, and Hodgson (2002) for a critical discussion of the notion of “firm -
market hybrid.”  
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by a syndrome of attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another” 
(Williamson, 1991: 271). He pointed out that some of the confusion in the 
literature is imputable to the fact that the notion of contract is employed too 
loosely by economists, and that a “deeper understanding of the nature of 
contract” (Williamson, 1979a: 235) was necessary. Turning to the legal 
literature, Williamson adopted Macneil’s (1978) three-way typology of 
contract law, in which each type of contract law is characterized by distinct 
properties of stability, flexibility, and remedy possibilities,
80
 and suggested 
that this typology can be used to construct a framework in which firms are 
neither simply kinds of markets, like in Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) 
account, nor indeterminate and unimportant, as continuum theorists such as 
Cheung (1983) had argued. As Williamson (1991: 270) put it:  
Firms are not merely extensions of markets but employ 
different means [and] discrete contract law differences 
provide crucial support for and serve to define each 
generic form of governance. 
Williamson began his demonstration by observing that three dimensions of 
transactions tend to increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1979a: 239; 
1981a: 676; 1981b: 555; 1985a: 52ff; 1985b: 181; 1986b: 179ff; 1988a: 70). 
Alongside the self-explanatory first dimension, transaction frequency, an 
important second dimension is uncertainty, of both the external “state -
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 Macneil (1978) distinguished three forms of contract law, namely “classical,” 
“neoclassical,” and “relational” contract law. In an earlier article Macneil (1974) had 
distinguished between “transactional” and “relational” contracts. The terms “classical” and 
“neoclassical” do not refer classical and neoclassical economics .  
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contingent” and internal “behavioral” or “strategic” kinds (see Williamson, 
1985a: 56-60). Regardless of the source of uncertainty, given that many key 
contracts tend to be incomplete because the contracting parties are unable to 
conclude “comprehensive” or “complete state-contingent contracts,” a key 
problem that designers of governance structures need to deal with is 
adaptation to typically unforeseeable changes.
81
 The most critical dimension, 
however, is the third. As Williamson (1988a: 70) clarified, following Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian (1978), “most of the refutable implications of 
transaction cost economics” hinge on the degree of asset specificity (see also 
Riordan and Williamson, 1985: 366).
82
  
Having thus dimensionalized transactions, Williamson (1979a: 248) 
went on to argue that the “main governance structure for non-specific 
transactions of both occasional and recurrent transacting” is “market 
governance” (see also Williamson, 1985a: 73). Spot markets are the loci of 
“truly discrete exchange” in that each transaction, as Macneil (1978: 856) 
had explained, is “entirely separate not only from all other present relations 
but from all past and future relations as well.” Crucially, the identity of 
parties is irrelevant, contingencies are fully specified, contracts are 
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 Williamson (1991: 277-278) credited Barnard (1938: 6) and Hayek (1945: 523) for 
underlining “adaptation as the central economic problem.”  
82
 Williamson (1991: 281) identified six forms of asset specificity raising the costs of 
investment redeployment: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, brand name capital, dedicated assets, and temporal specificity. In earlier work 
Williamson (1983: 526; 1985a: 55) had identified four different types of asset specificity: 
site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, and dedicated assets. 
According to Williamson’s (1996: 377) glossary, these are the most common.  
 67 
interpreted and executed in a strictly legalistic way, litigation is used to solve 
disputes, and market alternatives offer protection against opportunism. 
Discrete transactions of this kind, governed by what Macneil (1978: 856ff) 
called “classical contract law” (Williamson, 1979a: 236; 1985a: 69; 1991: 
271), are the paradigmatic focus of the standard economic model (see 
Goldberg, 1976b: 49, Macneil, 1978: 862ff; 1981: 1020). However, as 
Williamson (1979a: 235) pointed out, “many contractual relations are not of 
this well-defined kind.” It follows that in many cases the “fiction of 
discreteness” (Williamson, 1979a: 238) needs to be replaced by more 
realistic analytical categories 
In accordance with Macneil’s (1978: 865) own view that “the discrete 
transaction is at one end of a spectrum [while] at the other end … we … 
come to the firm itself,” Williamson argued that departures from market 
governance will be observed for recurring transactions underpinned by 
increasing levels of specific investments (Williamson, 1979a: 250; 1983a: 
537; 1985a: 75; 1985b: 185; 1986a: 85ff; 1991: 272ff; 1996: 16). As 
specificity and mutual dependence levels build up, he explained, market 
alternatives provide only limited protection from opportunism because 
identity plainly matters, as does the continuity of the relation. But for 
“bilateral structures” typical of long-term interfirm cooperation and similar 
hybrid forms to replace market governance (Williamson, 1979a: 250; 1991: 
271), “special adaptive mechanisms” are needed “to … restore efficiency 
when beset by unanticipated disturbances” (Williamson, 1991: 272) that may 
lead to a dispute. Commitment to third-party assistance, or arbitration, is one 
such special adaptive mechanism that safeguards specific investments 
(Williamson, 1983: 527-528; 1991: 272; 1996: 131-132).  
 68 
Contractual safeguards of this kind are typical of Macneil’s (1978: 
865ff) description of “neoclassical contract law.”83 A key aspect of the 
neoclassical contracting regime, according to Williamson (1991: 272), is that 
Llewellyn’s (1931: 737) notion of “contract as framework” applies. Contrary 
to the strictly legalistic classical contract law, in other words, neoclassical 
contracts are much more elastic in the sense that they are compatible with 
flexible interpretations of contractual clauses. Since the spirit of the contract 
counts as much as the letter of the contract, neoclassical contracts allow a 
significantly greater degree of adaptation. Despite such adaptability, 
however, neoclassical contracts are not indefinitely elastic. As unforeseen 
disturbances become highly consequential, the costs of maintaining the long-
term contractual relation via arbitration rise due to the fact that the bilateral 
governance of interfirm agreements still involves interactions across a market 
interface, and that “the autonomous ownership status of the parties 
continuously poses an incentive to defect” (Williamson, 1991: 273).  
This situation calls for an even more elastic and adaptive arrangement, 
one that would eliminate the incentive to defect altogether. For Williamson 
(1979a: 252ff; 1985a: 78ff), “unified governance,” namely unified ownership 
and internal organization through vertical integration, qualifies as the 
requisite elastic and adaptive mode of organization. A crucial advantage of 
the firm as a “unified governance structure” (Williamson, 1985a: 73), he 
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 Williamson’s use of Macneil’s typology changed over time, as did his typology of 
governance structures. For the present purposes, some aspects of Williamson’s (1979a) 
initial discussion, for instance the concepts of “trilateral governance” and “relational 
contracting,” are disregarded because both these notions have disappeared from 
Williamson’s account.  
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observed, is that “adaptations can be made in a sequential way without the 
need to consult, complete, or revise interfirm agreements” (Williamson, 
1979a: 253). Indeed, Williamson (1991: 274) argued, “internal organization, 
hierarchy, qualifies as [the most] elastic and adaptive mode of organization,” 
because “the implicit contract law of internal organization is that of 
forbearance,” meaning that courts typically refuse to hear technical disputes 
between internal divisions of the firm, and that internal procurement 
contracts are not legally enforceable.
84
 Instead of litigation (classical contract 
law of market governance) and arbitration (neoclassical contract law of 
hybrid governance), then, “hierarchy is its own court of ultimate appeal” 
(Williamson, 1991: 274), and disputes are solved by internal “administrative 
controls” (Williamson, 1991: 280).  
In this manner, the organizational anonymity problem appears to have 
been resolved because “whether a transaction is organized as make or buy … 
matters greatly in dispute-resolution respects” (Williamson, 1991: 275). 
Indeed, the institutional setting for contracting matters, and there is a clear 
sense in which intra-firm fiat is underpinned by the institutional setting. This, 
according to Williamson (1991: 276), is precisely what Alchian and Demsetz 
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 Forbearance doctrine, as Williamson (1991: 274-275) explained, is akin to but 
more general than the “business judgment rule” according to which corporate directors act 
on an informed basis in the firm’s best interest. Supporting Williamson’s view is  Manne’s 
(1967: 271) argument that the rule creates a “quasi-jurisdictional barrier to prevent courts 
from exercising regulatory powers over the activities of corporate managers,” and Gilson’s 
(1986: 741) opinion that “the courts’ abdication of regulatory authority through the business 
judgment rule may well be the most significant common law contribution to corporate 
governance.” 
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(1972) ignored when they argued that there is no meaningful difference 
between the relation between a grocer and his employee, and the relation 
between a grocer and his customer. For Williamson, prior neglect of different 
types of contract law doctrines, but also prior lack of consistent 
dimensionalization of transactions, explain Alchian and Demsetz’s error. 
Interestingly, Williamson (1991) put forward this new account of the sources 
of intra-firm authority in lieu of his earlier view of intra-firm authority based 
on the employment relation (e.g., Williamson, 1975; Williamson, Wachter 
and Harris, 1975), perhaps because he came to agree with Coase (1988c) that 
identifying employment relations and the firm is unnecessarily restrictive.  
Contrary to the view that firms are extensions of markets, which seems 
to imply that the incentive structure within firms should be the same as that 
to be found in markets, Williamson (1991: 275) further identified the 
difference between firms and markets as a difference in incentive intensity: 
“as compared with markets, internal incentives … are flat or low-powered, 
which is to say that changes in effort expended have little or no immediate 
effect on compensation.” But instead of viewing this as the problem to be 
resolved, as in Alchian and Demsetz’s setup, from Williamson’s (1985a: 
140ff; 1991: 275) point of view low-powered incentives are an advantage of 
the firm over the market because they help elicit greater intra-firm 
cooperation. That employees lack the high-powered incentives typically 
associated with residual claimant status (see Williamson, 1985a: 132) is 
beneficial precisely because the incentives to defect are muted.  
The generalization of the preceding analysis to all sorts of 
constituencies, including creditors or customers (Williamson, 1984: 1206ff; 
1988b: 574-575; 2008: 250), where “the very same contractual apparatus is 
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… uniformly applied to each constituency” (Williamson, 1985a: 318), 
implies the presence of a central contractual agent. Arguably, Williamson 
(1985a: 318) observed, it is “the centrality of management” that 
“distinguishes it from all other constituencies.” As Williamson (1985b: 199) 
further explained: “whereas each constituent part of the enterprise strikes a 
bilateral deal with the firm … management has knowledge of and is 
implicated in all of the contracts” (see also Williamson, 1984: 1225). 
Significantly, Williamson accepted an important aspect of Alchian and 
Demsetz’s theory, namely that management’s superior knowledge is the basis 
of superior decisions about efficient or profitable resource combinations.  
Clearly, Williamson also accepted the basic idea of the “nexus of 
contracts” developed by Coase’s followers although he expressed some 
reservations about the expression itself, suggesting at one point its 
replacement by the less legalistic expression, “nexus of treaties” 
(Williamson, 1990a: 3ff).
85
 This suggestion did not attract much enthusiasm, 
and even Williamson barely mentioned it in subsequent work. Nevertheless, 
from Williamson’s account it is clear that the notion of nexus of contracts 
does not automatically imply Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) rejection of firm 
boundaries. Contractual relations are within firm boundaries to the extent that 
they depend on the ability of central management to resolve disputes 
internally without appealing, and without being able to appeal, to an external 
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 It is possible that Williamson had in mind something similar to Macneil’s (1978: 
901) view of the firm as a “minisociety.” See  Adelstein (2010) for this interpretation. In a 
recent interview, Williamson (2007: 382) emphasized the expression’s relation to 
Llewellyn’s notion of contract as framework.  
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dispute-resolution mechanism.
86
 Arguably, incentive intensity, low within 
firms and high outside, is a matter of degree, while forbearance uniquely 
defines the nature of the firm in a way that even administrative controls 
cannot for their presence, too, is a matter of degree. This means that 
employees, including managers, are inside the firm, contrary to suppliers and 
customers. Furthermore, creditors are also on the outside while equity 
providers are within the firm (Williamson, 1984: 1228; 1988b: 580).
87
 
3.2 The meaning of ownership 
Williamson has often distinguished his theory from alternative approaches to 
economic organization.
88
 In particular, Williamson (1985a: 24; 1985b: 188; 
1989: 149; 2000: 610) has repeatedly contrasted the “measurement branch” 
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 A formal model of this idea can be found in Wang and Zhu (2004).  
87
 Williamson (1988b: 576) likened debt to outside procurement and equity to 
vertical integration. As Williamson (2008: 248) recently explained, debt and equity are not 
simply alternative financial instruments but also alternative modes of governance.  
88
 Williamson (1990b: 62) clearly separated the incomplete contracting world of 
transaction costs economics from the complete contracting tradition (e.g., agency theory). 
Within the new institutional economics, Williamson (2000: 596-600; see also Williamson, 
1993a) distinguished transaction cost economics’s focus on governance, that is, on the 
“play of the game,” from other theories that focus either on the higher analytical level of 
the institutional environment, that is, on the “rules of the game” (e.g., positive political 
economy), or on the analytically lower level of incentive alignment (e.g., agency theory).  
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of transaction cost economics developed along the lines of Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972), and the “governance branch” to which he is the foremost 
contributor. Alchian and Woodward (1988: 69-70) reformulated this 
distinction by metaphorically observing that “early explorers of transaction 
costs” can be divided into the “measurement expedition” and the “asset 
specificity expedition.” As we have seen, the latter expedition set out to 
reclaim firm boundaries by focusing on how contractual relations are 
fundamentally transformed once parties make, or need to make, relation-
specific investments. The main prediction is that transactions tend to shift out 
of markets into hierarchies through vertical integration in order to mitigate 
hold-up risk when expropriable quasi-rents are high (Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979a, 1985a).  
A pioneering formal model of this setup was introduced by Grossman 
and Hart (1986), and further developed in Hart and Moore’s (1990) “Property 
Rights and the Nature of the Firm.”89 Although Hart (1995: 87) later claimed 
that “the hold-up problem is a useful [but] not an essential part of the 
approach,” the so-called “new property rights theory” of the firm is an 
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 The approach was initially welcomed by Williamson (1985a: 136, n.4; 1990b: 68, 
n.15), who depicted it as belonging to the “formal” stage of the “evolving science o f 
organization,” that the preceding “semiformal” stage of his own transaction cost theory had 
made possible (Williamson, 1993a: 41-42, 55; 2010a: 686). However, although Williamson 
(2010a: 686) recently restated this position, he has emphasized the numerous substantive 
differences between the two setups (Williamson, 2000: 605ff; 2002a: 188). Most 
commentators today underline these differences (see Holmström and Roberts, 1998: 75; 
Foss, 2000: xlii; Whinston, 2003: 4; Garrouste, 2004: 371; Gibbons, 2005: 201) . 
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attempt to clarify the mechanisms involved in a simple dichotomy setup.
90
 
Grossman and Hart (1986: 692) argued that Williamson’s view of the 
benefits of integration, namely that opportunism is curbed within the low-
powered incentive structure of the firm, is unconvincing because it does “not 
explain how the scope for such behavior changes when one of the self -
interested owners becomes an equally self-interested employee of the other 
owner” (see also Evans and Grossman, 1983: 121; Grossman and Hart, 1987: 
505; Hart, 1988: 121; 1989: 1763; Moore, 1992: 495; Hart, 1995: 27-28).  
In addition, Hart (1988: 121) explained, like Coase, Williamson 
vaguely reduced the costs of integration to increased bureaucracy, and failed 
to recognize that the costs and benefits of integration are “two sides of the 
same coin” (Hart and Moore, 1990: 1120). This lacuna complicates the task 
of countering the claims made by continuum theorists who deny that 
integration produces real effects and “sidestep the issue entirely,” as Moore 
(1992: 494, n.2) put it, “by arguing that everything is contractual, and that 
firms are a mirage.” For Hart (1989: 1764-1875), this position is plainly 
mistaken “given that mergers and breakups occur all the time, and at 
considerable transaction cost.” Since it seems unlikely that such changes are 
“cosmetic,” he continued, the theoretical challenge is to explain how 
integration produces “real effects on incentives and opportunistic behavior” 
(see also Hart, 1990: 696).  
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 Regardless of the ongoing debate between Coase and Klein about the events that 
led to the integration of Fisher Body by General Motors, Hart has often used the example to 
illustrate the property rights theory of the firm (see Hart, 1988: 125; 1989: 1767-1773; 
1995a: 7, 23-33; 1996a: 372-375). 
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On Grossman and Hart’s (1986: 693) view, the problem with existing 
theories is that they lack “a sufficiently clear definition of integration .” This 
is what makes it hard to decide “whether [these theories] are designed to 
explain the types of people called employees or instead the types of assets 
under the control of a single ownership unit” (Grossman and Hart, 1986: 
693). Existing theories, in other words, are insufficiently clear on what 
exactly is acquired through integration. Addressing this problem, Hart (1995: 
29) observed:  
Imagine that firm A acquires firm B … What exactly 
does firm A get for its money? At least in a legal sense, 
the answer seems straightforward: firm A acquires, i.e. 
becomes the owner of, firm B’s assets … Excluded are 
the human assets of those people working for firm B; 
given the absence of slavery, the human capital of these 
workers belongs to them both before and after the 
acquisition. 
The distinction between alienable nonhuman assets and inalienable human 
assets, defined as the “skills of … workers and managers” (Hart, 1996a: 373), 
is central in the property rights theory of the firm. Arguably, only nonhuman 
assets, including “hard” assets such as machines and buildings, as well as 
“soft” assets such as contracts and patents, literally change hands in a 
merger. It follows, Hart (1995: 56) conjectured, that “(at least some) 
nonhuman assets are an essential feature of a theory of the firm.”91 In fact, if 
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 Nonhuman assets include machines, inventories, buildings or locations, cash, client 
lists, patents, copyrights, contractual rights and obligations, and so on (see Hart, 1989: 
 
 76 
the firm is to be meaningfully viewed as a single ownership unit, a case can 
be made for the fact that the firm itself is identical with these assets. From 
this point of view, Hart (1989: 1771, n.48) unequivocally stated that “in the 
language of the property rights approach, ‘firm’ is shorthand for a collection 
of assets” (see also Grossman and Hart, 1986: 692-293; Hart, 1990: 696; Hart 
and Moore, 1990: 1119-1120; Moore, 1992: 494).
92
  
This definition allows one to make sense of the fact that firms, like 
other assets, are bought and sold in markets – a fact that seems at odds with 
the view that firms are teams or coalitions of human beings. Furthermore, 
this definition makes Cheung’s perspective easy to refute, since “ firms 
appear easy to identify” (Moore, 1992: 494, emphasis in original). Indeed, it 
is easy to ascertain firm boundaries: nonhuman assets that belong to the firm 
are “inside” firm boundaries while nonhuman assets that do not are 
“outside.”93 While these advantages are somewhat tautological, proponents of 
the collection of assets view argued that their setup contains important 
insights for the contractual theory of the firm. In Hart’s words, the property 
rights setup “opens the door to a theory of ownership” (Hart, 1988: 123) that 
                                                                                                                                     
1766: 1995a: 29).   
92
 This definition is closely related to the corporate finance literature. Myers (1977: 
171), for instance, argued that “at any point in time the firm is a collection of tangible and 
intangible assets.” 
93
 According to Hart (1995: 62), this view holds equally for small firms  and for large 
corporations. Commenting on this approach, Langlois (1998: 16, n.18) pointed out that few 
in the literature have been able to define the boundaries of the firm as “criply and 
consistently.” See also Masten (1998: 58) and Foss (2000: xlii).   
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can “throw light on the meaning of authority” (Hart, 1996a: 371) such that 
“the Alchian-Demsetz observation that an employer has no more power over 
an employee than one independent contractor has over another … is no 
longer true” (Hart, 1996a: 377).  
Hart argued that both Coase’s (1937) theory of authority and Alchian 
and Demsetz’s (1972) objection, that employees cannot be forced to do what 
an employer wants, are flawed for the same reason. Since the distinction 
between nonhuman assets and human assets is missing, the debate is 
misleadingly focused on authority over human assets, instead of 
acknowledging that, just like ownership applies to nonhuman assets only, so 
too is “authority … best interpreted as applying to non-human rather than 
human assets” (Hart, 1996a: 383). In fact, as Hart and Moore (1990: 1150) 
observed, “in the absence of any nonhuman assets, it is unclear what 
authority or control means.” By contrast, when nonhuman assets are present, 
it is not difficult to understand that “an employer indirectly gains ‘authority’ 
over an employee as a result of owning an important asset” (Moore, 1992: 
498), and that, generally speaking, “authority over assets translates into 
authority over people” (Hart and Moore, 1990: 1150).  
To see why this is the case, Hart (1996a: 375) explained, it is important 
to recognize that the notion of authority is meaningful only insofar as 
contracts contain gaps that need to be filled in “as the future unfolds” (Hart, 
1995: 24).
94
 Indeed, there is no need to have a “mechanism by which the gaps 
are filled in as time passes” (Hart, 1988: 123) if contracting costs are zero, 
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 Tirole (1988a: 464) made a similar point. 
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and parties are able to write complete state-contingent contracts.
95
 In the real 
world, however, when parties have to deal with unforeseen contingencies in 
which nonhuman asset uses have not been specified, perhaps because they 
are non-contractible, authority is effectively exercised by the party that holds 
the “residual rights of control” over asset uses (Hart, 1996a 376). Since 
“possession of residual control rights is taken virtually to be the definition of 
ownership,” Hart (1995: 30) continued, authority resides with asset owners 
who hold all the economically significant ex post decision rights that have 
not been specified in the initial contract, and that do not violate some law or 
custom (see also Hart, 1989: 1765; 1900: 696; 1996b: 28-29; 1998: 331).
96
  
Hart and Moore (1990: 1150) argued that a key residual control right is 
the “ability to exclude people from the use of assets.” Alchian and Demsetz 
had acknowledged that the owner can unilaterally change team membership, 
but had failed to grasp that exclusion rights give employers leverage or 
indirect authority over employees. For Hart (1996a: 377), “an employee is 
more likely to do what the employer wants than a grocer is to do what the 
customer wants, because the employer can deprive the employee of the assets 
the employee needs to be productive, whereas the customer cannot deprive 
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 This observation is the starting point for a large variety of incomplete contracting 
models that extend well beyond the theory of the firm to issues ranging from capital 
structure and industrial organization to privatization and international trade. 
Complementary overviews are provided by Nicita and Pagano (2005), and Aghion and 
Holden (2011). 
96
 Hart (1996a: 383) claimed that the Weberian distinction between “formal” (de jure) 
and “real” (de facto) authority discussed in Aghion and Tirole (1997) does not change the 
thrust of the argument.  
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the grocer of the assets the grocer needs to be productive” (see also Hart, 
1989: 1771; 1995a: 58; Moore, 1992: 496). At the same time, as Hart (1996a: 
377) pointed out, “whereas a grocer can fairly easily find another customer to 
serve, an employee typically cannot.” Since an employee’s outside options 
are typically slim given the lack of asset ownership, he reasoned, “the 
employee is more likely to pay attention to the employer than a grocer is to 
the customer because the employee’s livelihood is at stake.”97  
This argument holds even in the absence specific investments, as does 
the fact that the allocation of residual control rights helps define the firm as a 
single ownership unit: employers hold control rights over non-specified 
actions of their employees because employers own the assets involved, 
whereas contrators do not hold control rights over non-specified actions of 
contractees or their employees because contractors do not own their 
contractees’ assets. On the other hand, Alchian and Demsetz’s definition of 
ownership as rights to residual income is comparatively less successful. 
Employees who receive residual income rights through various incentive 
schemes are not “owners” with “authority,” according to Hart (1988: 125; 
1996a: 30), and profit-sharing schemes between independent firms are quite 
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 Alluding to the debate with the radicals, Hart (1995: 5, n.5) recognized that the 
new property rights approach shares with Marxian theories of the capitalist -worker 
relationship “the idea that an employer has power over a worker because the employer owns 
the physical capital the worker uses (and therefore can appropriate the worker’s surplus).” 
On this view, Hart (1996a: 379) conceded, “an employer’s authority is represented not by 
the ability to force an employee to do what s/he wants, but rather by the ability to obtain a 
substantial share of the ex post surplus from the relationship through the control of non -
human assets.” 
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possible. Clearly, the divisibility of residual income rights contrasts with the 
indivisibility of residual control rights: it is “difficult if not impossible to 
allocate 80 per cent of the residual control rights to party A and 20 per cent 
to party B” (Hart, 1995: 64, n.13).98 
These considerations are important when parties in a buyer-supplier 
relationship are required to make complementary specific investments (e.g., 
buy specialized equipment, or learn to use each other’s assets) in order to 
maximize the joint surplus over time. Both parties realize that once there is 
“something binding the partners together” (Hart, 1995: 26), the division of 
the joint surplus in the event of unforeseen contingencies will depend on each 
party’s bargaining power rather on the initial contract, “best seen as 
providing a suitable backdrop or starting point for renegotiation” (Hart, 
1996a: 373).
99
 Since bargaining power depends on “the position of each party 
if the other party does not perform (e.g. if the other party behaves 
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 Nevertheless, for Hart (1995: 64-66; 1996b: 30-32; 1998: 334), complementarities 
between control rights and income rights make it sensible to bundle these rights. The result 
is therefore similar to Alchian and Demsetz’s solution to the monitor shirking problem.  
99
 Departing form their original renegotiation model (Hart and Moore, 1988; see also 
Hart and Tirole, 1988) in recent work, Hart and Moore (2007, 2008) and Hart (2008a, 
2009a) focus on how the pre-fundamental transformation contract becomes a “reference 
point” for subsequent haggling based on new behavioral considerations: parties withhold 
cooperative effort when “aggrievement costs” (Hart and Moore, 2007: 184; 2008: 4ff; Hart, 
2008: 406ff) are positive, that is, when parties feel that the spirit of contract has not been 
respected. Like in Klein’s (1996, 1998) account, this form of hold-up behavior does not 
occur within a certain “self-enforcing range” of states of the world. See Fehr, Hart and 
Zehnder (2009) for experimental evidence.  
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opportunistically),” Hart (1995: 3-4) explained, it may be optimal for the 
party most exposed to hold-up risk to “purchase all the rights except those 
specifically mentioned in the contract” (Grossman and Hart, 1986: 692).100 In 
fact, Hart (1998: 331) hypothesized, asset ownership “will tend to gravitate 
to the person for whom residual control rights are particularly important.”101  
Vertical integration, appropriately defined as “the purchase of the assets 
of the supplier (or a purchaser) for the purpose of acquiring the residual 
rights of control” (Grossman and Hart, 1986: 716; 1987: 535), will clearly 
have real effects by changing the “parties’ outside options and their 
incentives to engage in hold-up” (Hart, 2009: 280).102 By acquiring firm B, 
the incentives of firm A’s owner to engage in relationship-specific 
investments improve since integration increases firm A owner’s barganing 
power and share of ex post surplus by eliminating the hold-up risk that exists 
as long as firm B remains independent (see Hart, 1995: 32).
 
Symmetrically, 
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 For Hart (1996a: 373), “the more assets a party owns or controls, the stronger … 
its position if the relationship breaks down and … the stronger … its bargaining position in 
any ex post renegotiation.” In Grossman and Hart’s (1986: 704) terminology, ownership 
increases bargaining power by raising the owner’s “status  quo utility” in the event of no 
renegotiation. Holmström and Tirole (1989: 69) pointed out that on this view “ownership 
defines the default options in an incomplete contract.”  
101
 From this perspective, Hart’s (1995a: 44ff) discussion of optimal asset owner ship 
structures is based on the idea that assets will tend to be acquired by those to whom they are 
indispensable, or when they are highly complementary to the assets already owned (see also 
Hart and Moore, 1990: 1123-1124). 
102
 It follows that the value of residual control rights determines the value of the 
acquired firm. 
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given that firm B’s previous owner is now firm B’s manager and employee of 
firm A’s owner, his incentives are comparatively weaker. Arguably, as 
Moore put it, this is the trade-off to be evaluated “primarily in terms of the 
(aggregate) effects on the incentives” (Moore, 1992: 497) that can explain 
“the forces that determine whether transactions are conducted ‘within the 
firm’ as opposed to ‘through the market’” (Moore, 1992: 494, emphasis in 
original). 
Hart (1989: 1772; 1995a: 56ff) summarized the main insights of the 
property rights theory of the firm in his response to Klein’s (1988: 208) 
variation on the Hobbesian question: what, Klein had asked, prevents firm 
B’s employees from manifesting their concern about the merger by quitting 
en masse, and announcing one morning that they have become a new firm? A 
collective hold-up threat of this kind can be credible, Hart (1995: 57) 
observed, only in the absence of some sort of “glue” holding firm B 
employees in place, that is, only when there there is no ultimate source of 
firm B value “over and above the workers’ human capital.” Klein’s concern 
is therefore justified regarding his own theory of vertical integration as the 
purchase of “organizational capital … embedded in the human capital of the 
employees” (Klein, 1988: 208), and Hart (1988: 137) po inted out the same 
weakness in Kreps’s (1990a: 766ff) notion that the firm is composed entirely 
of “reputational capital” held together by “reputational glue” (Kreps, 1990a: 
762; 1990b: 93). 
The property rights view fares much better in this respect, Hart (1995: 
57) observed, since it is easy to demonstrate that “a firm’s nonhuman assets 
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… simply represent the glue that keeps the firm together.”103 Indeed, when 
the employees’ human capital is highly complementary to the nonhuman 
assets that change hands in the merger, and outside options are slim, firm B’s 
employees accept firm A’s authority because firm A now holds the residual 
control rights to key nonhuman assets, such as a physical location, the firm’s 
name, its distributional network, client lists, outstanding contracts (including 
employees’ non-compete clauses), and so on. In Hart’s (1995a: 58-59) words: 
If such assets do not exist, then it is not clear what 
keeps the firm together, or what defines authority within 
the firm. One would expect firms without at least some 
significant nonhuman assets to be flimsy and unstable 
entities, constantly subject to the possibility of break-up 
or dissolution.  
This discussion reveals an important consequence of the definition of the 
firm as a collection of nonhuman assets, namely that there is an important 
sense in which employees are not really part of the firm. Indeed, the firm is 
fundamentally composed of an “owner” (perhaps representing a coalition of 
owners) and the collection of nonhuman assets under the owner’s control. 
The owner, then, is the central contractual agent with whom employees, 
suppliers, creditors, and all other constituencies, contract as outside parties. 
In this sense, the new property rights theory of the firm is similar in spirit to 
Alchian’s (1984: 39) conception of the contractual nexus, according to which 
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 Even if reputation is viewed as a tradeable asset (see Tadelis, 1999), it is still very 
difficult, according to Hart (2001: 1714), to account for the “stickiness in the firm or 
system, so that a firm’s reputation can be separated from that of key personnel.”  
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“a firm is a coalition of interspectific resources owned in common, and some 
generalized inputs,” where the most notable generalized inputs are employees 
whose services are “rented” by the firm owners (see also Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988: 70; Alchian, 2006 [1978]: 644). This is also Fama’s 
opinion, although for Fama (1980: 290) “ownership of the firm is an 
irrelevant concept.”  
3.3 In search of new foundations 
In their review of the literature, “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisted,” 
Holmström and Roberts (1998: 79) claimed that the property rights view is 
hardly as successful as its proponents make it out to be. On the contrary, they 
argued, the emphasis on bargaining and exit rights is better suited to explain 
entrepreneurial incentives in markets rather than firms. Since the property 
rights view is really about the distribution of nonhuman asset ownership 
among “representative entrepreneurs,” as Holmström (1999: 100) similarly 
explained, the approach is silent on internal organizational issues, and 
“seems of little empirical relevance” (Holmström and Roberts, 1998: 79). 
Importantly, Holmström (1999: 87) continued, “the same critique that was 
directed at Alchian and Demsetz’s vision of the firm, that organizational 
affiliations did not matter for transactions, could be directed at the Hart -
Moore model just as well. Individual ownership of assets does not offer a 
theory of organizational identities unless one associates individuals with 
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firms.”104 The property rights view, Holmström (1999: 75) concluded, 
“despite its express objective to explain the boundaries of the firm, fails to do 
so.” 
Holmström (1999: 75) argued that the way forward lies in a synthesis of 
the property rights definition of firm boundaries based on asset ownership 
and a measurement costs explanation of internal organization built on 
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) insights.105 In addition, according to 
Holmström and Roberts (1998: 92), for the theory to “prove useful for 
empirical studies,” it is necessary to develop the idea that asset ownership is 
not the only source of incentives, and to explain how various substitutes for 
ownership elicit employee cooperation within the low-powered incentive 
structure of the firm. The firm, explained Holmström and Milgrom (1994: 
990), should be properly viewed as a “coherent incentive system” (see also 
Holmström, 1999: 89) within which incentive pay, job design, task 
assignment, and other complementary instruments such as transfer pricing 
schemes help internalize the “contractual externalities” that arise in the 
presence of measurement costs (Holmström and Tirole, 1991: 215; 
Holmström and Roberts, 1998: 86ff; Holmström, 1999: 76, 95ff).
106
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 Kreps (1990b: 99) likewise observed that the property rights view “is not a theory 
of the firm per se” since “capital ownership by single entrepreneurs is as likely a 
consequence as is ownership by an entity with a firm’s legal status.”  
105
 Hart and Moore’s (2005) model of the design of hierarchies, viewed as the 
division of labor between specialization and coordination, did not include measurement cost 
considerations.   
106
 These features are nevertheless absent in Hart and Holmström’s (2010) latest 
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A related critique of the property rights approach is behind Rajan and 
Zingales’s (1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) addition to the asset specificity 
expedition. The empirical irrelevance of Hart’s theory, they argued, is not as 
severe as Holmström and Roberts had claimed. Of course, taken literally, 
“the property rights view of the firm … applies only to the entrepreneurial 
firm,” acknowledged Zingales (1998: 501), but it is easy to see that Hart’s 
explanation of the employer’s power over employees can be 
straightforwardly extended to Chandler’s (1977: 1ff) “modern business 
enterprise” typical of managerial capitalism.107 Vertically integrated, 
nonhuman asset-intensive hierarchies of this kind, Rajan and Zingales (2000: 
209) explained, were “well defined by the ownership of assets,” because 
nonhuman assets were the “main source of value and control” over 
employees (Zingales, 2000: 1643). Given the absence of competition in the 
intermediate products market and the unavailability of finance, the lack of 
outside options literally glued employees to the firm’s nonhuman assets.  
However, as Rajan and Zingales (2001a: 207) emphasized, this form of 
glue is now “evaporating.” Indeed, “vertically integrated organizations that 
enjoy rents because their [nonhuman] assets … give them an unassailable 
position in the industry are becoming creatures of the past” (Rajan and 
                                                                                                                                     
discussion of firm boundaries based on the “contracts as reference points” framework.  
107
 The “modern industrial enterprise,” as Chandler (1990a: 3ff) also referred to it, 
was the object of the managerial theory of the firm developed by Baumol (1959), Marris 
(1964), and Williamson (1964), and appears in the bulk of the industrial organization, 
corporate finance, and corporate governance literatures. Williamson (1974, 1981c, 1985a) 
provided a transaction cost economics rationale for the “modern corporation” (see also 
Williamson and Berkovitz, 1996). See Mueller (2003) for a recent overview.  
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Zingales, 2000: 212). In fact, the “breakdown of the traditional vertically 
integrated firm” (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 213) has coincided with “major 
technological, regulatory, and institutional changes [that] have made finance 
more widely available” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001a: 206). Barriers to and 
costs of entry have considerably dropped at the same time as global trade has 
expanded the size of the market, producing a highly competitive and noisy 
environment in which firms need to continually invest in brand name 
distinctiveness and innovate in order to survive.
 
In this context, Rajan and 
Zingales observed, since “the innovative energy of employees has to be 
harnessed in making the firm more creative and productive” (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2004: 94), inalienable “human capital has replaced [alienable] 
capital as the main source of value” (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 224).   
Accordingly, the “new type of firm that is emerging” (Zingales, 2000: 
1625) is a human capital-intensive organization (Zingales, 2000: 1642ff; 
Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 214ff; 2001a: 206ff; 2004: 82ff) that needs to 
elicit the cooperation of managers and employees with rent-creating skills, 
ideas or strategies who “have been unshackled by the competitive market” 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 214). Significantly, in these firms, nonhuman 
assets have become more commodity-like, and can be easily replicated by 
talented employees literally setting up as competition to exploit growth 
opportunities that used to “belong” to the firm (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 
214; 2001a: 207; 2004: 84).
108
 This possibility alone, according to Zingales 
                                                 
108
 According to Rajan and Zingales (2001a: 208; 2004: 80; see also Zingales, 2000: 
1637), empirical support for this observation is provided by Bhidé’s (2000: 54ff) finding 
that 71% of the young and fast-growing firms included in the Inc 500 ranking were founded 
by people who exploited a growth opportunity by replicating or modifying an idea 
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(2000: 1643), indicates that the employer’s authority is “severely limited by 
the ability of employees to quit, taking with them their human capita l or … 
part of the firm.”109 This means that the locus of power is shifting from 
owners to employees, and that “the power relationship is not all one-way” 
any more (Rajan and Zingales, 2004: 83).
110
  
The new distribution of outside options weakens the relevance of Hart’s 
story, and brings Alchian and Demsetz’s observation that it is difficult to 
distinguish intra-firm authority from ordinary market contracting back to the 
center stage.
111
 Rajan and Zingales (2001b: 840) nevertheless maintained that 
Coase’s depiction of the firm as “an entity where transactions are driven 
more by authority or power than by prices” is correct. It follows that the 
theoretical challenge, emphasized in Zingales’s (2000: 1625, 1644) agenda -
setting article, “In Search of New Foundations,” is to overcome Alchian and 
Demsetz’s critique in the human capital-intensive firm: one needs to explain 
how power over human capital can be acquired, maintained, and enhanced 
                                                                                                                                     
encountered in previous employment.  
109
 It follows that, contrary to Williamson’s accent on low-powered incentives within 
the firm, skilled employees now need powerful incentives to remain within the firm.  
110
 The overall empirical effect of these transformations is that the firm’s size is 
“shrinking” (Rajan and Zingales, 2004: 80ff), and that its hierarchical organization is 
“flattening” (Rajan and Wulf, 2006a: 759ff). In a related argument, Langlois (2003: 352ff; 
2007b: 18ff) has claimed that the “visible hand” of management  characteristic of 
Chandlerian firms is “vanishing” as markets have thickened.  
111
 In addition, it would seem that Williamson’s account of forbearance as the source 
of intra-firm authority no longer holds in the new type of firm.  
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when nonhuman assets are insignificant. For Rajan and Zingales (1998: 388), 
this task amounts to developing a “more general theory of power in 
organizations, and thus, a more general theory of the firm.”112  
Generally speaking, on Rajan and Zingales’s (2000a: 204) view, an 
individual can “derive power from the valuable resources she br ings to the 
production process (and, hence, the resources she can threaten to withhold),” 
even if production takes place “in environments where property rights are not 
well defined, are poorly enforced, or cannot be enforced” (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998: 390). The human capital intensive-firm, in which “de jure 
mechanisms are of little direct use in offering [the employer] residual rights 
over [employees’] human capital” (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 214), is 
therefore a case in point, but the overall thrust of the argument also applies to 
the informal sector in both developed and developing economies.
113
 In all 
these situations, some sort of “de facto mechanism” (Rajan and Zignales, 
2000: 216) must substitute for ownership in providing the appropriate 
investment incentives. 
One way to make progress in this direction is to introduce a variation 
on the classic distinction between ownership and control. Indeed, contrary to 
                                                 
112
 For Rajan and Zingales, the importance of this task extends beyond the theory of 
the firm itself, since a theory of the firm is implicit in any discussion of corporate 
governance and corporate finance, as well as any policy prescription (see Zingales, 1998: 
500; 2000: 1629ff; Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 202; 2001a: 206).  
113
 As well as to “illegal organizations such as the Mafia” (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998a: 390). See Dixit (2004, 2009) for a detailed discussion of de facto mechanisms of 
contractual enforcement in situations of “lawlessness.” 
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Hart’s definition of ownership as residual control, Zingales (2000: 1638)  
argued, it is important to distinguish “the role played by ownership, which 
confers the right to withdraw a resource after specific investments have been 
made, from that of control, which regulates … access … before specific 
investments are made” (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000b: 841). In fact, at 
the formative stages of a business, an entrepreneur’s control over access to a 
“unique critical resource such as an idea, good customer relationships, a new 
tool, or superior management technique” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 805) is  
not only how de facto power is exercised but also the primary driving force 
behind organizational design. To see how access is relevant on both these 
counts, it is worth reconsidering some of the fundamental problems of 
entrepreneurship.
114
 
For Rajan and Zingales (2001b: 805), a key difficulty of 
entrepreneurship boils down to a trade-off: “how to enlist the cooperation of 
[other] agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of 
the surplus generated by the enterprise.” On the one hand, max imization of 
the joint surplus depends on the employees’ “firm-specific specialization” 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 215) that is possible only through “close 
proximity or access to the critical resource” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 
805).
115
 On the other hand, specialized employees, who now have easy access 
                                                 
114
 Rajan and Zingales’s story sits well with the idea, popularized by Rifkin (2000) 
and others, that the shift from ownership to access is a defining feature of the emerging 
human capital-intensive, service-oriented economy. 
115
 As Rajan and Zingales (1998a: 388) explained: “if the critical resource is a 
machine, access implies the ability to operate the machine; if the resource in an idea, access 
implies being exposed to the details of the idea; if the resource is a person, access is the 
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to outside sources of finance, are in a position to literally “expropriate this 
critical resource and compete against the entrepreneur” (Rajan and Zingales, 
2001b: 805). Therefore, the entrepreneur’s success  crucially depends on his 
capacity to minimize the risk of expropriation by providing employees with 
the right incentives to work within the firm rather than against it, so to speak, 
in the market.  
The risk of effective competition from opportunistic employees depends 
both on the degree of expropriability of the entrepreneur’s critical resources, 
and on how much access employees actually have (Rajan and Zingales, 
2001b: 805). In this context, it seems optimal for the entrepreneur to grant 
restricted access when the resources are highly expropriable, and to allow 
greater access when the possibility of expropriation is more limited.
116
 For 
Rajan and Zingales (1998: 391), this sort of decision is “the essence of 
internal organization,” properly defined as “the differential access agents 
within the firm have to the [critical resources] that compose the core of the 
firm.” Indeed, the objective of internal organization is to “draw forth 
specialization” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 811) by designing the right 
                                                                                                                                     
ability to work closely with the person.”   
116
 This is similar to Teece’s (1986: 287ff; 1998: 67ff) argument that an innovator’s 
ability to appropriate the benefits of innovation, that competitors and imitators attempt to 
capture, hinges on the “regime of appropriabili ty” defined by the innovation’s degree of 
“inherent replicability,” and the efficacy of legal protection. Weak definitions of property 
rights can make assets more replicable, or “fugitive,” as Arrow (1996: 649) put it. In this 
spirit, Rajan and Zingales (2001b: 831) conjectured that “the relative size of firms in 
industries with intangible assets should increase when the efficiency of the judicial system 
improves.” See Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001) for an empirical test of this proposition.   
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balance of power within the firm, that is, by allowing specialized employees 
to accumulate power and rents that they would not otherwise have in the 
market. These considerations lead Rajan and Zingales to identify two 
different organizational structures that can increase the size of the island of 
conscious power “by having more and more people specializing” (Zingales, 
2000: 1646).
117
 
When the opportunity for expropriation is limited, the entrepreneur can 
design a “vertical hierarchy” based on the partial delegation of control over 
access to specialized employees, who therefore obtain “positional power” 
over newer generations of employees, and accordingly more rents (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2001b: 807). The possibility of moving up the ladder ensures that 
employees remain dedicated to the entrepreneur. However, this 
organizational structure, typically “found in physical-capital-intensive 
industries” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001: 839), is less suited when the critical 
resources are highly expropriable. Hence in human capital-intensive firms, 
given that the entrepreneur cannot delegate control over access without 
seriously exposing himself to risk, Rajan and Zingales’s (2001b: 811) 
argument is that the appropriate organizational structure is a “horizontal 
hierarchy.” In flat organizations of this kind, employees’ specific investments 
and loyalty hinge not on positional power over other employees but on the 
                                                 
117
 Although the idea that the core of the firm comprises critical resources is similar 
to the “resource-based view” developed in strategic management by Wernerfelt (1984), 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and others, these contributions, as Rajan and Zingales (2001b: 
842) pointed out, do not explain intra-firm power and internal organization. 
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entrepreneur’s promise to allocate an ownership stake in the firm to a 
selected few in the future (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 839).
118
  
However, although surplus-sharing schemes such as delayed vesting 
can clearly serve as part of the “glue binding the organization” (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2001a: 209), the distribution of ownership rights to specialized 
employees does not necessarily enhance their incentives. Contrary to Hart’s 
account, as Rajan and Zingales (1998: 406) argued, “ownership may reduce 
the incentive to specialize.” Indeed, a “dark side of ownership” (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998: 390) is that “an owner has a larger opportunity set, and in a 
variety of circumstances, can face a greater loss of opportunities from 
specialization” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998: 407).119 Accordingly, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998: 422) concluded, “if all the parties involved in production 
(i.e., including the entrepreneur) have to make substantial specific 
investments over time, it may be optimal for a completely unrelated third 
party to [absorb] the opportunity losses from specialization.” The 
introduction of outside ownership, Zingales (2000: 1647) observed, may very 
                                                 
118
 Since this configuration creates an efficiency-enhancing “rat race” among 
employees, Rajan and Zingales (1998: 418) argued that they had managed to reconcile 
Marglin’s view that the entrepreneur guarantees his indispensable role in the production 
process in order to maximize his share of the pie with the classic Smithian analysis of the 
division of labor (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 836, n.21).  
119
 The “adverse effect of ownership” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998: 406ff) is that in 
some situations owners can earn more by selling their stakes than by investing in the 
business. A similar critique of Hart’s view that asset ownership always improves incentives 
can be found in Chiu (1998), De Meza and Lockwood (1998), and Wang and Zhu (2005).  
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well be “the major service venture capitalists provide emerging firms” that 
they finance (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 233).
120
   
Indeed, the resulting separation between ownership and control over 
access allows the entrepreneur to concentrate on the coordination and 
enhancement of the overall specialization, “so as to build complementarities” 
that “economically link some person or unit that cannot be owned to the 
firm” (Zingales, 2000: 1645; see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 215; 2001a: 
207). Complementarities are the real basis of the glue that keeps the firm 
together. To the extent that the entrepreneur is successful, Rajan and Zingales 
(2000: 217) reasoned, “the web of past specific investments that creates 
complementarities between different agents may itself be what is valuable 
and worth gaining access to.” It follows that “at some point the critical 
resource becomes the web of specific investments itself” (Zingales, 2000: 
1646), and the firm evolves into “something more than a collection  of people 
and resources” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 811).121 This is why the firm is 
normally “able to produce more than any competing entrepreneur with a 
similar resource starting from scratch” (Zingales, 2000: 1646). According to 
Zingales (1998a: 498): 
The firm [is] a nexus of specific investments: a 
combination of mutually specialized assets and people 
                                                 
120
 This is a form of Hobbesian solution. A related contribution of the venture 
capitalist is the standardization of the firm’s operations (Rajan, 2012: 1193).  
121
 In other words, over time, the firm deve lops the “organizational capital” 
(Zingales, 2000: 1646; Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 842) emphasized by Klein (1988), and 
wrongly rejected by Hart.  
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… that cannot be instantaneously replicated [by the 
market]. Unlike the property rights view, this definition 
recognizes that all the parties who are mutually 
specialized belong to the firm, be they workers, 
suppliers, or customers.  
On this view of “the economic essence of the firm” (Zingales, 1998a: 498; 
see also Zingales, 2000: 1646; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales; 2000: 39), it is 
clear that “something is more a part of the enterprise when it has greater 
complementarities with the rest of the enterprise” (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 
218-219). Importantly, as Rajan and Zingales (2000: 219; 2001b: 842) 
acknowledged, it is equally clear that this economic definition of the realm of 
transactions governed by power rather than by prices departs from “the legal 
definition of the firm” that a firm’s boundaries are determined by the 
common ownership of assets. For Rajan and Zingales, however, the fact that 
the entities legally defined as firms may not fit their definition of economic 
organization is not a weakness of their theory, but points instead to the 
“inadequacies of the legal definition” (Rajan and Zingales, 2001b: 843). Like 
Hart’s account, the legal definition is “becoming more and more 
anachronistic and will someday be abandoned” for a “less clear-cut but more 
realistic” definition similar to one suggested here (Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 
219). 
The implicit suggestion that the legal system should catch up with the 
new business realities, because the assumption that “the legal and the 
economic entity coincide” (Zingales, 1998a: 498) is no longer true, sheds an 
interesting light on Rajan and Zingales’s agenda. It is important to realize, as 
Zingales (1998: 498) put it, that “a corporation, in principle, is just an empty 
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legal shell,” the value of which is derived from “the claims the legal shell has 
on an underlying economic entity, which I shall refer to as the firm.” If, as 
Rajan and Zingales tacitly suspect, the corporate form fails to secure claims 
over the value created by the underlying human capital-intensive firm, then 
we should expect these firms to adopt alternative legal forms of business 
organization in order to internalize this externality. On this interpretation of 
Rajan and Zingales, the comparative efficiency of alternative governance 
systems, including considerations of capital structure, depends on their 
relative success in protecting “the integrity of the firm” (Zingales, 2000: 
1645; see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000: 222).   
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Chapter 4. The nexus paradox 
I take the ownership of assets by firms, and 
the attendant feature that economic contracts 
are made with firms, not their employees or 
owners, as one of the most significant and 
robust empirical regularities to be explained 
by any theory of the firm. Having said this let 
me confess … that I am unable myself to 
offer a well-developed explanation of asset 
ownership by firms. 
 Holmstöm (1999: 75) 
Rajan and Zingales’s emphasis on the efficiency-enhancing properties of 
third party ownerhip is at odds with the theory of the firm narrative, and their 
contention that the traditional legal definition of firms as distinct ownership 
units are increasingly outdated does little to solve the issue of the 
determinants of firm boundaries. On the contrary, their otherwise 
illuminating discussion of power has produced a rather peculiar variation on 
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the continuum thesis: since the island of conscious power can potentially 
encompass many legally distinct ownership units, it is clear that the size of 
the firm, to paraphrase Cheung, is indeterminate because there is no cut-off 
point. In other words, the problem of organizational anonymity has 
reappeared. Not surprisingly, despite the progress made since the beginning 
of the 1970s, the issue of the nature and boundaries of the firm “remains an 
empirical as well as theoretical chellenge” (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005: 
179). A case can be made for the fact that this challenge is intimately related 
to an issue that is largely neglected in the literature, namely the matter of the 
identity of the central contractual agent.  
Explicitly or implicity, most economists assume that the central agent is 
a human being (e.g., “entrepreneur,” “employer,” “owner”) or a group of 
human beings (e.g., “owners,” “management”). This position makes it 
difficult to come to terms with one of the most “significant and robust 
empirical regularities to be explained by any theory of the firm” emphasized 
by Holmström (1999: 75), namely that “firms tend to own or have control 
over all the alienable, nonhuman assets that they use,” and that “economic 
contracts are made with firms, not with their employees and owners.” The 
argument of this chapter is that Holmström’s puzzle reveals an important 
blind spot in the literature, that most economists seem to be oblivious to, and 
that this “nexus paradox” is at least in part responsible for the persistence of 
definitional difficulties (4.1). Arguably, the paradox will remain unresolved 
as long as theorists of the firm refuse to acknowledge the role played by the 
firm’s legal personality (4.2). Although this is precisely Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) definition of the firm, the lasting influence of their 
hostility to “personification” is behind this state of affairs (4.3). 
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4.1 The definitional impasse  
Since Coase (1937), theorists of the firm have struggled to determine the 
boundaries of the islands of conscious power to be found in the ocean of 
unconscious cooperation. As we have seen, Coase’s argument that the 
distinguishing mark of the firm is the replacement of ordinary market 
contracting by long-term employment contracts, whereby coordination is 
achieved by the employer’s authority, was contested by Alchian and 
Demsetz’s (1972) objection that the employer has no more power over 
employees than customers have over grocers. Coase’s dichotomy view was 
further criticized by Richardson (1972), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), 
and other continuum theorists, on the grounds that it conceals a great variety 
of interfirm contractual arrangements that are strictly speaking neither firms 
nor markets. To the continuum theorist, the difference between firms and 
markets is a difference in degree rather than in kind, and what counts 
analytically, as Cheung (1983) and Alchian (1984) argued, is the effects of 
different types of contractual arrangements rather than arbitrary labels.  
There have been three major attempts to reclaim firm boundaries. Based 
on the twin notions of asset specificity and opportunism, Williamson (1979a, 
1985a) examined the fundamental transformation of ordinary market 
contracting into interfirm contractual arrangements that foster the parties’ 
specific investments while minimizing their vulnerability to hold-up risk, and 
argued that firms, viewed as unified ownership structures that solve disputes 
internally, emerge in the last resort when asset specificity levels are 
particularly high. However, Williamson’s account of the comparative 
advantages of firms had little to say about the costs of integration, and 
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Grossman and Hart (1986) suggested that redefining integration as the 
purchase of residual control rights over nonhuman assets not only solves this 
problem but also leads to a straightforward formalization of firm boundaries 
and the associated allocation of power. This approach has been revised by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) to make sense of the nature and boundaries of the 
new human capital-intensive firm.  
Overall, members of the asset specificity expedition countered the 
continuum thesis by arguing that the particular constellation of accumulated 
specific investments allows one to identify a given firm, and to distinguish it 
not only from the market but also from other firms. After all, they reasoned, 
“firm-specific” characteristics are not to be found elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
asset specificity explanations share a crucial, albeit implicit, feature with 
theories that seem to invite the continuum thesis by presenting firms as kinds 
of markets. This is “the idea of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a central 
agent” (Ricketts, 2002: 162, emphasis in original). All contractual theorists 
of the firm agree that the institutional arrangement between various input 
owners involving contractual centralization enhances efficiency by reducing 
the number of contracts necessary for the organization of production, thus 
reducing the associated transaction costs. Cheung’s (1983: 17) denial that the 
presence of a central contractual agent helps define the firm is the exception 
that proves the rule. 
At the same time, theorists of the firm part ways when it comes to 
specifying the classes of agents inside the firm’s boundaries alongside the 
central agent.
122
 Although he later raised doubts about his earlier discussion, 
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 This important difference between various theories of the firm has been generally 
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Coase clearly included an entrepreneur and his employees within firm 
boundaries. In Alchian and Demsetz’s account the employer is also the 
owner, but employees are indistinguishable from other agents with whom the 
owner contracts. This is essentially Hart’s narrow definition of the firm that 
leads to the exclusion of all agents other than the owner. On the other hand, 
Williamson’s legally-grounded argument is that, to the extent that disputes 
arising in employment are normally resolved within the firm without recourse 
to litigation or arbitration, employees are clearly within firm boundaries 
along with owners and equity providers, while suppliers, customers and 
creditors are not. This contrasts with Rajan and Zingales’s claim that it is 
more realistic to include around an entrepreneur all agents making 
complementary specific investments, be they employees, suppliers, 
customers, or investors, but that ownership should be allocated to a third 
party outside the firm.  
Implicit in this discussion is the desirable match between the economic 
concept of the firm and the corresponding reality of the firm. Expressing this 
idea, Coase (1937: 386) argued that the definition of the firm needs to be 
“realistic in that in that it corresponds to what is meant by the firm in the real 
                                                                                                                                     
overlooked. As a result, some have argued that different theories of the nature of the firm 
are like the complementary answers that the blind men of Saxe’s poem provide when asked 
to define an elephant: each isolates one of several features of a complex phenomenon, the 
firm (see Foss, Lando and Thomsen, 1999: 645; Gibbons, 2005: 239; Garrouste and 
Saussier, 2005: 179; 2008: 23). However, contrary to the blind men who each isolate one of 
several features the same, given phenomenon, there is a clear sense in which different 
theorists of the firm actually isolate different phenomena. A firm comprising classes of 
agents X and Y within its boundaries is different from a firm comprising only class X.  
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world.”123 Interestingly, Coase (1937: 404) claimed that his economic 
definition of the firm as an island of conscious power distinct from ordinary 
market contracting was “realistic” precisely to the extent that it matched the 
corresponding legal category of “employer and employee” (see also Masten, 
1988). Williamson (1979a: 238) similarly suggested that the fiction of 
contractual discreteness needed to be replaced by more realistic analytical 
categories, and found these categories in various legal categories of contract.  
Rajan and Zingales (2000: 219; 2001b: 843) refused to follow Coase’s 
precept on the grounds that prevailing legal definitions failed to match the 
“new” nature and boundaries of the firm spawned by the financial, 
technological, and regulatory revolutions.
124
  
Arguably, if there is any truth to this claim, then there is a pressing 
need to consider the extent to which existing economic or legal notions (or 
both) must be revised. After all, a conception of the firm logically underlies 
contiguous fields, including strategic management (Conner and Prahald, 
1996: 478), corporate governance (Bolton and Sharfstein, 1998: 96), and 
corporate law (Armour and Whincop, 2007: 432), and these will presumably 
be affected by the changing nature of the firm. But the problem is, and has 
been, that a consensus regarding existing notions of what the firm is, beyond 
the mere fact of contractual centralization, was never reached.  Indeed, even 
the idea of a central contractual agent is sometimes present only implicitly. 
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 Mäki (1998: 410) clarified Coase’s position: a definition is “realistic or unrealistic  
in that it either refers or does not refer to a real entity or a set of such entities” in the socio -
economic realm. 
124
 Rajan and Zingales did not reject the principle behind Coase’s precept.  
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As a result, Eggertsson’s (1990: 158) observation, that the lack of 
standardized vocabulary and careful definitions “makes it difficult to see 
whether we are dealing with overlapping or competing theories,” still rings 
true today.  
The lack of standardized vocabulary and careful definitions is true not 
only of the “firm” but also of other key concepts, including “markets” and 
“transaction costs.” As they appear in the literature, all of these terms are 
highly ambiguous.
125
 Transaction costs, for instance, were initially quite 
distinctly associated with market exchange (Coase, 1937: 390; 1960: 15; 
Malmgren, 1961: 401; Williamson, 1971: 114; McManus, 1975: 335), but as 
firms came to be viewed as kinds of markets the expression gradually 
referred to a number of contracting costs, including information costs, agency 
costs, measurement costs, bargaining costs, motivation costs, coordination 
costs, and enforcement costs, all of which were said to arise in both firms and 
markets (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 785; Cheung, 1974: 63; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 308; Barzel, 1977: 292; 1982: 48; Klein, 1983: 373; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 29).
126
 Although Demsetz (1988a: 144ff; 1997: 
426) attempted to overcome potential confusion by proposing a distinction 
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 Other concepts, such as “authority,” “power,” “ownership,” and “contract” are 
also ambiguous in the literature, and their use is far from uniform. Holmström and 
Roberts’s (1998: 75) observation, that “there is still no single coherent theory of 
ownership,” could apply to authority, power or contract as well.  
126
 It seems disingenuous, however, to claim that the firm arises because of 
transaction costs when transaction costs can be found inside the firm. It is important to 
differentiate between different types of costs in order to make sense of the basic Coasean 
narrative. 
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between intra-firm management costs and inter-firm transaction costs, he 
nonetheless concluded that both types of costs are found in both firms and 
markets.
127
  
Since one type of contract substitutes for another, as Cheung (1983) had 
argued, it is hardly surprising that “it is often impossible to separate one type 
of transaction cost from another” (Cheung, 1998: 515). This observation led 
Cheung (1992: 51) to redefine transaction costs as “institutional costs,” that 
is, as “all those costs that cannot be conceived to exist in a Robinson Crusoe 
(one-man) economy” (see also Cheung, 1982b: 650; 1987: 56). Presumably, 
since Friday’s arrival on the scene transforms the one-man economy, 
transaction costs are associated with any human interaction.
128
 Thus, since 
“all organization costs are transaction costs, and vice versa,” as Cheung 
(1987: 56) explained, transaction costs are pervasive “even in an economy 
where market transactions are suppressed, as in a communist state” (see also 
Cheung, 1982a: 35). Viewed this way, it is clear that the concept of 
transaction costs has been diluted to the point of being a catch-all concept, 
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 See also Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991: 6). On the contrary, Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s (2007a) model retained the distinction between the two types of cost (see also 
Hodgson, 2010: 301).  
128
 This idea is partly explained by the view that transaction costs and externalities go 
hand in hand, and that transaction costs should be broadly defined as “resource losses 
incurred due to imperfect information” (Dahlman, 1979: 148). As Allen (1998: 106) argued, 
any costs that violate the Coase theorem can be defined as transaction costs.   
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and its usefulness in explaining the emergence of the firm in a market 
economy has become limited.
129
   
Although the entire edifice of the contractual theory of the firm is built 
on Williamson’s (1975: 20) premise that “in the beginning there were 
markets,” the meaning of the term “market” is surprisingly unclear in the 
literature.
130
 Whereas the bulk of the literature on vertical integration focuses 
only on the intermediate products market, the market and its functioning are 
often treated as a black box (see Holmström and Roberts, 1998: 77). It is 
often unclear if by “market” is meant something different from 
“transactions,” and more than “competition” or “market forces.”131 Of course, 
as Tirole (1988b: 12) put it, “there is no simple recipe for defining a market,” 
but this lack of standardized vocabulary and careful definitions does little to 
                                                 
129
 Similar considerations led Goldberg (1985: 398) to point out that the concept of 
transaction cost “runs the risk of becoming … the all-purpose answer that tells us nothing.” 
Anticipating these problems in another context, Fischer (1977: 332, n.5) observed that 
“transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device … because there is 
a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably-specified 
transaction costs.” Williamson (1995: 33) himself  was aware of the “grave problem with 
broad, elastic and plausible concepts – of which ‘transaction cost’ is one,” pointing out that 
“concepts that explain everything explain nothing.”  
130
 This parallels Coase’s (1988a:7) observation regarding conventional p rice theory, 
where “the discussion of the market itself ha[d] entirely disappeared.” Useful discussions of 
alternative definitions of markets can be found in Hodgson (2001b; 2008a; 2008b). 
131
 This is certainly the case in the new property rights theory of Grossman, Hart and 
Moore, as well as in its extension by Rajan and Zingales to the human-capital intensive 
firm. 
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advance the definition of the firm and its boundaries. Definitional problems 
are compounded when terms like “internal markets” (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971), “surrogate markets” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or “market 
hierarchies” (Pitelis, 1991) are used to refer to the firm, and matters are not 
resolved when terms like “quasi-firms” (Eccles, 1981) refer to “mutants” 
(Hutter and Teubner, 1993) or “strange forms” (Ménard, 1996) that are 
somehow “firm-like” (Demsetz, 1988a) but somewhere in between firms and 
markets.  
The view that the difference between firms and markets is a difference 
in degree rather than in kind underpins the tendency to minimize the 
importance of careful definitions, and leads to the conclusion that taxonomies 
are speculative, arbitrary, and ultimately pointless. This is why so many 
economists have fallen prey to the “continuum fallacy” and have abandoned 
attempts to define the firm (e.g., Cheung, 1983: 19; 1992: 56; Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988: 76; Demsetz, 1988a: 155; Masten, 1998: 58-59).
132
 In this 
context, instead of thinking that the firm is somehow a substitute for the 
market, which would imply a coherent definition of the firm (and, relatedly, 
of the market), a common strategy has involved explaining away the firm by 
concentrating on something else. This was Cheung’s (1983: 10; 1992: 63) 
argument that one type of contract substitutes for another. However, the 
                                                 
132
 The continuum fallacy, that is a variation on the ancient “sorites paradox,” has the 
following form: (a) A differs from Z by a continuum of insignificant change; (b) no non-
arbitrary line can be drawn; therefore (c1) there is no real difference between A and Z; or 
(c2) A does not exist. The conclusion that contraries (or opposites) are really the same when 
they are connected by intermediate small differences is clearly a fallacy. See Damer (2008: 
137ff) for a brief overview. 
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proposed term “contract” is just as vague as the term “firm” (see Schlicht, 
1998: 210-211). Both stand for a category, and like any category they have 
vague or fuzzy boundaries. Indeed, the term “firm” may be, and probably is 
to a certain extent, vague.
133
 
In economics as elsewhere, categories are normally defined following 
the Aristotelian slogan, definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam 
specificam.
134
 Hence, alongside other questions that it is meant to answer, a 
theory of the firm is about the common features of all the observed forms of 
the firm (Gindis, 2009: 27, n.1). Each specific form of the firm (e.g., sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, cooperative, “capitalist,” 
“democratic”) shares some features with the other forms but also possesses 
specific or differentiating features not shared with other forms. An 
Aristotelian reading implies a distinction between “essential” or necessary 
features to be found in all instances, and “accidental” or contingent features 
to be found in specific instances only. Alternatively, in line with 
Wittgenstein’s (1953: §65-77) notion of “family resemblances,” it may be 
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 Vagueness is different from ambiguity. Ambiguity is a conflict between different 
meanings of a term used in the same context, while vagueness is a problem of linguistic or 
conceptual precision. As such, vagueness can be tackled by what Copi and Cohen (1990: 
136) call “precising definitions.” Carnap (1947: §2) called “explication” the replacement of 
a vague pre-analytic concept by a new analytically (more) exact one. Useful d iscussions of 
vagueness and ambiguity can be found in Tindale (2007: 57ff) and Damer (2008: 121ff). 
See Kay (2008) for an account of how ambiguity has profoundly affected the development 
of the theory of the firm, not always for the best.  
134
 In the words of Aristotle (Metaphysics Z, 12, 1037b29): “there is nothing in the 
definition except the first-named genus and the diffenretiae.”  
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argued that the preceding strategy is an outdated and naïve view of science, 
and that attempts to define the “essence” or the necessary features of the firm 
are hopelessly unachievable.
135
 On this view, it is misleading to look for a 
single distinguishing mark of the firm: all the traits described by various 
theories may be associated with many firms, but any firm may lack any one 
of these characteristics.
136
  
In this context, it is tempting to argue that the “essence of the firm” is 
nothing more than a Weberian “ideal type” never encountered in reality, and 
to infer that the ideal features isolated by one theorist need not coincide with 
those isolated by another.
137
 However, it is important to recognize that the 
term “ideal type” needs to be used with caution because it seems to 
encourage a “false notion that we are simply dealing with ideas, and not 
reality” (Hodgson, 2001a: 329). Furthermore, it is important to understand 
that the process of abstraction, that is an inevitable part of the procedure of 
theoretical construction, is precisely the identification of what is essential to, 
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 Similar ideas can be found in some contemporary theories of concepts and 
categorization (e.g., Gert, 1995; Fodor, 1998; Laurence and Margolis, 2003). 
136
 Hence Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 785) observed that “the term firm as 
commonly used is so turgid of meaning that we can not hope to explain every entity to 
which the name is attached in common or even technical literature.”  
137
 From this perspective, Machlup (1967: 28, emphasis in original) described as 
“ludicrous the efforts of some writers are to attempt one definition of the firm.” Machlup 
(1967: 28-29) continued: “I hope there will be no argument about which concept of the fir m 
is the most important or the most useful. Since they serve different purposes, such an 
argument would be pointless … Most of the controversies about the ‘firm’ have been due to 
misunderstanding about what the other specialist was doing.”  
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and enduring in, any entity (see Hodgson, 2001a: 287). In the process of 
abstraction, concrete items are stripped from particularities, specificities and 
exemplifications: ultimately, a universal or quasi-universal is isolated (see 
Mäki, 1992: 322; Mäki, 2004: 321). The family resemblance argument 
simply does not provide sufficient reasons for abandoning attempts to define 
the firm by isolating the essential from the non-essential.
138
  
Arguably, as Ménard (1995: 176-177) and Hodgson (1998c: 35; 2002: 
57) pointed out, if our present definitions do not fit reality, this should be 
taken as a cue to make our definitions more precise, not for abandoning talk 
of firms and firm boundaries. Machlup (1967: 28) was right about the 
importance of being “aware of equivocations,” but he was  certainly mistaken 
to conclude that the presence of competing definitions of the firm means that 
attempts to provide a definition of the firm are “ludicrous.” It is unproductive 
to think of definitions along the lines of the proverbial “anything goes.” On 
the contrary, a case can be made for the fact that we need definitions that 
“carve reality at its joints” (Hodgson, 2001a: 315) so “it can be understood 
and explained” (Hodgson, 2002: 42).139 As Khalil (1997: 528) similarly 
observed: “the world was never neat and this has not, and should not, stop 
theorists from carving it into categories of actors, structures, artifacts, 
institutions, and so on.”  
                                                 
138
 Properly understood, the family resemblance argument only means that proposed 
essential definitions may turn out to be wrong (O’Neill, 2001: 172; Hodgson, 2013: 14). 
Fallibilism of this kind is hardly problematic. 
139
 The expression is Plato’s (Phaedrus 265e). Plato compared definitions with a 
butcher’s job of dividing according to objective (in this case physical) articulation.  
 110 
Some consider that definitions are “mere typographical conveniences” 
and “theoretically superfluous” (Whitehead and Russell, 1910: 12). However, 
as Jensen (1983: 329) pointed out, the success or failure of research efforts 
crucially depends on the choice of definitions. Definitions are of the utmost 
importance, since in the most fundamental scientific sense to define is to 
delimit. Definitions, as Suppe (2000: 76) explained, serve to “fix boundaries 
of phenomena or the range of applicability of terms or concepts .”140 Indeed, 
“economic theories differ from one another in that they carve out the world 
differently” (Mäki, 2004: 319). It is important to understand that definitions 
do not only define words: “when the words are used they define the world for 
us,” Samuels (2001: 92) argued, and this means that definitions “may mislead 
or incompletely define the world” (see also Samuels, 2007: 166ff). From this 
perspective, a useful theoretical definition of the firm should state what the 
firm is, and this implies that it is neither circular nor too broad or too 
narrow.
141
 The importance of the preceding considerations for a theory of the 
firm is easy to understand. 
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 A definition of any thing or entity comprises an intensive and an extensive aspect, 
and this implies talk of boundaries: by defining the attributes that the thing or entity 
possesses and the objects that fall under this category, one necessarily defines the attributes 
that other things or entities do not possess. Non-resolved debates about the “intension” or 
sense of the term “firm,” that is, about the attributes shared by all the things or entities that 
the term denotes, inevitably lead to debates about the term’s “extension” or reference, that 
is, about the set of possible things or entities the term can denote. See Copi and Cohen 
(1990: 141ff). 
141
 Arguably, a definition should not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure or 
figurative language. These ideas build Copi and Cohen’s (1990: 137) general discussion of 
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In Williamson’s discussion of asset specificity, firms are organized with 
common ownership of assets and unified control when highly specific 
investments are to be made in relatively frequent and uncertain transaction 
situations. On this view, then, there are no firms, or should be no firms, 
without specific assets. This hardly seems to be a position a theorist of the 
firm should be comfortable with: given that there certainly are firms without 
specific assets, as Gibbons (2005: 209) pointed out, there can and should be a 
theory of the firm that is not exclusively based on specific investments. By 
the same token, if the employment relation is the essential characteristic of 
the firm, as Coase and others have argued, then single-person operations 
without employees, partnerships without employees, cooperatives, and so on, 
would not count as firms. Similarly, single entrepreneurs would not count as 
firms when the firm is defined as an “organization,” a “team” or a 
“coalition,” where all these notions imply at least two individuals. Again, 
these are not things a theorist of the firm should be comfortable with.  
Of course, the question of theoretically considering the single-person 
business as a “unitary firm,” as McNulty (1984: 245) put it, will depend on 
the question at hand, and this will also depend on the scale of observation. 
For instance, when the focus is on local competition, it makes sense to 
include single-person operations because these often compete with more 
complex forms of the firm in consumer markets (see Orts, 1998: 289) , but 
this justification may not hold when considering international trade flows.
142
 
                                                                                                                                     
theoretical definitions, and on Hodgson’s (1998c: 23ff) more specific discussion of the 
“Coasean tangle.” 
142
 Similarly, in some cases, defining the firm as an organization may be necessary, 
 
 112 
Nevertheless, the issue of the nature of the firm should be relatively 
independent of instrumental questions of this kind. As Fourie (1993: 43) 
argued, “one must accept the one-person firm as a conceptual possibility and 
indeed as an often encountered empirical reality” (see also Dietrich, 1994: 6; 
Kay, 2008: 1212).
143
 Thus a conception of the firm that fits this reality is 
needed.
144
 Hence Demsetz (1988a: 156; 1995: 9; 2011c: S10) maintained that 
single-person businesses logically cannot be excluded because firms should 
be defined by the fact of production for others rather than for oneself. Are 
not “firms” production units, as opposed to consumption units, that are 
present in the circular flow of income in an economy, regardless of their 
having employees?  
However, not all specialized production units that Demsetz would count 
as firms would be statistically counted as firms. International conventions 
such as the United Nations System of National Accounts draw a distinction 
between a production unit that is “incorporated” and one that is not. The 
former, regardless of whether it has employees, is “a legal or social entity … 
recognized by law” as distinct from the person who controls it (United 
                                                                                                                                     
for instance when the focus is on authority relations, but in other cases, excluding the 
single-person business from the set of firms may lead to mistaken analyses.  
143
 Over 74% of registered businesses have no employees in the United Kingdom 
(Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 2010). This proporition rises to 78% in the 
United States (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2007).   
144
 Given this often encountered reality, as Fourie (1993: 44, emphasis in original) 
observed, the firm “cannot in general have the supersession of the price mechanism as 
distinguishing characteristic.” 
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Nations, 2008: 61). An “institutional unit” of this kind is “capable, in its own 
right, of owning assets, incurring liability and engaging in economic 
activities and in transactions with other entities” (United Nations, 2008: 61). 
This distinguishes it from other forms of production units that typically 
belong to the household sector.
145
 The emphasis on registration is essential. 
An individual selling things on street corners, however frequently, does not 
count as a firm, even if the individual in question has a street tradename. On 
the other hand, registration or incorporation, along with a tradename and 
other legal, economic and social identifiers, would make the individual count 
as a bona fide firm. Accordingly, to the extent that these identifiers are 
nonhuman assets, the Grossman and Hart (1986) view that firms without 
nonhuman assets are not identifiable in the world (see Khalil, 1997: 524) 
contains a grain of truth.
146
  
Hart (2011: 102) recently framed the question of the definition of the 
firm in the following terms: “is a firm circumscribed by its legal status or by 
its economic activities?” This formulation is misleading because any firm is 
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 More precisely, a production unit will belong to the household when it is not 
possible to “separate all assets, including financial assets down to the level of cash, into 
those that belong to the household in its capacity as a consumer from those belonging to the 
household in its capacity as a producer” (United Nations, 2008: 83).  This view was also 
adopted in the 1993 International Classification of Status in Employment (see International 
Labour Organization, 1993: 52-55). Conventions of this kind raise important questions 
regarding the definition of business enterprise in the so-called “informal economy.” 
146
 Nonetheless, the Grossman and Hart (1986: 692) definition of the firm “as being 
composed of the collection of assets that it owns” is blantanly circular, and needs to be 
avoided (see Gindis, 2007: 270).  
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circumscribed by both legal status and economic activities. In fact, most 
economic activities of the firm are only possible because the firm has a legal 
status, and this is true even though legal and economic boundaries may not 
always perfectly match. Given the basic principle in most jurisdictions that 
“only a legal person has the capacity to contract,” “own property,” and 
“vindicate [its] ownership rights in court” (Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 
518), markets are populated with legal persons of various kinds (see Deakin, 
2006: 318ff). Although all new institutional economists would agree with 
Coase (1988a: 10) that markets require for their operation the establishment 
and enforcement of “legal rules governing the rights and duties of those 
carrying out transactions,” the role played by law’s provision of separate 
entity status to an entrepreneur or a coalition of resource owners has been 
largely overlooked. This blind spot has contributed to the persistence of 
numerous thorny questions about ownership, boundaries, and the sources of 
intra-firm authority.  
4.2 Missing persons 
The problem of the identity of the central contractual agent has not attracted 
much attention. A plausible explanation is that it is assumed that the 
“entrepreneur,” the “employer,” the “monitor,” and the “owner,” however 
ownership is defined, is the one and the same human being. To the extent that 
the basic narrative inherited from Coase is a stylized rationalization of the 
emergence of entrepreneurial firms in market economies, this implicit 
assumption may seem appropriate. The entrepreneur, who owns or controls 
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access to a set of productive assets or resources, and holds residual claim 
rights to the net value of the output, is the only common signatory of a set of 
contracts with employees, suppliers, clients, and creditors. An 
entrepreneurial firm of this kind is a “single ownership unit,” as Grossman 
and Hart (1986: 693) put it, in which residual control and residual income 
rights are in the hands of a single agent who thereby obtains power not to be 
found in ordinary market contracting over all increasingly specialized agents 
(that may or may not be employees).   
This narrative contrasts with Holmström’s “significant and robust 
empirical regularity” that implies that the central agent holding title to the 
assets used in production and entering contractual relations with employees, 
suppliers, and other agents, is not a flesh-and-blood entrepreneur but the firm 
itself. However, the precise meaning of this statement remains obscure in 
Holmström’s (1999: 74) own “subeconomy” view of the managerial firm in 
which “asset ownership conveys the CEO the power to define the ‘rules of 
the game,’ that is, the ability to restructure the incentives of those that accept 
to do business on (or with) the island.” Indeed, Holmström’s firm is akin to 
Williamson’s “unified governance structure” in that “management is 
centrally implicated in all contracts” with other constituencies (Williamson, 
1985a: 318). Given that managers, including the CEO, are usually themselves 
employees, this setup is similarly at odds with the observation that economic 
contracts are made with firms and not with their employees. Furthermore, the 
matter of asset ownership is not settled since managers, including the CEO, 
typically do not own the assets used in production.
147
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 Wernerfelt’s (2002: 473) discussion of why the boss should own the assets used 
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Although Holmström (1999: 75) is “unable … to offer a well-developed 
explanation of asset ownership by firms,” from which follows the “attendant 
feature that … contracts are made with firms,” elements of the requisite 
explanation are available. The key point overlooked by Holmström is the 
“foundational legal principle” emphasized by Iacobucci and Triantis (2007: 
518), that “only legal persons may own property … and … [have] the 
capacity to contract.” In other words, Holmström’s puzzle vanishes once the 
firm is viewed as a “legal person” or a “legal entity” (Riordan, 1990: 94; 
Kreps, 1990a: 753; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 20; Kraakman, 2001: 148; 
Hodgson, 2002: 53; Spulber, 2009a: 52; Triantis, 2011: 190; Deakin, 2012a: 
115; Hansmann, 2013: 893) or a “legal agent” (Putterman, 1993: 260; 
Kornhauser and MacLeod, 2013: 920) with the capacity to own assets and to 
contract in its own name.
148
 As Van den Steen (2010: 468) explained, the 
firm “has all the standing of a real person (e.g., it can own assets and write 
contracts),” even though management exercises these powers by acting “as 
the ‘as if’ owner of all assets and as the ‘as if’ party to all contracts, thus 
claiming the authority that goes with centralized ownership.”149  
Clearly, legal personality not only allows each firm to be an efficiency-
enhancing “contracting hub” (Spulber, 2009a:  440) at the “center of [a] hub-
                                                                                                                                     
by employees ignored Holmström’s puzzle altogether.  
148
 The legal person attributed to the firm by the legal system is quite literally, rather 
than just metaphorically, the central contractual agent (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000a: 
391).  
149
 From the legal point of view, the firm and the employer will normally be the same 
legal person (see Deakin, 2003: 98).  
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and-spoke network” (Spulber, 2009b: 618) of contracts with other legal 
persons, it also helps explain the sources of intra-firm authority. Williamson 
(1985a: 318) recognized that “all contracts are struck with a legal entity 
called ‘the firm’,” but discounted the importance of this fact in his later 
examination of the relative advantages of the firm in dispute-resolution 
respects. Yet his notion of forbearance makes sense only if firms have legal 
personality. Indeed, courts typically refuse to rule on internal disputes 
because, as a legal person, the firm “appears in courts as a single party” 
(Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 524).
150
 The attribution of legal personality to 
firms has implications for legal standing, namely for the determination of the 
“class of individuals standing to sue in any given dispute” (Holderness, 1998: 
508). Since internal divisions do not have legal personality, cannot sue or be 
sued, cannot own property, and cannot contract in their own name, they do 
not have an independent standing in court. (Hodgson, 2002: 46; Iacobucci 
and Triantis, 2007: 524; Gindis, 2009: 39).
151
  
Legal personality enables firms “to enter binding contracts, to seek 
court enforcement of those contracts, and to do so in their own name” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 20). This means that there is an important sense 
in which the firm is distinct from any and all of its human constituents, 
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 As Wang and Zhu (2004: 96) explained, “forbearance law [implies] that no third -
party enforceable ‘procurement contract’ can be used between an employer and an 
employee.” 
151
 A further implication is that divisions cannot have debts vis-à-vis external parties, 
since “debt is a personal obligation that is enforceable only against a legal person because 
only a legal person can be sued” (Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 524). These features 
distinguish intra-firm divisions from subsidiaries in corporate groups.  
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contrary to Alchian and Woodward’s (1987: 112) view that the firm is a 
coalition of owners, and distinct from any and all of its nonhuman assets, 
contrary to Hart and Moore’s (1990: 1120) claim that the firm is a collection 
of nonhuman assets. The firm may be created by a coalition of owners and 
may typically hold title to a collection of nonhuman assets, but the firm is not 
the same thing as the coalition and cannot be said to be equivalent to a 
collection of assets.
152
 This holds for all observed types of firm: firms are 
distinct legal agents in various markets, whether they are entrepreneurial or 
managerial, capitalist or socialist, nonhuman asset-intensive or human 
capital-intensive, and regardless of the distribution of types. Legal entity 
status is common to all legal forms that a firm might take, whether sole 
proprietorship, partnership, mutual, or corporation (Gindis, 2009: 26-27; 
Deakin, 2012a: 115; 2012b: 353).
153
  
It is difficult to understand why all types of firms have “enhanced 
transaction capabilities” (Spulber, 2009a: 64) as compared to bilateral 
exchange in markets without legal personality (see also Armour, Hansmann 
and Kraakman, 2009: 6). As separate legal persons that “generally can 
continue in existence after any of the individuals originally involved in it are 
long gone” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 331; see also Spulber, 2009b: 319), 
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 Technically speaking the assets belong to the firm as a legal entity, rather than to 
any individual owner or to the group of owners taken as a whole. 
153
 Contrary to Van den Steen’s (2010: 468) view that legal personality matters 
mainly for an analysis of large firms with shareholders, legal personality is equally 
important for the entrepreneurial firm, although for most practical matters it may seem that 
“the firm (as a legal person) and the owner (as a physical person) are interchangeable.”  
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firms are able to create many kinds of durable transactions that individual 
consumers cannot. Accordingly, as Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 331) 
observed, “reputations can attach to firms rather than just to individuals,” 
substantiating Kreps’s (1990b: 116) framework in which reputation can rest 
“in a wholly intangible entity (the firm), as long as those who make decisions 
or take actions in the entity’s name have a stake in preserving its reputation” 
(see also Kreps, 1990a: 766). Paraphrasing Hart (2001: 1714), the firm’s 
independent identity is an important part of the stickiness allowing the firm’s 
reputation to be separated from that of its key personnel.  
These ideas sit well with Williamson’s (1983a: 519; 1985a: 167) 
observation that “credible commitments … appear mainly in conjunction 
with irreversible, specialized investments.” As Demsetz (1997: 429) pointed 
out, in order for the firm’s commitments to be treated as reliable by various 
long-term contracting parties the risk of asset disgorgement needs to be 
drastically diminished if not eliminated altogether. More precisely, according 
to Demsetz (1997: 429), it is clear that 
if each of the owners of a small share of equity could 
insist on the return of his pro rata share of the firm’s 
assets, as he can, for example, in dealing with an open-
ended mutual fund, the firm could be forced to disgorge 
assets. This would create a great deal of uncertainty for 
customers and suppliers if these were to find that long-
term relationships with the firm are important, for the 
overhang of the threat to the firm’s assets make the 
firm’s ability to honor such relationships problematic … 
To prevent disgorgement of assets, it is desirable for the 
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firm itself to own the assets once they are acquired with 
equity provided by shareholders.
154
 
It is now easier to see why ownership rights to assets are vested in the firm 
itself, and why contracts are made with firms rather than with their owners or 
their employees. As Blair (2003: 393; 2004: 45; 2005a: 35) observed, capital 
needs to be “locked-in” to prevent instability and enhance overall credibility. 
Indeed, locked-in capital can serve as the “hostage” discussed by Williamson 
(1983), unilaterally committed to ensure the credibility of all the firm’s 
future transactions, irrespective of any changes in firm membership. This 
kind of bonding is a key part of the glue that keeps the firm together, and 
without which, to paraphrase Hart (1995: 59), the firm would indeed be a 
flimsy entity, “constantly subject to the possibility of breakup or 
dissolution.” Without the separate legal entity in which ownership rights to 
assets are vested, “things fall apart; the centre cannot hold ,” to quote Yeats 
(1934 [1920]: 211) completely out of context.  
The legal system offers devices that prevent things from falling apart. 
Most notably, diffent types of “asset partitioning” (Hansmann and Kraakman, 
2000a: 393ff, 2000b: 810ff) or “entity shielding” (Hansmann, Kraakman and 
Squire, 2006: 1336ff), similar to the civil law notion of “separate patrimony” 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000a: 439; 2004: 7; 2008: 5, n.4; Armour, 
Hansmann and Kraakman, 2009: 6), protect in various degrees the firm’s 
                                                 
154
 Credibility is further reinforced, according to Demsetz (1995: 51), if “the firm … 
is granted a life that is in important ways distinct from the lives and desires of those who 
supply it with capital and other inputs.” This is in fact provided for in business entity laws 
of most jurisdictions. 
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assets from the personal creditors of its owners, and establishes an order of 
priority in bankruptcy.
155
 These aspects, as Hansmann (2013: 895) observed, 
have been generally ignored in the law and economics literature, where the 
focus has always been on “owner shielding” or shareholder limited 
liability.
156
 Nevertheless, a case can be made for the fact that entity shielding, 
rather than owner shielding, is the most vital aspect of the firm’s continuity 
over time.
157
 Indeed, as Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire (2006: 1336) 
argued, whereas there are many viable firms lacking shareholder limited 
liability, “significant enterprises lacking entity shielding are largely unknown 
in modern times” (see also Hansmann, 2013: 895-896).    
Similar considerations led Barzel (1997: 81) to define the firm as “the 
set of contracts whose variability is contractually guaranteed by common 
equity capital,” although he did not mention the firm’s attendant legal entity 
status.
158
 According to Barzel (2003: 57), any transacttion including this 
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 Lamoreaux’s (1998: 70) argument that there are different degrees of “firmness” 
anticipated to some extent these ideas. 
156
 See, for instance, Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull (1980), Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1985), Woodward (1985), Forbes (1986), Brander and Spencer (1989), Ribstein 
(1991), and Winton (1993). An overview of this literature is provided by Carney (1999). 
157
 In fact, as Blair (2004: 56, n.15) pointed out, “the idea of corporations as separate 
legal persons for purposes of holding property preceded the idea of limited liability.” The 
view that entity shielding guarantees continued existence of the firm despite ownership 
change contrasts with Eggertsson’s (1990: 183) claim that “it is limited liability that 
guarantees continued existence of the firm despite ownership changes.”  
158
 As Barzel and Suen (1997: 2) elaborated, firms are “essentially constellations of 
equity capital surrounding the contracts which [they] guarante[e].” Hansmann (2013: 893) 
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guarantee “occurs within the firm and ... is part of the scope of firm” (Barzel, 
2003: 57; see also Barzel, 2005: 26). Thus, contrary to Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976: 311) dismissal of the distinction between the inside and 
outside of the firm, and to Cheung’s (1983: 17) claim that there is no rough-
and-ready manner to decide whether a given contractual arrangement is “one 
or two firms,” the acknowledgement of legal personality helps ascertain firm 
boundaries in a relatively straightforward way (Hodgson, 2002: 44; Gindis, 
2009: 39).
159
 Both market governance and bilateral or hybrid governance 
involve at least two legal persons, that is, at least two singular firms. In the 
franchise case, contrary to Rubin (1978: 232), “since each franchisee invests 
in his outlet [and] has some guarantee capital” (Barzel and Suen, 1997: 4), 
each franchisee is unequivocally a separate firm. To claim that this may not 
correspond to the “economic” definition of the franchised organization does 
not alter the fact that each franchisee is a separate firm.  
                                                                                                                                     
similarly argued that, “as a general default rule of law, the contracts entered into by a firm – 
or by any legal entity, including a natural person – are bonded by the assets owned by that 
entity, in the sense that a patron with an unsatisfied claim against the firm can seize the 
firm’s assets to satisfy that claim.” Whether or not asset commitment is especially 
important as a “solution to multi-party action under uncertainty,” as Grandori (2010: 359) 
has suggested, asset commitment is an essential element of the viability of the firm.   
159
 The firm can be properly viewed as a “nexus of internal and external contracts” 
(Reve, 1990: 137ff). In line with Coase’s (1988c: 39) reminder that the emergence of the 
firm leads not only to the substitution of “intrafirm for factor -factor transactions,” but also 
to the substitution of “firm-consumer for factor-consumer transactions,” the firm should be 
viewed as “both … a nexus of contracts that [indirectly] link its employees to each other, 
and … a whole to its customers, suppliers, and stockholders” (Crémer, 1986: 33). See also 
Hermalin (1999: 106). 
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The clear functions of legal personality, together with the fact that one 
finds clear indications of its importance scattered in the literature, raises an 
important question: why has legal personality been generally absent from the 
theory of the firm narrative? In part, the answer is that  economists are 
interested in (economic) “substance” rather than (legal) “form,” and have 
therefore “downplayed or rejected outright the role of the law in defining the 
firm” (Masten, 1988: 185). There is indeed a widespread view that statutory 
legal rules and forms need to pass the market survival test to be of interest to 
economists. As Deakin (2012b: 344) explained, many economists downplay 
or ignore “the terms used by the legal system” based on the belief that “legal 
concepts … are ‘fictions’ which are liable to conceal the true nature of the  
[economic] forces at work.” What matters, from this perspective, is not what 
is formally provided by the legislator but rather whatever turns out to best 
suit the needs of rational contracting parties.
160
 To quote Williamson (1990a: 
4), since efficiency is enhanced when “individual parties to an exchange 
‘contract out of or away from’ the governance structures of the state by 
devising private ordering” (see also Williamson, 2002a, 2002b) , this is what 
economists should focus on.
161
   
                                                 
160
 This kind of argument leads many economists to  consider “law as an 
epiphenomenon of individual interactions” (Hodgson, 2003: 378). See also Hodgson’s 
(2009) discusssion.   
161
 The focus on “private ordering” and more generally on “order without law,” to use 
Ellickson’s (1991) expression, is a common theme across the new institutional economics 
(see Richter, 2008). Work along these lines ranges from “self-enforcement” in market 
transactions (e.g., Klein and Leffler, 1981; Barzel, 2002) to situations of “lawlessness” 
where the rule of law is either ineffective or absent (e.g., Dixit, 2004). Rajan and Zingales’s 
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Yet the inclusion of legal definitions does not mean that these should 
replace or overrule economic analysis. On the contrary, it only means that 
economists should not forget that parties’ rights and duties are often 
prescribed by law in ways that cannot be easily altered by contract, if they 
can be altered at all (see Franke, 1987: 143).
162
 This is why Behrens (1985: 
62) emphasized the necessity to build alongside an “economic theory of the 
firm” explaining the existence and nature of the firm a complementary “legal 
theory of the firm” explaining not only the distribution of rights within the 
firm but also accounting for the legislator’s provision of certain institutional 
arrangements. Curiously, despite the tendency to ignore legal concepts and to 
focus on private contracting and market forces, no properly convincing 
reason “for economists to relinquish a legally-grounded definition of the 
firm” has ever been provided, as Hodgson (2002: 38) has argued, particularly 
by “those that wish to dispense with a legally-oriented definition of the firm” 
(Hodgson, 2002: 55). 
A telling case is Rajan and Zingales’s (2000a: 219) rejection of the 
legal definition of the firm in favor of a “realistic” definition of economic 
organization. Their claim that the former is anachronistic is based on a 
misrepresentation. The first and foremost legal definition of the firm is that 
“each firm is a legal person” (Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 515).163 
                                                                                                                                     
theory of the firm is explicitly meant to apply in this context.   
162
 Coase (1992: 717) likewise argued that “the rights which individuals possess, with 
their duties and privileges, will be, to a large extent, what the law determines.” 
163
 Interestingly, in a very recent article, Rajan (2012: 1188) recognized not only that 
“the firm is a separate legal personality defined and protected by law” but also that “there 
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Economic complementarities between suppliers and buyers, however strong, 
do not eliminate the fact that contractual relations between suppliers and 
buyers imply that both are separate legal persons: the relation involves two 
separate firms. Economic complementarities of the kind Rajan and Zingales 
have in mind do not eliminate legal structure but are only possible thanks to 
this structure (Kraakman, 2001: 148). Zingales (1998: 498) correctly pointed 
out that the value of the legal entity derives from the claims it has on the 
underlying economic organization, but failed to see, as Schanze (2006: 73) 
explained, that the legal entity “‘carries’ the real organizational setup; it is 
the reference point for the enabling framework expressed economically as a 
nexus of contracts.”164  
Strikingly, Rajan and Zingales’s account of the third party owner, and 
of the resulting separation between ownership and control, reinforces  the 
case for the inclusion of legal personality in the theory of the firm rather the 
reverse. Following Blair and Stout (1999: 274, n.57), the third party owner 
should be properly viewed not as an individual (venture capitalist or 
shareholder) but as the “separate legal entity in which ownership rights over 
assets used in production are vested” (see also Blair, 1999: 85; 2005b: 611; 
Blair and Stout, 2006: 492), and in whose name central management acts.
165
 
                                                                                                                                     
are (unmodeled) benefits of legal boundaries.”  
164
 Schanze (2006: 72) could only lament that “there are a dozen ‘theories of the 
firm,’ meters of shelf space on the ‘theory of organization,’ and very little on the ‘theory of 
the juridical person’.”  
165
 Zingales (1998: 501) explicitly acknowledged this interpretation, while Rajan 
(2012: 1187-1188) has done so only implicitly. Commenting on Rajan and Zingales’s 
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Despite different terminologies and objectives, this view is consistent with a 
generally unnoticed feature of Demsetz’s (1983) work on ownership and 
control (see also Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). For Demsetz (1995: 50-51), 
ownership and control are separated not so much between shareholders and 
managers, but rather between the firm as an entity owning the assets and both 
shareholders and managers.
166
 This sort of separation is essential, as Spulber 
(2009a: 64ff; 2009b: 303ff) has argued, to an understanding of the nature of 
all types of firm (see also Hovenkamp, 2009: 386ff). To use Rajan and 
Zingales’ terminology, this separation protects the integrity of the firm. 
Considerations of this kind shed light on Masten’s (1988: 184) view 
that “the real issue in contemplating the nature of the firm … is not whether 
the relationships among members are contractual but whether the firm 
represents a distinct institution,” beyond the comparison between 
employment contracts and ordinary market contracts.
167
 As Spulber (2009a: 
67; 2009b: 313) observed, firms are “autonomous players” with objectives of 
their own: “the firm is an independent decision maker as a result of 
separation from its owners, employees, and trading partners.” This 
                                                                                                                                     
theory, Holmström (1999: 96) pointed out that “the third party could be a firm,” but failed 
to make the connection with his own puzzle. 
166
 According to Demsetz (1995: 50), this is a “largely unrecognized condition” for 
the entrenchment of management that seems to lead to the conclusion that “the cost of 
agency … is borne by the firm” (Demsetz, 1983: 376, n.3).  
167
 Accordingly, Khalil’s (1995: 49; 1997: 534) claim that institutional underpinnings 
cannot be the basis of the distinctiveness (or individuality) of the firm is mistaken once 
legal personality is acknowledged. 
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perspective also gives new meaning to North’s (1990: 4ff; 1994: 361; 2005: 
59) classic distinction between institutions, viewed as the “rules of the 
game,” and organizations, viewed as the “players.”168 Indeed, North’s 
original failure to explain how organizations can be players in markets 
alongside individuals was addressed in his new conceptual framework: “the 
organization must be a legal person capable of bearing rights and duties, and 
it must be independent of the identity of its individual members at any given 
moment” (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009: 152, emphasis in original).   
Overall, the inclusion of legal personality in the theory of the firm 
developed in Coase’s footsteps is unavoidable. Importantly, legal personality 
allows one to make sense of the efficiency-enhancing contractual structure 
that is both a key defining aspect of the firm, and the principal justification 
for its emergence in market economies. Furthermore, theorists of the firm 
need to recognize that it is only insofar that firms have legal personality that 
they can own and pledge assets, contract with one another, merge, and act in 
other market-like ways, not to mention access the legal system in the case of 
a dispute. These facts are typical of what theorists of the firm purport to 
explain, but cannot be fully understood as long as legal persons are missing. 
In a nutshell: without legal persons, there are contracts without contracting 
parties, and contractual theories of the firm that do not include legal 
personality are like Hamlet without the Prince. Although the inclusion of 
legal personality is essential for analytical progress in the field, this progress 
has been resisted, as is clear from Hart’s (2011: 109) review of Spulber 
                                                 
168
 North’s definition of organizations as “players” is an abstraction rather tha n a 
definition (see Hodgson, 2006: 10). 
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(2009a), that refers the reader to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) reminder that 
firms are not individuals with objectives of their own.
169
  
4.3 The reification illusion 
As we have seen, only legal personality can explain Holmström’s (1999) 
significant empirical regularity that assets typically belong to the firm, and 
that contracts, guaranteed by the firm’s asset commitments, are therefore 
made with firms as bona fide “contracting entities” (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 331; Hansmann, 2013: 893). As independent legal agents “with the 
right to enter into binding agreements” (Kornhauser and MacLeod, 2013: 
918), firms are distinct from their human constituents at any point in time. 
Beyond the reluctance to adopt legally-grounded definitions of the firm, the 
implication that firms are “autonomous players” (Spulber, 2009a: 67; North, 
Wallis and Weingast, 2009: 152) is perhaps the most important reason for the 
non-inclusion of legal personality in the theory of the firm. After all, as 
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 306-307) put it, rather than simply assuming that 
“firms are important actors” in markets, the purpose of the contractual theory 
of the firm is to look inside the “black box” by focusing on the “conflicting 
objectives of the individual participants.” 
                                                 
169
 Like Hart’s (2011) review of Spulber (2009a), Bates’s (2010) review of North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2009) similarly neglects to mention legal personality, even though 
legal personality plays a key explanatory role in both books.   
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The notion that groups of individuals act or can act like single agents is 
more often than not viewed with suspicion (e.g., Pejovich, 1990: 54; 
Furubotn and Richter, 1998: 3). This is why when Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) first defined the firm as a nexus of contracts in their landmark article, 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure,” they stressed that “the personalization of the frm … is seriously 
misleading. The firm is not an individual” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311, 
emphasis in original). Although they acknowledged “the artificial construct 
under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310, n.12), they argued that this is simply a 
“legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contractual relationships” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976: 311, emphasis in original; see also Jensen and 
Meckling, 1978: 36; 1979: 470; 1983: 298; Jensen and Ruback, 1983: 43; 
Jensen, 2003: 1).  
The fact that transaction costs are reduced, they explained, when 
“individuals and organizations – employees, investors, suppliers, customers – 
contract with each other in the name of a fictional entity” called “the firm” 
(Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 9) should not obscure the fact that, stripped to 
their essentials, firms and similar organizations are “pure conceptual 
artifacts, even when they are assigned the legal status of individuals” 
(Meckling, 1976: 548). On this view, firms are not really autonomous actors; 
they cannot be. Firms simply do not have what it takes to qualify as actors.  
Firms “cannot really have purposes” (Meckling, 1976: 559) or their own 
“objective functions” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311). Contrary to 
individuals, Jensen and Meckling (1994: 9) explained, “organizations and 
groups of individuals cannot have preferences.” Since they lack both 
purposes and preferences, it is clear that firms “do not choose in the 
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conscious and rational sense that we attribute to people” (Jensen, 1983: 327). 
Only “individuals can act and choose” (Brunner and Meckling, 1977: 81), 
and only individuals can therefore bear the costs (or benefits) of those actions 
and choices (Meckling, 1977: 29-30, n.36; Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 
10).
170
  
The problem with legal personality, therefore, is that the notion seems 
to invite fallacious anthropomorphic conceptions that lead to mistaken 
economic analyses, specifically when it comes to cost-benefit analyses. As 
Posner (1990: 186) observed, the fact that “many lawyers and judges … think 
that one can speak meaningfully of powerful or wealthy corporations, or of 
placing taxes on corporations rather than on [natural] persons,” is 
problematic. This position was recently summed up by Werin (2003: 317):  
The very fact that a company is a legal person with its 
own name, authorized to enter into legally 
acknowledged contracts and able to make 
pronouncements of various kinds exactly like a physical 
individual, leads many people to think of it as a unified, 
monolithic subject similar to a human being. But the 
fundamental difference … is that costs and losses – as 
well as yields – can ultimately fall on individuals only. 
So, by necessity, any benefit or burden of a legal person 
                                                 
170
 In his tribute to Meckling, Alchian (2006 [1983]: 267) agreed that “the firm is not 
an individual entity with a single objective,” and “does not have goals in the sense 
individuals do.” It is a mistake to think of the firm as an individual entity, he explained, 
even when all participants in the firm share the same objective.    
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is, in the end, a benefit or burden to specific individuals 
as determined by clauses of the contracts entered into by 
the company (plus legal rules such as tax rates). There is 
an unfortunate tendency towards misleading 
anthropomorphism not only in journalistic and political 
debate, but in professional texts by economists and 
lawyers as well. This only blurs the picture.  
While “ascribing human characteristics to the [firm] is often a useful 
linguistic expedient,” as Meckling and Jensen (1983: 10) conceded, one 
should not be snared by what Klein and Coffee (1988: 107) called the 
“reification illusion.” Regrettably, this illusion, that has “venerable roots in 
both law and economics” (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 10), has obscured the 
fact that “the ‘behavior’ of the firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the 
outcome of a complex equilibrium process” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 
311; see also Meckling, 1976: 567; Jensen and Smith, 1985: 93-94; Jensen, 
1983: 327; 1998: 1). In line with Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) view  of firms 
as markets, and with Alchian’s (1984: 46, emphasis in original) reminder that 
“thinking of firms as fundamental actors conceals the intra-firm competition” 
among individuals, Kreps (1990a: 723) captured Jensen and Meckling’s 
message: “firms are not entities, things of the rough category of the 
consumer; instead firms are institutions, in the rough category of the 
market.”171 This distinguishes the contractual theory of the firm from 
                                                 
171
 Kreps (1990a: 724) explained: “firms are places in which exchanges take place 
between individuals, exchanges that could take place in markets, but which are more 
efficiently consummated within a firm.”  See also Williamson’s (1979a: 239; 1996a: 378) 
view of firms, markets and hybrid forms as institutional matrices within which transactions 
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competitive price theory that “treats the firm as it treats the household” 
(Demsetz, 1992a: 11), namely as “representative individuals” (see Kirman, 
1992).
172
  
Strikingly, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311) observed, although “we 
seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an 
individual, we often make this error … about organizations” such as firms. 
Commonplace errors of this kind give rise to an acute problem: they lead 
social critics and policy-makers alike to holding firms responsible for things 
that firms as such cannot commit. Firms cannot “misbehave” any more that 
they can be said to “behave” in any particular way. Arguably, firms cannot be 
socially (or otherwise) responsible, since responsibility is an attribute of 
human beings only. In fact, firms “can no more be responsible than can a 
lump of coal” (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 10; see also Jensen and Meckling, 
1976: 311).  
These considerations about responsibility, that seem at odds with the 
rest of the theory of the firm literature, were particularly meaningful in the 
context of the mounting social criticism of big business best represented by 
                                                                                                                                     
are negotiated and executed. 
172
 Meckling and Jensen (1983: 10) adopted an instrumentalist position reminiscent of 
the realism of assumptions debate of the 1940s-1950s by pointing out that, given its higher 
scale of observation, the usefulness of competitive price theory and the overall explanation 
of the functioning of the market system may not be seriously impaired if the firm is treated 
“as if it were a wealth-maximizing individual.” Nevertheless,  they argued, this 
“anthropomorphic practice … has not been an unmixed blessing” since “it has distracted 
social scientists away from the study of … organizational form[s].” 
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consumer activists Nader, Green and Seligman’s (1976a) book, Taming the 
Giant Corporation.
173
 Just like Alchian and Demsetz (1972) had produced a 
contractual theory of why capital hires labor as a response to the radical 
challenge, Jensen and Meckling’s theory was a response to the activism of 
those that Posner (1974a: 341) called the “Nader-type muckrakers.”174 An 
important part of the identity of the contractual theory of the firm comes 
from this engagement with what Fischel (1982a: 1261) more elegantly 
described as the “corporate governance movement,” that in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s produced in both academic and popular press a host of variously 
justified calls for “corporate social responsibility,” “economic democracy,” 
and other “progressive” legal reforms.175  
                                                 
173
 The only other important contribution to the theory of the firm in which the 
problem of managerial responsibility was explicitly addressed was Arrow’s (1974) Limits of 
Organization. Contrary to Jensen and Meckling, however, Arrow (1974: 67) argued against 
simply brushing the matter aside, and emphasized the “functional value of holding authority 
responsible” (Arrow, 1974: 73). 
174
 There is a sense in which Nader and his followers, who were reformers but not 
radicals, composed the conservative side of the New Left. As Posner (1974a: 341) pointed 
out, Nader’s movement shared with the radicals the belief that “big business – the 
capitalists – control the institutions of … society.”  
175
 These pleas for “countervailing powers,”  to use Galbraith’s (1952) term, stemmed 
from the midcentury discussions of imperfect competition, separation of ownership and 
control, and managerial discretion, in which management was portrayed as “self -
perpetuating” (Galbraith, 1967: 73ff; Means, 1969:  20ff) and capable of “administering 
prices” in non-competitive ways (Means, 1962: 78ff; 1972: 292ff). Alongside these critical 
works, the managerial theory of the firm (Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Williamson, 1964) 
explored precisely the same themes. 
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In fact, a national debate on corporate social responsibility ensued from 
Nader’s (1965) revelations about General Motors’s reluctance to invest in 
safety measures in some of their vehicles, and from Nader-backed Campaign 
GM in 1970.
176
 This highly-publicized campaign, and its implicit 
endorsement by the Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC), led the firm 
to create a Public Policy Committee, composed of five outside directors, to 
advise management on matters concerning the public interest (see Schwartz, 
1971a: 432ff, 1971b: 764ff). As Schwartz (1971b: 769) commented, the 
growing social awareness of the late 1960s had “finally hit the corporate 
structure in th[e] country.” Importantly, the corporate governance movement 
pushed for regulation in view of accelerating the process.  As Arrow (1973: 
316-317) observed at the time, “ethical codes” of conduct “will not develop 
completely without institutional support” in the form of “taxes, regulations, 
and legal remedies.”177  
Nader and his followers urged the federal government to take over the 
chartering process traditionally left to states.
178
 Federal chartering of large 
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 Short for Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible .   
177
 This is why Berle (1954: 182ff; 1959: 90ff) combined his hope that managers 
would develop a “corporate conscience” and act in accordance with a “public consensus” 
with Miller’s (1959) suggestion to  constitutionalize corporate law. The objective was to 
facilitate business’ integration of the “paramount interest of the community” emphasized in 
the months preceding the New Deal by Berle and Means (1932: 312-313).  
178
 This proposal was discussed in detail by Nader (1972: 9; 1973: 67ff), Nader and 
Green (1973: 174ff), Nader, Green and Seligman (1976a: 71ff, 1976b: 62ff), Henning 
(1972: 918ff), and Schwartz (1972a: 72ff; 1972b: 96ff; 1972c: 132ff; 1976a: 1139ff). An 
overview of these debates can be found in Green (1983).       
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corporations, they argued, would allow government to ensure the 
independence of a majority of board members, and impose various disclosure 
requirements.
179
 This would help overcome the failure of states to curb 
managerial discretion given, in Cary’s (1974a: 663) famous words, the “race 
to the bottom” initiated by Delaware’s highly permissive (i.e., pro-
management) 1967 corporate law statutes. Although Cary, a former SEC 
Chairman, did not endorse Nader’s “politically unrealistic” federal chartering 
solution (Cary, 1974a: 700), he did suggest that “the time ha[d] come … to 
consider a Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act” (Cary, 1974b: 1101; 
see also Cary, 1974a: 700ff) in order to protect the rights of investors and 
consumers from unchecked managerial power. Moreover, even Folk (1972: 
312ff; 1976: 1080), the former Chairman of the Delaware statute drafting 
committee, agreed that higher standards of managerial responsibility would 
be desirable.
180
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 Although he did not endorse the federal chartering solution, pointing out that law 
cannot accomplish everything, Stone (1975: 119ff) argued in favor of increasing social 
control of the corporate decision-making process. 
180
 Similar concerns were raised at the international level in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, and strikingly similar reforms were suggested. Ball (1967: 29), for instance, 
proposed that it was time to create a truly international company law under which the major 
international corporations would be incorporated, a suggestion that was under consideration 
in the discussions leading up to the creation of the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations in 1973. In a parallel development, the Commission of the European 
Communities formally proposed to create a supra-national statute for the European 
company in 1970. See Rubin (1973) for a detailed comparison.   
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Following the introduction by a Nader supporter of a bill to establish a 
Federal Corporate Chartering Commission, the Committee on Commerce of 
the U.S. Senate held hearings on Corporate Rights and Responsibilities in 
1976. The pro-federal chartering testimonies of Nader, Green and Seligman 
(1976c), and Schwartz (1976b), justified regulation by reminding the 
Senators that the corporation, properly understood , is a “creature of the state” 
since the corporate charter is essentially a “contract between the corporation 
and the state” (Nader, 1972: 9).181 In effect, the state “provides the charter to 
the corporation, exchanging considerable privileges … in return for certain 
standards that have to be observed” (Nader, Green and Seligman, 1976c: 207; 
see also Nader, Green and Seligman, 1976a: 71-73). Given the privileges of 
legal personality, perpetual existence, and limited liability granted to 
corporations, Nader inferred, the state should be able to regulate its creations 
by setting standards of corporate behavior, and sanction socially 
irresponsible activities. The application of this doctrine at the federal level 
would avoid the race to the bottom that inevitably undermines individual 
states’ incentives and abilities to regulate their creatures.  
The anti-federal chartering testimonies of Manne (1976), Winter 
(1976), and Hessen (1976a) attacked the foundations upon which Nader’s 
argument was built. The view “that the State is the creator and the 
corporation is the recipient” is false, Hessen (1976a: 14) argued, and 
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 Berle (1954: 104) similarly wrote: “The corporation is … a creature of the state 
which charters it … Historically there is sound basis for insisting that the corporation has 
some color of state authority.” This view sat well with the notion that large corporations are 
state-like “political entities,” the government of which should be a public matter (e.g., 
Latham, 1959; Miller, 1960; Eells, 1960; Galbraith, 1972; Dahl, 1973).  
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designed to obscure the fact that “a corporation is created by a voluntary 
contractual agreement between individuals seeking to promote their own 
financial self-interest” (Hessen, 1976a: 9). The state is not a party to the 
contract; “nor does it give life or birth to the corporation ,” since “the role of 
the State is simply to record the formation of every corporation – nothing 
more” (Hessen, 1976a: 9). All the so-called “privileges” of corporations can 
be achieved by contractual arrangement, and in this sense corporations are 
just like ordinary partnerships (Hessen, 1976a: 21ff).
182
 Crucially, given that 
“the corporation is … simply a label which denotes a group of individuals 
banded together in a contractual relationship” (Hessen, 1976a: 14; see also 
Manne, 1976: 236), the corporation cannot be said to have any rights or 
responsibilities of its own.
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 This argument was central in Hessen’s (1976b) debate with Green (1976) in the 
press, but also in Hessen’s (1979a: 1332ff; 1979b: 16ff) subsequent writings. Likewise, 
Meckling and Jensen (1983: 10, emphasis in original) wrote: “The corporation is neither the 
creature of the state nor the object of special privileges extended by the state … The 
corporation requires for its existence only freedom of contract. Corporate vitality is in no 
way dependent on special dispensation from the authorities. Limited liability, for example, 
is not an idea specialized to corporations. Non-profit organizations, partnerships, and 
individual proprietorships, for example, all exhibit various forms of limited liab ility … 
Freedom of contract surely encompasses the right of parties to prescribe limits to liability in 
contracts.” Interestingly, Meckling and Jensen (1983: 10) cited Chief Justice Marshall’s 
famous opinion in the Dartmouth College case of 1819, according to which the corporate 
charter could be construed as a private contract, and that the legislator’s capacity to modify 
its terms were restricted by the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution (see Horwitz, 
1977: 112). For a detailed discussion of this view of corporations see Butler and Ribstein 
(1989: 770ff). 
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It follows that any regulatory intervention designed to increase the 
corporation’s accountability to the public only raises costs for the real 
individuals involved, particularly the residual claimants. Arguments in favor 
of intervention, Winter (1976: 45ff) explained, misconstrue jurisdictional 
competition as a race to the bottom when in actual fact state competition for 
corporate charters benefits investors by reducing the average costs of 
incorporation.
183
 The observed characteristics of corporate law result from an 
evolutionary trial-and-error process, and federally-imposed standards can 
only interfere with this efficiency-enhancing market mechanism.
184
 In 
particular, as Manne (1976: 226ff) opined, to the extent that Fama’s (1965a, 
1965b, 1970) “efficient market hypothesis” is correct, any attempt to impose 
outside directors representing the public interferes with the working of the 
“market for corporate control” (see Manne, 1965: 112ff; 1967: 265ff) that 
ensures the replacement of less productive managerial teams by more 
efficient ones. These are exactly Jensen and Meckling’s arguments.   
Whatever their shortcomings, Jensen and Meckling (1976: 357) pointed 
out, corporations have “survived the market test against potential 
                                                 
183
 See also Winter (1977), Hyman (1978) and Fischel (1978). Dodd and Leftwich 
(1980) provided empirical support for this observation that overturned Cary’s argument by 
presenting jurisdictional competition as a “climb to the top” (Fischel, 1982b: 920; see also 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985a: 182ff; 1985b: 446ff; 1985c: 1270ff; Romano, 1985: 229ff). 
Jurisdictional competition on the supply side and contractual freedom on the demand side 
form the basis of what Romano (1993) celebrated as “the genius of American corporate 
law.” 
184
 As Posner (1977: 307) explained, “competition among states to attract 
corporations for taxing purposes should result in optimal rules of corporate law.”  
 139 
alternatives” (see also Jensen, 1983: 328; Fama and Jensen, 1983a: 302; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1992: 271; Meckling, 1994: 16). Indeed, social critics 
and reformers have failed to realize that the modern private firm is a human 
invention having evolved to its present form over hundreds of years, during 
which “individuals have fashioned a complex network of contractual 
relations to more effectively serve the objectives of the parties to the legal 
fiction” (Meckling and Jensen, 1983: 9), and that these are best served when 
the only “social responsibility of business is to increase its profits ,” as 
Friedman (1970) put it.
185
 Any regulations that impose additional costs on the 
human beings involved, Jensen and Meckling (1978: 32) concluded, can only 
diminish the chances of the corporation’s survival as a viable contractual 
choice (see also Meckling and Jensen, 1977: 40).   
Tullock’s (1969: 290-291) call for a “new theory of corporations” to 
counter critics of the prevailing corporate system was answered by Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) arguments. In effect, Jensen and Meckling provided a 
theory of the firm foundation for the rising anti-regulatory corporate law and 
economics movement developed in Manne’s footsteps, that allowed Fischel 
(1982a: 1261) to emphasize Nader’s “lack of understanding of the economic 
… theory of the firm.” Jensen and Meckling provided not only a timely 
rhetoric but also a rallying label, “nexus of contracts.”186 It became common 
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 See also Friedman (1962: 133ff). Variations on these arguments appeared in 
Manne and Wallich (1973), Chamberlain (1973), Jacoby (1973), Rockefeller (1973 , 1974), 
Posner (1974b), Winter (1978), Demsetz (1978a, 1978b), Williamson (1979b), and Hessen 
(1980, 1982).  
186
 Jensen and Meckling’s influence is manifest in Posner and Scott’s (1980) reader 
on corporate law and economics edited mainly for law professors: the first section on “The 
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to argue that corporate law is “trivial,” to use Black’s (1990: 551ff) 
expression, because all or most statutory corporate features are the product of 
contractual choice and competitive market forces.
187
 It also became common 
to expose the idea of corporate social responsibility as hopeless nonsense. 
The “entity” that is supposed to “responsible,” it was argued, is a fictitious 
nexus of contracts that is mistakenly reified (e.g., Fischel, 1982a: 1273; 
Klein, 1982: 1523; Romano, 1984: 992; Baysinger and Butler, 1985b: 448ff; 
1985c: 1270ff; Butler, 1989: 100ff; Bainbridge, 1992: 971; Butler and 
Ribstein, 1988: 617; 1995: 145ff). In the words of Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1985: 89):  
The liability of “the corporation” is limited by the fact 
that the corporation is not real. It is no more than a 
name for a complex set of contracts among managers, 
                                                                                                                                     
Economics of the Corporate Firm” includes the excerpt containing their 1976 claims, and is 
followed by a section on “The Corporation’s Social Responsibility” criticizing Nader, 
Galbraith, and others. By the end of the decade, one commentator observed that “critics and 
advocates agree that a revolution, under the banner ‘nexus of contracts,’ has … swept the  
legal theory of the corporation” (Kornhauser, 1989: 1449). In the words of another, “some 
have accorded this notion the weight of scientific truth: it has been received in the legal 
literature as an ontological discovery with immediate and significant imp lications for 
corporate law discourse” (Bratton, 1989a: 409).  
187
 Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311, n.14) acknowledged the importance of statutory 
law, but argued that “common law and human ingenuity in devising contracts” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 357) are the ultimate explanations of the evolution of alternative 
organizational forms. A synthesis of this argument is provided by Meckling (1994).  
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workers, and contributors of capital. It has no existence 
independent of these relations.
188
 
Symmetrically, this means that all the so-called “corporate” rights can only 
“apply to individuals [and] not to imaginary ‘entities’” (Hessen, 1979a: 1328; 
see also Butler and Ribstein, 1995: 143). All rights, as Jensen and Meckling 
(1978: 36) concurred, particularly property rights, are “human rights” (see 
also Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 307, n.6; Meckling and Jensen, 1977: 41).
189
 
When sets of rights, such as the rights to contract, to property, to sue, and so 
on, are nominally vested in non-human legal persons, the real referents of 
these rights can only be the actual human beings involved, that is, the 
shareholders (Hessen, 1979a: 1336; 1979b: xv). Importantly, Hessen (1976b: 
15) continued, the corporate form, or any other legal form of business entity 
for that matter, produces no new rights, entitlements, duties or 
responsibilities that the participating individuals do not already have as 
individuals. An individual’s rights do not change by becoming a member of 
an organization: an individual does not acquire more rights, and his rights are 
certainly not reduced.   
From this perspective, it follows that criticism of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1978 ruling in Bellotti, that granted corporations “freedom of speech 
rights” under the First Amendment in the form of campaign finance, is 
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 This approach leads to “a benign … view of limited liability” (Ribstein, 1991: 82).  
189
 Barzel (1997: 4, n3) similarly argued that “the distinction sometimes made 
between property rights and human rights is spurious,” because “human rights are simply 
part of a person’s property rights.” See also Furubotn and Richter (1998: 81), and Allen 
(1998: 108). 
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misguided. Those who believe in the existence of a “business-government 
symbiosis” (e.g., Fusfeld, 1972; Miller, 1975; Lindblom, 1977), and 
denounce the Court’s extension of a human privilege to fictitious corporate 
entities that the Bill of Rights was not designed to protect (Miller, 1979: 
82ff; 1981: 24ff), have fallen prey to the reification illusion. They fail to see 
the self-evident fact that the real referents of constitutional rights such as 
“corporate speech” rights are the human beings involved, ultimately the 
shareholders, who are exercising their right to use the corporate form as a 
collective “medium of expression” (O’Kelley, 1979: 1382; Goss, 1979: 856; 
Pilon, 1979: 1321) in the marketplace for ideas.
190
 After all, concluded 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1989: 1426; 1991: 11), there can be no serious 
argument about the fact that “the ‘personhood’ of a corporation is a matter of 
convenience rather than reality.”191  
                                                 
190
 On the “marketplace for ideas,” see Director (1964: 3), Posner (1972a: 308ff), and 
Coase (1974c: 384). 
191
 In 2010 the Supreme Court’s ruling in the controversial Citizens United case 
similarly acknowledged “corporate political speech rights,” spawning precisely the same 
criticism (e.g., Nader and Weissman, 2010) and exactly the same line of defense (e.g., 
Ribstein, 2011).  
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Chapter 5. The corporate personality 
controversy 
It is said by many that the juristic 
controversy over the nature of corporate 
personality is dead. If so we have a corpse, 
and the opportunity to learn from its 
anatomy. 
 Hart (1954: 49-50) 
Like Hayek’s (1955: 57) rejection of the anthropomorphic fallacy committed 
when “attributes of ‘personality’ or ‘individuality’ … are ascribed to 
society,” Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) vigorous charge against the 
“personalization” of the firm was a warning against the reckless misuses of 
ordinary language in the social sciences, particularly for what they 
considered to be disputable political ends.
192
 Hence Jensen and Meckling 
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 Hayek (1973: 27; 1978: 72; 1988: 112ff) repeatedly argued that many of the 
enduring “collectivist fallacies” in the social sciences are due to anthropo morphic language.  
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dismissed Nader’s regulatory proposals by accusing him of falling prey to the 
reification illusion. Yet Nader certainly agreed with his opponents that 
corporate personality is a misleading fiction (Nader, Green and Seligman, 
1976a: 183; 1976c: 207; Nader and Meyer, 1988: 31), and never claimed that 
corporations are or can be literally responsible entities. He merely argued 
that they can and should be made accountable for the public’s benefit. 
Although this normative debate about the scope of corporate rights and duties 
is linked to opposite views regarding the public or private origin of the 
corporate form, the question of the real or fictitious nature of the corporation 
itself is also clearly raised.  
Economists are generally unaware that these questions have 
preoccupied jurists for centuries, and that the 1970s debate is a partial replica 
of a forgotten literature discussing the nature and origin of corporate 
personality. The argument of this chapter is that theorists of the firm can 
benefit from revisiting this debate. As the great jurist Hart (1954: 49-50; see 
also Hart, 1983: 36) pointed out, if “the juristic controversy over the nature 
of corporate personality is dead,” then “we have a corpse, and the 
opportunity to learn from its anatomy.” In the late nineteenth century, the old 
view that corporate personality is a state-created fiction, precisely the 
perspective resurrected by Nader, was supplanted by a private contract 
approach strikingly similar to Jensen and Meckling’s ideas (5.1). At the same 
time, in Europe, an alternative view of the corporation as neither contract nor 
concession dominated debates (5.2), while parallel American discussions of 
the “corporation problem,” as many referred to it, also made significant 
advances in corporate theory (5.3). Although the controversy died out by the 
1930s, several insights for the theory of the firm can be derived from this 
forgotten literature.  
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5.1 From status to contract 
In “The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State,” Anderson and 
Tollison (1983: 116) unequivocally claimed that “the emergence and spread 
of the corporation did not depend on legislation” but on “the interplay of 
market forces.” Likewise, Mahoney (2000: 892-893) argued that “the benefits 
of treating a business as something separate from its owners are so obvious 
… that it has never required substantial governmental assistance to achieve.” 
On this view, corporate personality and other features of “corporateness” can 
be “created by contract, supplemented perhaps by other common law devices 
such as trusts or agency” (Mahoney, 2000: 873-874). However, an overview 
of the history of corporate theory reveals that, overwhelmingly, jurists of the 
past held the exact opposite position, namely that “the corporation is, and 
must be, the creature of the state,” to use Maitland’s (1900a: xxx) words. 
This dogma was self-evident at least as far back as the Roman Empire, and 
was unquestioned by the glossators and commentators of the Late Middle 
Ages. The era of papal and royal absolutism, the mercantilist period, and the 
early industrial revolution were similarly dominated by this view of 
corporations.   
Roman civil law recognized that some groups, formed for the pursuit of 
a common purpose, were distinct from the collection of their members (see 
Duff, 1938: 33-37).
193
  Typically, universitates (from “forming one whole out 
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 Following Plutarch, Blackstone’s (1765: 456-457) Commentaries attributed to 
Numa Pompilius, the legendary second King of Rome, the creation in the late eighth 
century BCE of separate collective associations for every distinct trade and social activity. 
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of many individuals”) and collegia (from “being gathered together”) had 
what today would be called corporate personality: they possessed the legal 
capacity of asset ownership that could be seized and sold to cover 
commercial debts, as well as the capacity of suing in their own name.
194
 The 
organization and operation of these corporate forms was practically 
uncontrolled under the Republic, but the acquisition of a license from the 
state became mandatory under the Empire, whose rulers became concerned 
with potential conspiracies devised behind closed doors by groups of private 
citizens (Berle and Means, 1931: 414; Duff, 1938: 235). Since the licensing 
system gave the emperors the ability to modify the conditions of the license 
by threatening to withdraw it altogether the emperors, as Berle (1928: 4) 
argued, effectively created a “visitorial power” of the state over corporations.  
Berman (1977: 899; 1983: 120ff) and other historians have shown that 
Western legal science was formed with the rediscovery of the Code of 
Justinian in the late eleventh century, roughly at the time of the revival of 
long-distance trade in Europe.
195
 This means that the basic framework 
                                                                                                                                     
Vinogradoff (1922: 120ff) reported that corporate units were also recognized by the 
Athenians, and regulated by Solon’s laws from the late sixth century BCE onwards. The 
commonplace view is that “the corporation as a separate legal entity  is uniquely European” 
(Harris, 2009: 613), but some have argued that several legal forms exhibiting at least some 
corporate features could be found in ancient India in the ninth century BCE (Khanna, 2005), 
as well as in ancient Mesopotamia at the time of the Code of Hammurabi nearly four 
millennia ago (VerSteeg, 2000). Very little is known about ancient China in this respect.  
194
 Radin (1924-1925: 119) wrote: “fiction or not, and whatever it turns out to be, 
corporate personality in form and substance was a thoroughly Roman concept.” 
195
 Kuran (2011: 100ff) has argued that this rediscovery played an important role in 
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through which medieval civilists viewed the emerging corporate forms, 
including boroughs, guilds, monasteries, charities, and universities, was laid 
down centuries earlier in the Digests by Gaius: collegia voluntaria cannot 
have the status of a corporation unless it is conferred on them by law 
(Canning, 1980: 16; Bolgár, 1982: 80; Avi-Yonah, 2005: 773; Abatino, Dari-
Mattiacci and Perotti, 2011: 368).
196
 In other words, corporate personality 
cannot be formed by anyone at will; its creation is restricted to the 
acquiescence of the sovereign. Medieval canonists likewise justified the 
unified jurisdiction and state-like authority of the Pope over various 
organizations of the Christian community (Berman, 1983: 215ff; Greif, 
2006b: 309) that from the eleventh century onward came to be viewed as a 
corporate body (Pollock and Maitland, 1898: 495ff; Gierke, 1900: 22ff; 
Lewis, 1935: 49; Kantorowicz, 1957: 194ff; Berman, 1978: 596).
197
 
                                                                                                                                     
the subsequent “long divergence” between the Middle East and the West. Contrary to the 
Arab world, where the notion of corporate personality was absent because “Islamic law 
recognized only flesh-and-blood individuals” (Kuran, 2004: 73), the adoption of the 
corporate form of property in the West eventually allowed the West not only to emerge 
from the Dark Ages but also catch up and overtake the enlightened and advanced Arab 
world. See also Kuran (1997: 63; 2004: 73ff; 2005: 789ff).   
196
 According to Maitland (1900a: xvii), in the Digests “there is no text which 
directly calls the universitas a persona, and still less any that calls it persona ficta.” Gaius’s 
principle, as Dewey (1926: 667, n.15) explained, merely stated that “being a universitas or 
collegium is something dependent upon statutes … and imperial constitutions.”   
197
 A fundamental aspect of medieval religion, according to Tierney (1987: 164) , was 
that the church was not perceived as a collection of separate individuals but was seen as a 
corporate community, sustaining a life of its own, apart from the secular power. More 
precisely, as Greif (2006a: 253) elaborated, “because the church had an interest in 
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It is important to point out that despite its Continental flavor, this 
theory made sense in the Anglo-Norman feudal system, as a by-product of 
the Norman Conquest. Since virtually all land became the property of 
William the Conqueror after 1066, any “land that a person was allowed  to 
retain was considered to be a privilege or concession granted by the Crown, 
in return for which some compensation was demanded” (Hessen, 1979a: 
4).
198
 In this context, boroughs and townships seeking some degree of 
political autonomy claimed special privileges, such as the right to collect 
local taxes, to organize their own courts, and so on, that they were 
progressively granted (Pollock and Maitland, 1895: 634ff; Maitland, 1898: 
18ff; Raymond, 1906: 356ff; Laski, 1917a: 569; Holdsworth, 1922: 140ff; 
Pirenne, 1937: 52; Wang, 1942: 498; Frug, 1980: 1090ff). Hence Bracton, the 
most illustrious of thirteenth-century English jurists, qualified the borough as 
a universitas (Pollock and Maitland, 1898: 676). Describing this “transition 
from community to corporation,” Maitland (1898: 85-86, emphasis in 
original) wrote: “the town … gets its capital T … The Town is a person, and 
may be a landowner among landowners, lessor, hirer, creditor, debtor.”  
                                                                                                                                     
constituting itself as a corporation,” that is, to be viewed as a power separate from the 
secular powers of emperors, kings and feudal lords, “it promoted a legal scholarship to 
define and sanction the legal status of corporations.” The corpora te theory used in both 
ecclesiastical and lay contexts was essentially the same: corporations can be created or 
authorized only by royal charter or papal bull.  
198
 Merchant guilds similarly purchased their monopoly rights from the crown (North 
and Thomas, 1973: 100; Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994: 757; Richardson, 2004: 19; 
North, 2005: 141). See Black (1984: 18ff) for a detailed discussion of the guilds’ corporate 
legitimacy. 
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Incorporation, however, came with costs, as boroughs and other new 
corporations were now exposed to various forms of liability (Bouckaert, 
1991: 163). This issue was again theoretically dealt with by appealing to the 
basic principles of Roman law. By analogy to individual responsibility, the 
classical jurists believed that corporate culpability must be based on the 
recognition of collective guilt, and this was clearly lacking. There is no 
corporate mens rea, they reasoned, given the simple fact that corporations 
cannot intend and act as human beings can. As Pope Innocent IV famously 
explained in a 1245 decretal, corporations are persona ficta, that is, “names 
in law and not that of [natural] persons” (cited in Bolgár, 1982: 82; see also 
Kantorowicz, 1957: 305).
199
 Accursius, one of the great thirteenth-century 
Italian jurists, similarly claimed that “a corporate body is nothing more than 
the people who are there” (cited in Canning, 1996: 172).200 These 
formulations set the terms of the debate, and jurists thereafter multiplied 
references to the persona ficta that could only be created by the constitutive 
will of the sovereign.
201
  
                                                 
199
 Following Gierke, Innocent IV is widely credited as the father of this express ion 
(see Maitland, 1900a: xix; Koessler, 1949: 436ff). 
200
 This belief motivated Innocent’s refusal to excommunicate corporations, and his 
ruling that sanctions can apply only to the guilty officials (Bolgár, 1982: 81ff; Clarke, 2007: 
26). In modern language, Innocent argued that courts should hold individuals responsible by 
“piercing the corporate veil.” 
201
 For instance, in the famous Sutton’s Hospital case, Chief Justice Coke (2003 
[1612]: 355) observed that “incorporation cannot be created without the King,” since a 
corporation “is only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the 
law” (Coke, 2003 [1612]: 371), taking this to imply that corporations “may not commit 
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This view dominated the era of political centralization and royal 
absolutism.
202
 The great English, Dutch, and French chartered trading 
companies (e.g., Muscovy Company, Levant Company, East India Company, 
Hudson Bay Company, Virginia Company), that flourished after 1600, were 
publicly granted monopolies of trade and colonial management (Weber, 1927 
[1923]: 211; North and Thomas, 1973: 149; Supple, 1977: 440; Braudel, 
1981: 443; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003: 17; Hansmann, Kraakman 
and Squire, 2006: 1376). At the same time, they were organized as joint-
stock companies with tradeable shares, the market for which produced the 
first financial bubbles.
203
 Although proponents of the public choice paradigm 
(Hessen, 1979a: 29-30; Butler, 1986: 171ff; Harris, 1994: 618ff; 2000: 64ff) 
have challenged the traditional view that the Bubble Act of 1720 was the 
regulatory reaction of a panic-stricken Parliament to the financial crash 
designed to prevent further speculation (e.g., Carr, 1905: 172; Maitland, 1911 
[1904]: 390; Formoy, 1923: 28; DuBois, 1938: 2ff), the significant result of 
the Act was that it forbade the creation of joint-stock companies without an 
act of crown or Parliament.
204
 
                                                                                                                                     
treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicated, for they have no souls.”  
202
 The principle of the sovereign’s absolute power was justified by Bodin (1993 
[1576]) in France and Hobbes (1996 [1651]) in England, albeit based on very different 
rationales. For Hobbes (1996 [1651]: 221), absolute power was weakened by the powers 
wielded by corporations, that he likened to “worms in the entrails” of the commonwealth.  
203
 The Mississippi Bubble (1719-1720) in France, and the South Sea Bubble (1720) 
in England.  
204
 In the first English treatise on corporate law, written in this context, Kyd (1793: 
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Similar restrictions operated throughout Europe and the New World. In 
the United States, charters were granted to ventures deemed to be in the 
public interest, including commercial banking, insurance, education, 
railroads, canal-building, bridge-building, navigation, water supply, mining, 
and so on (see Evans, 1948: 10ff).
205
 But state grants became strongly linked 
with legislative favoritism, and “it became a key feature of post -Jacksonian 
populist reform to slay the dragon of legislative favoritism by making 
corporate charters available to anyone who asked for one” (Manning, 1977: 
7). Accordingly, the main transformation of corporate law throughout the 
nineteenth century was the gradual liberalization of business regulation via 
the widespread adoption of general or “free” incorporation laws that made 
incorporation a simple administrative matter (Hurst, 1956: 86; 1970: 56-57; 
1982: 25; Friedman, 1985: 512; Horwitz, 1985: 187; Millon, 1990: 206ff; 
                                                                                                                                     
41) declared that “to the existence of all corporations, it has long been an established 
maxim, that the King’s consent is absolutely necessary.” And only just a few years before 
the Act’s repeal in 1825, Chitty (1820: 122-123) was equally explicit: “the exclusive right 
of the Crown to institute corporations, and the necessity for its express or implied consent 
to their existence, is undoubted.” 
205
 Hence Kent’s (1827: 215) claim that “the corporation is a franchise” implied, as 
Maitland (1900a: xxxi) explained, that corporations hold “a portion of the State’s power.” 
In the first American treatise on corporate law, Angell and Ames (1832: 3, emphasis in 
original) similarly wrote: “a corporation is … strictly a political institution.” In this context, 
American courts strictly applied the ultra vires doctrine according to which transactions 
beyond the charter’s scope were either null and void or illegal (see Horwitz, 1985: 186ff). 
This is why, in the 1839 Supreme Court case of Bank of Augusta, Chief Justice Taney ruled 
that transactions across state borders were null and void: corporations, he argued, only 
existed within the jurisdiction that chartered them.  
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Freyer, 2000: 469; Blair, 2003: 425-426; Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, 
2006: 1386, 1394; Pagano, 2010: 119-120).
206
 Any group of corporators, 
regardless of the object of their venture, obtained the right to corporate status 
by simple registration, at a standard fee, provided that a certain set of 
requirements was met.
207
  
In the laissez-faire context of the Gilded Age, a period that witnessed 
the emergence of American industrial capitalism, the doctrine that 
corporations were public “concessions” gave way to the view that 
corporations were products of private “rights” and “freedom of contract,” in 
appearance confirming Maine’s (1861: 170, emphasis in original) famous 
dictum that “the movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a 
movement from status to contract.”208 The 1880s, as Horwitz (1985: 204) 
                                                 
206
 Early general incorporation laws were adopted in 1809 in Massachusetts, 1811 in 
New York, 1837 in Connecticut, 1838 in Florida, 1846 in New Jersey, Ohio and Michigan, 
and 1849 in California. In Europe corresponding laws were passed in 1844 in Britain, 1867 
in France, 1870 in Prussia, and 1883 in Italy. By the mid-1880s, general incorporation with 
shareholder limited liability was the norm in most Western jurisdictions.  
207
 An implication of the general incorporation laws was the demise of the ultra vires 
doctrine: corporations could be formed without restrictions on the type of activities 
pursued.  
208
 Maine’s dictum was not simply a generalization based on legal history but an 
illustration of his Victorian laissez-faire philosophy (Cohen, 1933: 558; VerSteeg, 1989: 
671; Woodard, 1991: 226). At the same time, “status” and “contract” are Weberian ideal -
types used to distinguish “archaic” and “modern” societies, much in the spirit of Tönnies’s 
(1887) “community” and “society,” or Durkheim’s (1893) “mechanical solidarity” and 
“organic solidarity.”  
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explained, were characterized by “the tendency to reconceptualize the 
corporation along partnership-contractualist lines.” In precisely the terms 
used nearly a century later by Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Hessen 
(1979a), proponents of the so-called “aggregate theory” of the corporation 
(Blumberg, 1990: 50; Millon, 1990: 213; Phillips, 1992: 438; 1994: 1065; 
Dunlavy, 2004: 69; Lamoreaux, 2004: 41; Avi-Yonah, 2005: 771), sometimes 
referred to as the “associational-contract theory” (Hager, 1989: 580) or the 
“partnership theory” (Mark, 1987: 1461), proposed that it was time to 
eliminate talk of “artificial persons” supposedly created by the state.209  
The new theory of the corporation was introduced in Morawetz’s 
(1882) A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Other Than 
Charitable.
210
 For Morawetz (1882: 24), the fact that in popular conceptions 
and business practices the key features of corporateness, namely being 
“considered as personified entities, acting as a unit, and in one name,” had  
been achieved by unincorporated partnerships, proves that “the idea o f a 
corporation does not necessarily imply a grant of corporate power by 
statute.” Accordingly, as Taylor (1884: 26), another key aggregate theorist, 
suggested, if substance is to be preferred over form, the “clearer and more 
serviceable conception [of the] corporation as consisting of the shareholders” 
should always be preferred to the misleading focus on the fictitious legal 
person. After all, as Taylor (1884: 14) explained, in terms of “physical 
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 See Horwitz (1982) for an overview of the history of the public/private distinction 
in American legal thought.   
210
 Morawetz’s approach to corporations was later described by Seymour (1903: 549) 
as “the first attempt to put [corporate] law upon a scientific basis.”  
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existences” there is only “a collection of [natural] persons” (see also Taylor, 
1882: 369; Morawetz, 1882: 1; Thompson, 1894: 395; 1895: 3; Trapnell, 
1897: 12; Clark, 1897: 9; 1909: 296-297; Clark and Marshall, 1901: 3; Purdy, 
1905: 3-4).  
Aggregate theorists believed that “a corporation is only a highly 
developed partnership,” as Cook (1891: 88) put it, and claimed that “a 
corporation is an association formed by a contract between the members who 
compose it” (Morawetz, 1882: 420). This mutual consent, they argued, is 
essential to the charter that, when granted by the legislature and accepted by 
the grantees, “constitutes a contract between the State and the corporators” 
(Morawetz, 1882: 420) that cannot later be altered by the state (Taylor, 1884: 
325; Thompson, 1895: 55; Clark, 1897: 51; Trapnell, 1897: 13).
211
 The 
implication of the partnership analogy, that “the rights and duties of an 
incorporated association,” particularly as related to property, “are in reality 
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it , and not of an imaginary 
being” (Morawetz, 1882: 2), soon found an echo in the courts. In the 1882 
case of San Mateo Justice Field opined that if courts were to “always look 
beyond the name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it 
represents,” they would realize that “to deprive the corporation of its 
property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their 
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 The view that the corporate charter is a contract between the corporators and the 
state (see also Harvey, 1906: 117-118; Wormser, 1914: 107-108) distinguishes the late 
nineteenth century version of the contractual approach from the modern version of Jensen, 
Meckling, and Hessen, although the reference to Dartmouth College and the implication 
that the state cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the charter are common to both 
approaches.   
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property or to lessen its value” (quoted by Mark, 1987: 1460; see also 
Horwitz, 1985: 1354; 1992: 69; Harris, 2006: 1469).  
This point of view was perhaps best expressed by Pomeroy, one of the 
corporate lawyers involved. According to Pomeroy (cited by Horwitz, 1985: 
178, emphasis in the original case transcript), 
whatever be the legal nature of a corporation as an 
artificial, metaphysical being, separate and distinct from 
the individual members, and whatever distinctions the 
common law makes, in carrying out the technical legal 
conception, between property of the corporation and 
that of the individual members, still in applying the 
fundamental guaranties of the constitution, and in thus 
protecting rights of property, these metaphysical and 
technical notions must give way to the reality.  The truth 
cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of protecting 
rights, the property of all business and trading 
corporations IS the property of the individual 
corporators. A State act depriving a business 
corporation of its property without due process of law, 
does in fact deprive the individual corporators of their 
property. In this sense … there is no real distinction 
between artificial persons or corporations, and natural 
persons.
 
 
The re-description of corporations as private associations of shareholders, in 
essence very much like partnerships, was accepted by the Supreme Court in 
its key ruling in the 1886 Santa Clara case that secured corporate property 
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from state interference under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
212
 The reason, as Harris (2008: 317) explained, is the same as in 
the 1978 Bellotti case: in the Court’s pro-business view constitutional rights 
were being granted to shareholders, not to corporate fictions (see also 
Horwitz, 1985: 176ff; Mark, 1987: 1462ff; Hovenkamp, 1991: 43ff). 
Although the Court famously and controversially did not wish to hear 
argument on the question (see Mayer, 1990: 581), the aggregate theory of 
corporations was not without conceptual problems, and these were 
immediately pointed out by various critics (see Horwitz, 1985: 206ff).   
Among these, Lowell and Lowell (1884: 3-4) warned that anyone “who 
confounds a corporation with its stockholders, who says that they are the 
corporation, or that it consists of its members, not only misstates the legal 
view of the matter, but is in danger of falling into endless confusion and 
error” (see also Anon, 1885: 114; Williams, 1899: 3). Indeed, if the 
corporation is an association of shareholders, then the view that corporations 
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 For Davis and North (1971: 77), the Santa Clara decision was one of the key 
changes in the institutional environment that led to American economic growth. As Hurst 
(1970: 65ff: 1982: 29) explained, the decision established the legitimacy of the corporation, 
thereby not only directing the entrepreneur’s choice of legal form away from the 
unincorporated partnership but also paving the way for further liberalization of corporate 
law. By the late 1880s, the restriction on corporate ownership of stock in other corporations 
was abolished in New Jersey, soon followed by Delaware and New York. Remarkably, this 
movement led Wilgus (1904a, 1904b, 1905) to call for federal chartering based on 
arguments later associated with Nader. Like Cary, Wilgus (1904a: 369ff) emphasized the 
laxity of state laws, an observation famously picked up in the 1933 case of Liggett by 
Justice Brandeis, who described the competition between states as “a race … not of 
diligence but of laxity.” 
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are owned by shareholders becomes logically problematic. Arguably, either 
shareholders are the corporation and hence cannot be said to own the 
corporation, or shareholders own the corporation but are certainly not the 
corporation. Perhaps more importantly, as Jones (1892: 78-80) observed, 
aggregate theorists fail to see that 
although it may be conceded that the idea of a 
corporation as a legal entity is “the impalpable and 
intangible creation of human thought” … further 
examination of the question will show that it is both 
confusing and unwise to speak of this idea as “a mere 
fiction,” or as “a figure of speech” … The invisibility of 
the corporate entity is no indication that … it is unreal 
… All rights are invisible but on that account they are 
no less real. All legal propositions are ideas, but they 
are not fictions. 
5.2 Neither contract nor concession 
The developments of corporate law and political philosophy in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century radically diminished if not eliminated the state’s 
involvement in the chartering process. In this context, as we have seen, the 
aggregate theory proposed by Morawetz (1882), Taylor (1884), and others, 
was essentially a conceptual and normative reaction to the new legislative 
framework. Hessen (1979a: 22) argued that their “inherence theory” of 
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corporations, as he approvingly calls it, namely that “men have a natural 
right to form a corporation by contract for their own benefit,” with  the 
implication that corporate rights and duties are in fact created and sustained 
entirely by the exercise of individual contractual freedom, “is the only theory 
of corporations that is faithful to the facts and philosophically consistent with 
the moral and legal principles of a free society.” At the time of Morawetz and 
Taylor, however, not all on the Old Continent would have subscribed to this 
view of social harmony. In Germany, in particular, an alternative legal 
philosophy dominated debates.
213
  
The nineteenth century was that of the historical school of law, an 
intellectual movement that developed in reaction to both the rationalist and 
universalist project of the French Revolution and the spreading proposals for 
codifying German law inspired by the 1804 Code Napoléon. In the wake of 
the deliverance from French rule, the school’s founder, Savigny (1815), an 
ardent opponent of codification, asserted that law is not a product of reason: 
law develops in a continuous, “organic” process, as do languages, customs or 
cultures, and its source can thus only be the historically-specific “spirit of the 
people,” the Volkgeist (see Freund, 1890a: 474ff; Montmorency, 1910: 52; 
Kantorowicz, 1937: 335; Wilhelm, 1968: 21; Stein, 1980: 60; Gale, 1982: 
131; Pearson, 1997: 28; Lindenfeld, 1997: 74; Thornhill, 2006: 133; 
Freeman, 2008: 1077ff).
214
 Nevertheless, and perhaps somewhat 
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 The terms of the particularly intense dispute in Germany influenced the structure 
of corresponding discussions in France, Italy, and Belgium. See Hallis’s (1930) detailed 
discussion of the Continental debates.  
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 Savigny’s influence on the German historical school of economics developed in 
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inconsistently, Savigny (1840) turned to Roman law to provide the material 
needed by the German nation in its quest for political and legislative 
unification. This led him to profess that corporate personality is a “pure 
fiction” (cited in Pound, 1959: 228) created by the state, given that human 
beings possessing volition are the only natural subjects of legal rights (see 
Hallis, 1930: 5ff).  
Savigny was criticized by other members of the historical school who 
saw in the age-old Germanic tribal customs the real essence of the German 
nation (see Thornhill, 2006: 207ff). From this perspective, Gierke’s four -
volume Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht (The German Law of 
Fellowship), published between 1868 and 1913, led the attack against the 
prevailing “straight-jacket of received Roman concepts” (Gierke, 1990: 
196).
215
 Gierke rejected the state-creation theory of corporations not only for 
its Roman flavor, but also because, like his contemporaries, he believed in 
                                                                                                                                     
the 1840s and 1850s by Hildebrand, Roscher, Knies, and others,  is a well-documented fact 
(Schumpeter, 1954: 423ff; Seligman, 1962: 5; Pribram, 1983: 213; Krabbe, 1992: 155; 
1996: 87; Tribe, 1995: 69; Hodgson, 2001a: 56, n.1), as is his influence on Maine (Pound, 
1937: 557; Stone, 1944: 101; Hoeflich, 1989: 17; Pearson, 1997: 30). In addition, Hayek 
(1973: 22) saw in Savigny an important forerunner of his own theory of law as 
spontaneously evolved custom. 
215
 The main ideas of Gierke’s theory of corporations were disseminated in the 
Anglophone world through Maitland’s famous translation of a section of volume 3 (Gierke, 
1900). Other partial translations include Barker’s translation of parts of volume 4 (Gierke, 
1934), Lewis’s translation of the introduction to volume 1 (Gierke, 1935), Heiman’s 
translation of several sections of volume 3 (Gierke, 1977), and Black’s translation of key 
excerpts from volumes 1, 2, and 3 (Gierke, 1990).  
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the freedom of association. However, Gierke (1934: 46) dismissed the view 
that a corporation is “nothing more than a network of contractual 
relationships between its various members,” and the implication that all 
corporate rights are to be “necessarily reduced to the collective rights of a 
number of individuals.”216 This view, Gierke (1935 [1902]: 140) argued, 
erroneously assumes that “reality … shows us only single men as subjective, 
self-contained unities” (see also Gierke, 1934: 96ff), whereas it is possible to 
“attribute to … the human association full reality and a unitary character” 
(Gierke, 1935 [1874]: 169, emphasis in original). 
The history of legal and political thought, Gierke (1935 [1902]: 144) 
observed, is full of “theories of the reality of super-individual unities,” all of 
which ascribe “some sort of reality … to corporate unity.” Although “this 
does not exclude the possibility of an illusion,” he conceded, “it encourages 
us to introduce hypothetically the idea of real corporate unity into the 
problem of legal corporate personality” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 144). For 
Gierke, there is real corporate unity, or “human associational unity” (Gierke, 
1935 [1902]: 139), when an association of individuals , by “partially 
absorbing their individuality, binds a group of individuals together into a new 
and independent whole” (Gierke, 1935 [1874]: 169), and thereby becomes “a 
single entity within a plurality” (Gierke, 1990: 243). In effect, Gierke (1990: 
242, emphasis in original) explained, when the bond of fellowship is strong, 
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 In the words of his translators, Gierke believed that corporations are “more than 
mere partnerships or simple collections of individual persons” (Barker, 1934: xxiv), and 
more than a “lifeless nexus of contractual relations between the associated members” 
(Barker, 1934: lxi). He therefore set out to show that “contract, that greediest of legal 
categories … cannot painlessly devour the joint-stock company” (Maitland, 1900a: xxiv).  
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the organized association tends to acquire a “living collective personality” 
that “exists independently of the separate personality of its members, and 
remains immutable and unbroken even when members change” (Gierke, 
1990: 242, emphasis in original).  
Crucially, since the bond of fellowship can turn a group of human 
beings into a “physico-spiritual living unity” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 152) that 
is in many ways similar to that of a singular human being, there is good 
reason to argue that the group, too, “has a will and can translate its will into 
action” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 144).217 Capturing these considerations in his 
introduction to Gierke, Maitland (1900a: xxvi) wrote of the corporation that 
it is 
no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State’s machinery, 
no collective name for individuals, but a living 
organism and a real person, with body and members and 
a will of its own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills 
and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills 
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 This is a variation on Plato’s “city-soul analogy” (see Republic 368e-369a) that 
has strongly influenced legal and political philosophy ever since. Relevant examples of the 
view that the state is a real person with a collective will can be found in the writings of 
natural law theorists (including Althusius and Pufendorf), social contract theorists (such as 
Reid or Rousseau), and idealist philosophers in both Germany (particularly Fichte and 
Hegel) and Britain (most notably Gierke’s contemporaries, Bradley and Bosanquet). See  
Coker (1910) for a detailed overview of nineteenth-century organicist theories of the state, 
including Gierke’s own position (see Coker, 1910: 76ff). Some, but not all, of these theories 
were the product of nineteenth century romaniticism, the first quali ty of which being 
perhaps the tendency to endow inanimate things with life (see Wolff, 1938: 502).  
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and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious 
person … It is a group-person, and its will is a group-
will.
 
 
It is important to notice that Gierke’s organicist and vitalist position, that 
corporations are “real persons” with real volition (see Hallis, 1930: 141ff; 
Barker, 1934: xxxii; Lewis, 1935: 56; Heiman, 1977: 37), allowed him to use 
Savigny’s “will theory” of rights, namely the Kantian idea that rights result 
from the right-holder’s will, in order to include rather than exclude 
corporations from the realm of law’s actual or potential subjects of rights 
(see Gindis, 2009: 32).
218
 Writing at a time when new types of corporate 
forms, including trade unions, cooperatives, mutuals, clubs, associations, and 
political parties were proliferating (see Turner, 1992: 179), Gierke provided a 
rationale for their gradual recognition as legal persons in both courts and 
legislation by claiming that “human associations are real unities which 
receive through legal recognition of their personality only what corresponds 
to their real [pre-legal] nature” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 143). Thus, when the 
law treats corporations and similar fellowships as persons it is not creating a 
convenient but nonetheless “imaginary unity” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 140). 
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 Like Savigny, Gierke believed that “in the realm of law, will is the soul of 
personality” (cited in Heiman, 1977: 38), but turned this claim against Savigny’s fiction 
theory of corporations along the lines introduced by Beseler (1843), Gierke’s mentor (see 
Friedrich, 1931: 655; Mogi, 1932: 13; Lewis, 1935: 18; 1968: 178; Dreyer, 1993: 14; 
Backhaus, 2005: 519; Harris, 2006: 1427).  
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Indeed, it is “not disregarding reality, but giving reality more adequate 
expression” (Gierke, 1935 [1902]: 143).219  
 Legal recognition of pre-existing reality plays an important role. As 
Black (1990: xvii) explained, Gierke thought that “the recognition of real 
group personality … is essential to human liberty, and that the arbitrary 
treatment of associations is the hallmark of tyranny.”220 This view was shared 
by Maitland, who contributed to the circulation of Gierkean ideas at the turn 
of the twentieth century not only through the translation but through his own 
later work as well (see Fisher, 1910: 157ff; Stoljar, 1958: 21; Runciman, 
1997: 89ff; Runciman and Ryan, 2003: xi).
 221
 Mack (1952: 249), Derham 
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 Proponents of the historical school examined the pre-legal sources of law, and saw 
that key legal concepts and rules had often codified pre-existing social-economic practices. 
If this observation was to have any normative implication, then surely it must be that the 
legislator should attempt to match legal form to historically-specific socio-economic 
substance rather than impose universal or imported rules. Gierke represented this position 
as he successfully campaigned to increase the share of Germanic influences in the various 
drafts of the German Civil Code (see Backhaus, 1998: 9; Harris, 2006: 1439). Gierke was 
particularly critical of the 1888 draft’s neglect to tackle the problem of acquisition and loss 
of legal personality (see John, 1989: 114), and its subsequent inclusion owes much his 
efforts.  
220
 Black (1990: xv) argued that there are clear parallels with Tocqueville and Mill on 
the central role of voluntary associations in modern society.  Although he was anything but a 
radical, Gierke found in producers’ cooperatives the truest mark of human associational 
unity, and therefore believed that they would be the pattern of the future (Black, 1990: xxv -
xxvi). Not surprisingly, Gierke regarded one-man companies that lack the associational 
element with great disfavor (see Wolff, 1938: 502). 
221
 Gierke’s organicist ideas, although an original import into jurisprudence, were 
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(1958: 10), and Hart (1983: 37) may be right that Maitland never fully 
believed in the German jurist’s mystical notion of “physico-spiritual living 
unity,” but the fact is, that statements such as, “the personality of the 
corporation … is in no sense … artificial or fictitious, but is every whit as 
real and natural as is the personality of man” (Maitland, 1900b: 335-336; see 
also Maitland, 1905: 195), inevitably connect him to Gierke. In any case, 
some but not all aspects of Gierke’s setup figured prominently in the work of 
Maitland’s followers.222  
Standing on Maitland’s shoulders, a new generation of British corporate 
theorists established an alternative to both Bentham’s (1864: 8) legal 
positivist claim that “law … is the will or command of a legislator” (see also 
Austin, 1832: 17) and Austin’s (1873: 235) contention that corporations are 
“persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in discourse.”223 Using 
                                                                                                                                     
certainly not novel in post-Darwinian Britain. Like many other scholars of his time, 
Maitland was influenced by Spencer’s (1851) views of the “social organism.” However, 
Maitland (1883) rejected Spencer’s (1879) individualist ethics.  
222
 Maitland was the intellectual father of the British political pluralists ( see Webb, 
1958: 45ff; Hirst, 1994: 10ff; Eisenberg, 1995: 65; Runciman, 1997: 64ff),  a progressive 
movement that focused on the place of specific corporations such as churches (Figgis, 
1914) or trade unions (Cole, 1917, 1920) within the general framework of the sovereign 
state (Barker, 1915; Laski, 1917b). “All pluralist theory,” Coker (1934: 170) explained, 
“shows the influence, on the one hand, of earlier sociological and juristic discussions of the 
state’s relation to economic and professional groups and, on the other hand, of broader 
ethical and philosophical ideas as to the value of variety and freedom in sel f-expression.” 
223
 According to Stein (1982/83: 509-510), Austin may have been the first to 
introduce the term “legal person” into English.  
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Maitland’s (1900a: xxiv) terminology, Carr’s (1905) treatise, the first to 
discuss the latest theoretical developments from the Continent, accordingly 
opposed Gierke’s “realism” (Carr, 1905: 180-185) not only to Savigny’s 
“fiction” theory (Carr, 1905: 161-163) but also to Austin’s “symbol” view 
(Carr, 1905: 177-179). Carr (1905: 154) nevertheless criticized Gierke’s 
dubious “anthropomorphism” for replacing one fiction by another. Although 
it is true, to quote Dicey (1905: 154), that “whenever men act in concert for a 
common purpose, they tend to create a body which, from no fiction of law, 
but from the very nature of things, differs from the individuals of whom it is 
constituted,” it is equally true, as Brown (1905: 369) observed, that “the 
group is not an organism.” Nor is it a “real person” in Gierke’s sense.  
Arguably, as Salmond (1902: 350-351, emphasis in original) similarly 
explained, “a group or society of men is a very real thing, but it is only a 
fictitious person.” The corporation’s pre-legal “personality” is a fiction, not 
its legal personality. In fact, from Brown’s (1905: 375-376; 1906: 269-270) 
point of view, the legal personality of corporations and similar groups is as 
“real” as that of the human individual. Over time, under very different 
circumstances, both have been recognized as capable of holding rights and 
duties, that is, allowed to “rank as a unit in the legal scheme” (Carr, 1905: 
185) by an increasingly permissive and yet regulative state. Notwithstanding 
conventional legal jargon, neither is properly speaking “natural,” if by this 
term is meant “pre-legal.” Moreover, the problem of rights should not be 
construed exclusively as a matter of volition. Despite there being, as Brown 
(1905: 374) pointed out, some sort of “psychical reality” arising from 
“unities of spirit, purpose, interests, and organization,” for in its absence it is 
difficult to explain how “the group becomes, or tends to become, a unit” 
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(Brown, 1905: 396), it seems that “no degree of psychological unity” 
(Brown, 1906: 269) will ever completely satisfy the will theorist of rights.       
This is why Salmond (1902: 234ff, 334ff) turned to the “interest 
theory” of rights that separated rights from volition. According to this theory 
associated with Jhering (1852), another important figure of the German 
historical school (see Seagle, 1945: 71ff; Zweigert and Siehr, 1971: 216ff; 
Stein, 1980: 65ff; Pearson, 1997: 29-30; Elders, 2005: 568ff; Thornhill, 
2006: 197ff; Duxbury, 2007: 25ff), rights tend to be assigned when and 
where there are interests sufficiently important to be legally protected (see 
Gindis, 2009: 32). Given that the attribution of rights is typically preceded by 
a “struggle for law” (Jhering, 1879 [1872]: 64) among individuals and groups 
within society, we only have rights if “there is something for us, and the 
power of the State recognizes this and protects us” (Jhering, 1913 [1877]: 49 -
50, emphasis in original). Significantly, Jhering accepted that the purpose of 
law is to recognize and protect not only individual but also collective 
interests, and encouraged their advancement (see Geldart, 1913: l; Wieacker, 
1995: 460; Tamanaha, 2006: 3).
224
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 The argument that law is both the result of conscious endeavors to solve the 
complex problems of social existence and a method of reconciling conflicting interests is 
Jhering’s “epoch-making making” contribution, as Pound (1911: 140) described it, to the 
sociology of law (see also Gurvitch, 1947: 77; Tamanaha, 2006: 61). Gierke was also seen 
as a predecessor by Ehrlich (1936: 24) and Gurvitch (1947: 72ff). Interestingly, Gierke had 
a contrasting influence on the founding fathers of modern sociology. Durkheim’s (1893) 
views of professional groups and of social reality sui generis have a distinct Giekrean 
flavor, and this is explicitly acknowledged in the preface to the second edition of Division 
of Labour in Society (Durkheim, 1902: xv), while Weber, a jurist by training having 
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Although Jhering himself subscribed to a view that Maitland (1900a: 
xxiv) called the “bracket theory” of corporations (see also Carr, 1905: 178; 
Pound, 1959: 250), namely that rights ultimately belong to human beings and 
are vested in corporations for convenience only, the interest theory of rights 
proved to be useful for corporate theorists who wanted to untie the Gordian 
knot formed by Gierke’s link between pre-legal group personality and legal 
personality. Indeed, in the aftermath of Salomon, a landmark case argued in 
1897 in which the House of Lords clearly upheld the principle of a 
company’s separate legal personality, even in the case of a one-man 
company, Jhering’s approach allowed the pragmatic English jurist, reputed to 
have “never taken dogmatic theories of any kind much to heart” (Pollock, 
1911a: 219), to come to terms with evolving legal conceptions.
225
 From a 
practical point of view, the valuable result of efforts to move corporate 
theory in a new direction was that “business men and owners of property 
would have far less difficulty in understanding their rights” (Hogg, 1906: 
177).   
A “working theory of the corporation,” as Geldart (1911: 94) put it, 
should be able to “explain the facts without assuming either a fiction or a real 
personality” (Geldart, 1911: 97). From this perspective, he continued, the 
                                                                                                                                     
published his first book on the history of partnership law (Weber, 2003 [1889]), generally 
rejected anthropomorphic and organicist conceptions in Economy and Society (Weber, 1978 
[1922]: 13ff), and was specifically critical of Gierke’s theory elsewhere (Weber, 1975 
[1903-1906]: 231-232).  
225
 See Grantham and Rickett’s (1998) detailed discussion of Salomon. 
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contractual theory of corporations will be of little service.
226
 Taken literally, 
the contractual view implies not only that there is a “contract made by every 
shareholder with every other” but also that there are “contracts between each 
shareholder and the directors, between each shareholder and every 
[supplier],” that is to say, that there is a set of “innumerable contracts to 
which [each shareholder] has not given a moment’s thought” (Geldart, 1911: 
97-98). Clearly, Geldart (1911: 98) concluded, “to escape from the fictitious 
person we have fallen into the arms of the fictitious contract.” Echoing this 
opinion, Laski (1916a: 420) similarly observed that “the contractual theory 
… can result in fictions compared to which the supposed fiction of corporate 
personality has less than the ingenuity of childish invention.”  
For Laski (1916a: 421), the issue of “property rights serve[s] to bring 
out the failure of the contractual attitude with striking clearness.” The claim 
that the property of the corporation is the property of its corporators because 
the corporators pooled their resources on a voluntary basis is simply contrary 
to the facts. An even cursory examination of the “true legal nature of 
corporate ownership” (Smith, 1914a: 69-70; 1914b: 143) reveals that once 
incorporated, the property thus pooled together belongs to the corporation 
itself as a matter of law. By the same token, the view that all the rights 
attributed by law to corporations belong to its human members is equally 
problematic (see Brown, 1905: 367). It is in their own interest that 
individuals sometimes give up some of their property rights because this 
allows them to realize the benefits of collective action, and the primary legal 
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 As Brown (1905: 367) put it, “the corporation is no mere partnership … Whilst 
partnership can be resolved into mere contract, a corporation implies a new status.”  
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device for achieving these benefits is by incorporation, that is, by filing for 
and obtaining a legally endowed collective capacity for property, contract 
and litigation (Laski, 1916a: 424; see also Vinogradoff, 1924a: 595).  
Whether or not this capacity is granted, and under what conditions, is 
ultimately a question of public policy (Smith, 1914a: 71; 1914b: 145). 
Political pluralists generally agreed with Vinogradoff (1924a: 604) that “the 
life of groups has two sides, i.e., the social contents which are real and 
produce the union, and the legal form which has to be arranged artificially by 
the State in order to safeguard public and private interests” (see also 
Vinogradoff, 1924b: 550). It follows, they reasoned, that it is a matter of 
policy to decide whether corporations should be held responsible for the 
actions of their directors or managers, and that this could be settled without 
focusing on the presence or absence of the corporation’s mens rea.227 Indeed, 
as Laski (1916a: 409; 1916b: 122ff) observed, given the well-established 
principle of vicarious liability the corporation can certainly be held 
responsible for torts, but also for non-compliance with labor laws, and so on 
(see also Geldart, 1911: 102; Baty, 1916: 65ff; Vinogradoff, 1924a: 602). 
                                                 
227
 These questions were central in the debates surrounding the 1901 case of Taft 
Vale, a case in which the House of Lords ruled that trade unions could be held liable for 
damages caused by their members. The unions viewed Taft Vale as a barrier to the right to 
strike, and one of the first significant political actions of the newly-formed Labour Party 
that entered Parliament in 1906 was to successfully promote the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 
that effectively overturned the decision (see Martin, 1958: 118ff). A detailed account of 
these events is provided by Geldart (1906: 206ff). See Webb and Webb (1920: 596ff) f or a 
general overview.  
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The state, from this perspective, can regulate corporations even though it 
does not create them. 
5.3 The value of corporate personality  
In the United States, where the movement from status to contract seemed to 
have reached an advanced stage, at least in comparison to Europe, the 
aggregate theory of corporations turned out to be surprisingly short-lived. 
Paradoxically, although Santa Clara and the legislative ethos of the 1880s 
seemed to have legitimized the corporation as a private institution by using 
the partnership analogy, thereby favoring the emergence of big business, it 
was precisely the emergence of big business that led to the demise of 
aggregate theory by the end of the 1890s. As Horwitz (1985: 176; 1992: 74) 
and many others have explained,
228
 it became difficult to argue that 
corporations, particularly the increasingly large-scale, concentrated 
manufacturing conglomerates, were essentially like partnerships.
229
 Indeed, it 
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 This narrative can be found in Mark (1987: 1472), Bratton (1989b: 1490), Hager 
(1989: 581), Millon (1990: 203), Phillips (1994: 1088), Tsuk (2003: 1874), Harris (2006: 
1471), and Adelstein (2012: 214). 
229
 Although at the dawn of the twentieth century only about 14% of manufacturing 
establishments were operated by corporations (Evans, 1952: 486), the wave of horizontal 
integration in American industry that began in the mid-1890s after the passage of general 
incorporation laws for holding companies in New Jersey led to extreme concentration. 
According to Lamoreaux (1985: 2-3), more than half of these “consolidations” absorbed 
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became hard to deny the reality of corporate organization, as something 
distinct from the aggregate of its shareholders, when vast economic power 
lay in the hands of professional managers and “absentee ownership,” to use 
Veblen’s (1923) celebrated expression, was more often than not the norm.  
In the years preceding Veblen’s (1904) caustic critique of the 
prevalence of pecuniary business interests over industrial employment, the 
“corporation problem,” as Cook (1891) referred to it, namely the pressing 
societal need to deal with the numerous abuses perpetrated by corporate 
promoters and managers exploiting their oligopolistic positions, had been at 
the center of public, academic and legislative debates (see Hurst, 1970: 
61ff).
230
 Like many of their contemporaries, progressive economists such as 
Ely (1887: 977) observed that an important part of the difficulty of finding 
“some contrivance which will render artificial persons amenable to the moral 
law” of liability was due to the fact that “the nature of corporations ha[d] not 
yet been fully explained” (Ely, 1887: 975).231 The need for a new theory of 
                                                                                                                                     
over 40% of their industries, and about a third absorbed over 70%. Chandler (1990: 75) 
described these events as “the largest and certainly the most significant merger movement 
in American history.”  
230
 Congress created a federal Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 to tackle the 
problem of pricing abuses by railroad corporations (see Sklar, 1988: 51; Berk, 199 7: 100ff), 
and took steps to restrict the widespread use of the trust arrangement as a means of avoiding 
corporate law regulations with the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 (see Hovenkamp, 1991: 
64; Friedman, 2002: 53ff).  
231
 This view was shared by Adams (1891: 75ff; 1897: 16ff) and other precursors of 
American institutionalism, including sociologists such as Small (1896: 403). In general, the 
issue of the “social control of business” (Clark, 1926) was central for members of the 
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corporations was particularly manifest in the debate surrounding the problem 
of corporate taxation. The Revenue Act of 1894 included a first attempt to 
tax corporations at the federal level (see Joseph, 2004: 76ff; Bank, 2010: 
40ff), and this required some justification.
232
  
From an analytical point of view, extant corporate theories seemed 
unable to come to terms with what Davis (1897: 274) described as the “new 
social forces” associated with the rise of the business corporation. In 
particular, the aggregate theory failed to explain the “voluntary inception” 
(Davis, 1897: 280) of corporations without reducing the charter to a 
“contract” or a “bargain between a state and a group of its citizens” (Davis, 
1897: 282), an idea that Williams (1899: 68), among others, claimed to be 
“founded partly upon a misconception of the true nature of corporations, and 
partly upon the failure to distinguish between ancient and modern charters.” 
The idea of a bargain with the state is misleading, Williams (1899: 74) 
argued, because the terms of the bargain cannot be really altered: after 
incorporation the rights and duties of shareholders are “fixed and determined 
… by law, the fact being that such rights and duties cannot in any way be 
affected by any contract among themselves” (Williams, 1899: 74).233 In 
                                                                                                                                     
institutionalist movement (Hodgson, 2004a; Rutherford, 2011).  
232
 See Seligman’s (1890) revealing discussion of the issues, particularly the thorny 
problem of double taxation. Although “the nature of the corporation [was] still under 
discussion” (Pepper, 1895: 296), the Act was struck down by the Supreme Court in 1895, 
only to later uphold the Corporate Tax Act of 1909 (see Bank, 2010: 66ff). The principle of 
corporate taxation was firmly established in the Revenue Act of 1913. An overview of the 
ensuing debates is provided in Ballantine (1921). 
233
 This led Williams (1899: 74) to observe that the position of a shareholder in 
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addition, he continued, although it is true that, unlike the privilege-conferring 
charters of old, the new charters are merely records of privately initiated 
incorporations, in both cases the practical result is the provision of artificial 
personality by the state, and this truth could not be evaded.  
To say that a corporation is an artificial person, observed Williams 
(1899: 10), “is not to deal in metaphysics or in subtle concepts, but is simply 
to state a legal fact of the greatest practical importance.” Unfortunately, as 
Davis (1897: 275, n.1) could only lament, the notion of artificial personality 
has been the “source of much confusion in legislation and legal decisions 
relating to corporations,” the main difficulty having stemmed from “the 
effort to apply to them legal principles elaborated in a system of law founded 
on individual social units instead of modifying the existing system so as to 
make its principles applicable to [composite] social units.” From this point of 
view, Davis (1897: 286-287) argued, the fact that an incorporated group acts 
and is acted upon as a composite unit needs to be ackowledged,
234
 and a link 
between this “compulsory unity” and the notion of artificial personality needs 
to be established. In this context, Freund’s (1897) The Legal Nature of 
Corporations represented an important innovation. Significantly, in an effort 
to meet the “demands of technical jurisprudence” (Freund, 1897: 83), Freund 
offered the first American discussion of Continental debates.
235
  
                                                                                                                                     
relation to the corporation is “one of status and not of contract.”  
234
 Given that “the members of a corporation act not as units, but as parts of a 
composite unit,” Davis (1897: 279, n.1) explained, “their social relations are … exceptional 
as compared with the regular social relations of individuals regarded as social units.”  
235
 Freund encountered Gierke’s theory before Maitland’s translation (Gierke, 1900), 
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Freund (1897: 49) attributed the failure of “prevailing theories of 
corporate existence” to the “orthodox view” of the nature of rights, namely 
that “undivided personal volition [i]s essential to the holding of a right.” The 
will theory of rights, Freund pointed out, is the erroneous belief that leads 
Morawetz, on the one hand, to reduce all corporate rights and duties to the 
rights and duties of their individual members (Freund, 1897: 12), and Gierke, 
on the other hand, to see “every corporate act [a]s the manifestation of 
corporate will and therefore of corporate personality” (Freund, 1897: 76). For 
Freund, a more adequate theory of corporations is one that rejects Gierke’s 
“strained view of the corporation as a real person” (Freund, 1897: 76) or “a 
new and distinct species of humanity” (Freund, 1897: 52) while accounting 
for the undeniable fact that for most if not all practical purposes law treats 
“corporation and member as two absolutely different [rights-and-duties] 
holders” (Freund, 1897: 41). The challenge is to show that corporate rights 
and duties are not “abnormal and illogical” (Freund, 1897: 48), and that “the 
treatment of the corporation as a distinctive legal person” (Freund, 1897: 83) 
is justified. 
From Freund’s perspective, the fact that this “technical conception … 
has grown up in connection with property and not with governmental rights” 
(Freund, 1897: 9) becomes clearer once rights are construed, following 
                                                                                                                                     
having studied in Germany between 1881 and 1884 (Kraines, 1974: 2). He not only 
transmitted German ideas but also “adapted them to the American reality” (Harris, 2006: 
1435; see also Horwitz, 1985: 218). In many ways, Freund had the mind of an economist, 
and his book could arguably be described as the earliest “rational study” of corporate law, 
to paraphrase Holmes (1897: 1001). Morawetz’s contribution was nowhere nearly as 
scientific or systematic as Freund’s, contrary to Seymour (1903: 549). 
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Jhering, as “legally protected interests,” the benefits of which are secured by 
some “active … element of control” (Freund, 1897: 15).236 The advantage of 
identifying the “two elements of a right, control and interest” (Freund, 1897: 
17), is that both their normal coincidence in the same natural person and their 
frequent separation can be explained within the same framework. The latter 
case is of particular interest to the corporate theorist, as corporations are 
certainly characterized by a “separation of control and interest” (Freund, 
1897: 16). Indeed, it is the specific form of separation, and more precisely 
the specific form of control, that distinguishes corporations from partnerships 
and other unincorporated associations. All these forms of association should 
again be distinguished from standard agency or trust arrangements that 
similarly involve a separation but lack the “voluntary acts of mutual 
connection” (Freund, 1897: 22) that are essential to associations.237  
In any association based on the “combination of resources,” Freund 
(1897: 19) explained, the purpose of which is to “bring returns to each party 
far in excess of what he would procure by the separate and independent 
                                                 
236
 Freund hence anticipated Maitland’s followers. Jhering’s (1879 [1872]) 
jurisprudence was already familiar and admired in America (see Tamanaha, 2006: 61ff; 
Duxbury, 2007: 28). In The Common Law, Holmes (1881: 208) had referred to him as “a 
man of genius.” 
237
 A related case in point identified by Freund (1897: 22) is the set of “relations in 
which a number of people are subject to a common authority without having joined each 
other by voluntary acts of mutual connection. In these cases there is strictly speaking no 
association, but a sum of individual contractual relations entered into by one person with a 
number of persons acting separately, and affecting them alike. There is an aggregate body 
… but for legal purposes its existence is irrelevant.”  
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employment of this own means,” a key issue that arises is whether the 
associates must act in concert to pursue their common interests. Given that 
disagreements over the proper course of action may arise, and in fact often 
do, particularly when the number of joint parties is large, the obstacle of 
“concurrent action” (Freund, 1897: 23) needs to be overcome. A common 
solution to this problem is the adoption of a decision-making procedure such 
as a majority rule (see Freund, 1897: 24ff), and this implies, according to 
Freund, a form of separation of control and interest: when associates agree to 
“principle of representative action” (Freund, 1897: 47), each associate 
accepts the possibility that the representatives of the majority in control of 
the common interests may initiate actions that they may not individually 
desire. It follows that the associates’ commitment to the association, despite 
this possibility, is of central importance. Without it,  the unity and the 
continuity of the association over time are uncertain.     
Indicative of the level of commitment is the associates’ choice of legal 
form. In fact, without legal form, an association will not only be “legally 
irrelevant” (Freund, 1897: 71) but will also be unable to exercise any 
“binding power over its members” (Freund, 1897: 21) since the undivided 
control over the association’s affairs will not be legally secured. An 
association of this kind will be constantly subject to the possibility of 
breakup and dissolution, to paraphrase Hart (1995). On the other hand, 
depending on the chosen legal form, “security both against outsiders and 
against defection on the part of the members” (Freund, 1897: 22) can be more 
or less successfully achieved. Freund’s argument is that incident to the 
adoption of a particular legal form is the legally binding separation between 
control and interest, and that this institutionalization of the principle of 
representative action is what provides the associates with the requisite 
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security. The greater the degree of separation recognized by law or the 
courts, the greater the security, and the more “the idea of the unity of the 
association as a holder of rights is justified” (Freund, 1897: 77).  
In Freund’s (1897: 24ff) terminology, the operation of the principle of 
representation that is an incident of, or originates with, the legal form itself is 
“original representation.”238 American courts, he observed, effectively 
recognize a form of original representation in partnerships. Courts have 
repeatedly upheld the business convention that “each partner is the 
representative of the firm” (Freund, 1897: 26) based on the reasoning that a 
partnership may outwardly “appear as a unit” (Freund, 1897: 30), that this 
“outward unity is expressed by a collective name and title” (Freund, 1897: 
40), and that in ordinary business dealings this implies that partnerships 
contract their own debts secured by the property held in common.
239
 With 
partnerships, however, the recognition of the separation is imperfect. While 
in some respects “the undivided control of partnership affairs may be 
strengthened by contractual stipulations,” Freund (1897: 27) clarified, 
partnerships lack an absolute protection against “express dissent” and “an 
unqualified recognition of majority rule” (Freund, 1897: 28). It follows that 
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 Original representation is fundamentally different from “representative action 
under express delegation, by which joint rights are commonly exercised” based on the law 
of agency (Freund, 1897: 23). The main problem with “the relation between agent and 
principal” is that it “does not solve entirely the difficulties of concurrent action” (Freund, 
1897: 23-24). 
239
 See Pepper’s (1898: 299ff) complementary discussion of partnership property. An 
extensive list of court cases in which partnerships were treated as de facto legal persons in 
line with business practices can be found in Cowles (1903).  
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“the principle of original representation fails in transactions beyond the 
ordinary course of business” (Freund, 1897: 27), where acquired reputations 
tend to be insufficient.  
By contrast, Freund (1897: 81) argued, original representation that 
comes with corporate status means that “corporations constitute distinctive 
parties to legal relations” irrespective of the scope of business, reputation or 
other factors that affect the unincorporated partnership, and ultimately 
condemn it to relatively small sizes. Indeed, a fundamental advantage of the 
corporate form is that undivided control over corporate assets lies in the 
hands of a “governing body,” whose position is “different from that of mere 
agents” because its binding powers cannot be revoked at any time, even “by 
majority [shareholder] resolutions” (Freund, 1897: 59).240 The separation of 
control and interest is accordingly complete, with the implications that “the 
rights held by a corporation are not the rights of any physical person, that its 
members are not the part owners of the corporate property, nor part creditors 
or debtors of the corporate claims and obligations”  (Freund, 1897: 9-10). An 
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 Specific members of the governing body may be under some conditions replaced 
but the undivided control over corporate affairs by a governing body is an incident of the 
corporate form itself. These considerations led Mark (1987: 1474) to describe “Freund’s 
brilliant exposition of the notion of undivided control over property within a corporation” 
as the “intellectual foundation of the position of management,” that anticipated Berle and 
Means’s (1932) classic discussion by a few decades (see also Mark, 2006: 1485). From this 
perspective, Freund anticipated aspects of both Blair and Stout’s (1999, 2006) “mediating 
hierarchy” model of corporations, and Bainbridge’s (2002a, 2002b, 2008) “director 
primacy” model. Relatedly, but perhaps more importantly, Freund’s exposition was the first 
to demonstrate the functonal value of corporate law.  
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incorporated association becomes a genuine “property-holding body” 
(Freund, 1897: 9) that can survive changes in membership, and this is what 
provides the ultimate security both against outsiders and against defection on 
the part of the members.  
The upshot is that the three “salient features of the body corporate,” 
namely “its unity, its distinctiveness, and its identity in succession” (Freund 
(1897: 47), justify the treatment of the corporation as a “human agency 
devoted to distinct purposes” rather than merely as a “number of individuals” 
(Freund, 1897: 81). That a qualified departure from the principle of 
individual rights is necessary in order to make sense of the idea of corporate 
rights and duties can be understood in a straightforward manner by Freund’s 
(1897: 77-78) “analogy of composite things”:  
If we treat a house, a ship, a forest, or a mine, as one 
thing, we do not deny that this thing is composed of 
many separate or severable parts, each of which may be 
a thing by itself. But in so far as the connection is 
operative, the part has no legal existence except as a 
part, and does not form an object of separate legal 
disposition; it shares the legal status of the composite 
thing, while as soon as the nexus is broken or only 
disregarded, it becomes a subject of independent 
treatment in law. In like manner we treat the 
[corporation] as one, disregarding the separate existence 
of its members as individuals, in so far as their 
recognition as such would make the protection of joint 
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interests an impossibility, i.e., in so far as it would 
disturb the conditions of undivided control. 
When Morawetz and others claim that the corporation is “in strict logic a 
fiction,” they fail to see that “fictions based upon the neglect of the irrelevant 
are very different from fictions which mean the substitution of an imaginary 
conception for a substantial nonentity” (Freund, 1897: 78).241 The dogmatic 
belief in the “axiomatic proposition that the aggregate is nothing but the sum 
of its parts” (Freund, 1897: 11) accordingly leads them to “unwarranted and 
fallacious conclusions” that any theory of corporate existence, corporate acts 
or corporate rights and duties, deals with “undemonstrable entities” (Freund, 
1897: 52).  
This contrasts with Freund’s own approach that proves that it is 
possible to satisfy the demands of technical jurisprudence “without having 
recourse to a fictitious entity” (Freund, 1897: 83), or to the more dubious 
ideas associated with Gierke. At no point does Freund deny that the 
corporation “becomes visible and active in and through individuals only” 
(Freund, 1897: 77). On the contrary, Freund’s theory is built on the fact that, 
far from being speculative, the idea of “corporate acting capacity” (Freund, 
1897: 55) is directly derived from acts by individuals in appropriate 
corporate positions: “when we speak of an act or an attribute as corporate, it 
is not corporate in the psychologically collective sense, but merely 
representative, and imputed to the corporation for reasons of policy and 
convenience” (Freund, 1897: 52). Indeed, Freund (1897: 75) argued, “when 
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 See Fuller (1967) for a detailed discussion of different kinds of fictions to be 
found in jurisprudence and language more generally.  
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we speak of corporate acts, or corporate tort … we mean … representative 
acts [or] tort.” As an “instrument of legal reasoning,” the objective of which 
is to “determine the incidence of the effects of legal acts done in the 
corporate name” (Freund, 1897: 82), there is nothing objectionable in the 
“idea of vicarious performance,” Freund (1897: 56) concluded.  
Freund’s ideas sat well with the views of some of his contemporaries.242 
Among these, Robinson’s (1900: 80) assertion that every “voluntary 
combination” formed for the pursuit of common interests is necessarily 
“unstable” unless “its existence is rendered imperishable by law,” seems to 
be an echo of Freund’s account of the value of corporate personality.243 Other 
prominent jurists, such as Pepper (1901: 267), explicitly emphasized the 
superiority of Freund’s representation theory over the Gierke’s organicist 
approach. Deiser (1909: 314) likewise acknowledged that Freund had 
contributed to strip Gierke’s theory of its some of its “spectral attributes,” 
thereby “offering a working basis for the solution of corporate problems.” As 
“the true nature of the corporation [was] gradually becoming plainer” (Davis, 
1905: 267), the “dogmatic speculations” (Gray, 1909: 54) associated with 
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 Freund’s theory received some attention mainly after Maitland’s translation, 
although his innovative work was not widely cited (see Harris, 2006: 1435; Gindis, 2007: 
275). In an early endorsement, Pepper’s (1897: 479) review of Clark’s (1897) t reatise based 
on the aggregate view of the corporation invited readers to study the more satisfying work 
by Freund.  
243
 Robinson’s observation is in line with Freund’s (1904: 356) overall position that 
the status of unincorporated associations is in many key respects “uncertain and 
unsatisfactory” because “the right to hold property in a corporate capacity” cannot be 
guaranteed by “contractual stipulations between the members.”  
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Gierke came to be used as a foil by corporate theorists concerned mainly with 
practical questions about corporate rights and duties. For many, this meant 
rejecting both concession and aggregate theories while acknowledging the 
key role of the policy and, by extension, of legislation (see Gray, 1909: 54-
55; Machen, 1911: 361).
244
   
These considerations played an important role in the vivid debates 
surrounding the legal status of unincorporated associations such as trade 
unions and partnerships.
245
 While the judicial recognition of the mercantile or 
“entity” view of partnerships as de facto legal persons was widespread (see 
Burdick, 1902: 217ff; Cowles, 1903: 343ff; Brennan, 1904: 208), it was not 
uniform, and this created some uncertainty, particularly in matters of 
interstate commerce. Responding to this situation, the drafters of the Uniform 
Partnership Act of 1914 attempted to agree on “such fundamental matters as 
the legal nature of a partnership, the rights of the members in partnership 
property, or even their relation to third persons” (Lewis,  1911: 100), but 
failed to do so, according to some observers, in a logically coherent manner 
(Crane, 1915: 789; Rowley, 1916: 128ff). Indeed, as one outspoken critic 
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 See Freund (1906) on the important links between jurisprudence and legislation.  
245
 The issue of the legal status of trade unions was particularly debated in the 
aftermath of Taft Vale (see Brandeis, 1903; Wambaugh, 1903; Anon, 1903). Brandeis 
(1903: 13) famously argued that unions should incorporate, becoming legally responsible 
for the actions of their members, as this would enhance the unions’ legitimacy in the eyes 
of employers, thereby reducing the “bitter antagonism” between capital and labor. Like 
their British counterparts, however, Gompers and other American labor leaders rejec ted this 
idea (see Meltzer, 1998). See Adelstein (1989) for a detailed discussion of Brandeis’s use of 
corporate theory before and after his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916.   
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pointed out, by refusing to formally define the partnership as a legal person, 
the drafters not only fell short of their stated objective, namely to link varied 
business practices to a single statutory form, but also failed to achieve 
consistency with existing legislation, most notably the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898 (Crane, 1915: 769; 1916: 842).
246
 
Overall, to borrow Justice Holmes’s famous expression in the 1908 case 
of Donnell, the new partnership statute interposed only a partial 
“nonconductor” between the partnership property and the partners: as Holmes 
himself put it a few years later in Francis, “partnership debts are debts of the 
members of the firm.” The separation of control and interest emphasized by 
Freund is accordingly incomplete. Contrary to partnerships, the corporation’s 
legal personality completely insulates corporate property from shareholders 
and their creditors,
247
 and this is the legal instrument that uniquely fosters the 
corporation’s unity and continuity over time. The resemblance between 
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 The Bankruptcy Act clearly construed partnerships as falling under the category of 
“persons” alongside corporations (see Anon, 1908: 391; Hough, 1908: 603; Burdick, 1909: 
396). The text of the Uniform Partnership Act was highly ambiguous in this respect since it 
recognized that partnerships as such could hold property but a t the same time that partners 
were co-owners of this property. As Drake (1917: 626) put it, the statute recognized “the 
composite entity of the group and not the unit entity of an extrinsic juristic person.” This 
misalignment between formal statute and business practices was corrected only in the 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1997, that defined the partnership as “an entity distinct 
from its partners” (§201a).  
247
 Elsewhere, Holmes argued that “the corporation is a person, and its ownership is a 
non-conductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its 
members” (quoted in Berger, 1955: 809).  
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Freund’s account and the notion of “asset partitioning” suggested by 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2000a: 393ff; 2000b: 810ff) is striking. 
Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire’s (2006: 1337ff) discussion of “entity 
shielding,” whereby partnerships benefit from “weak entity shielding” and 
corporations from “strong entity shielding,” can be traced back over a 
century earlier to Freund’s emphasis on what Blair (2004) called the 
“neglected benefits” of entity status.  
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Chapter 6. Hamlet with the Prince 
My contribution to economics has been to 
urge the inclusion in our analysis of features 
of the economic system so obvious that … 
they have tended to be overlooked. 
 Coase (1992: 713) 
Freund was truly a precursor of the modern law and economics of the firm. 
Unfortunately, Freund’s insights were lost in the subsequent debates leading 
up to Berle and Means’s (1932) classic The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Many of Freund’s contemporaries, including luminaries such as 
Hohfeld, continued to view of the notion of corporate personality with great 
suspicion, and argued that courts should ruthlessly pierce the corporate veil 
whenever necessary. As Hohfeld (1909: 289) put it in his influential essay on 
shareholder liabilities, “when all is said and done, a corporation is just an 
association of natural persons.” In many circles, commentators derided the 
Continental debates about the nature of corporate personality (Seymour, 
1903: 529ff; Singleton, 1912: 291f; Wormser, 1912: 496), and with the rise 
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of the legal realist movement that favored empirical rather than conceptual 
jurisprudence (Douglas, 1929; Radin, 1932; Cohen, 1935), the debate 
progressively died out.
248
 As jurists elected to leave the “heaven for legal 
concepts,” to borrow Jhering’s (1985 [1884]) mocking phrase, by the late 
1920s it was effectively dead. Not, as Derham (1958: 1) observed, “because 
the argument was won or lost or the problem resolved, but because the sweep 
of events moved on.”  
A legally-grounded view of the firm, linking the theory of the firm 
literature and the insights revealed in the preceding autopcy of the corporate 
personality controversy, is proposed in what follows. The issue of legal 
personality has been the source of so much confusion that it is crucial to 
demonstrate that its inclusion in the theory of the firm does not amount to 
reification. Much of the controversy about the nature of legal personality, 
both past and present, is due to some recurrent misunderstandings and 
conflations that can be avoided once the precise meaning of personhood is 
understood. Although there are now some works about the importance of 
legal personality (Spulber, 2009a; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2012; Van 
den Steen, 2010), the reception of the notion among economists is all but 
non-existent. Hart’s (2011) review of Spulber reveals the lasting and 
damaging effect of Jensen and Meckling’s rejection of personification. 
Chapter 6 begins by distinguishing three notions of personhood relevant to 
any discussion of legal personality such that the reification illusion is 
avoided (6.1). The resulting conception is shown to be relevant for our 
                                                 
248
 Detailed discussions of the legal realist movement can be found in Duxbury 
(1995) and Schlegel (1995). 
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understanding of the institutional structure of production (6.2), and a starting 
point for future research (6.3).  
6.1 The meaning of personhood 
Historically, the controversy surrounding the nature and origins of legal 
personality has been implicitly or explicitly linked to the issue of the nature 
and origins of legal rights, and more specifically to the question of the locus 
of legal rights and duties. These questions revolve around the fundamental 
distinction between “subjects” and “objects,” or “persons” and “things,” a 
distinction that goes back at least to Roman law, and is an indispensable 
building block of every system of law and political economy (see Allen, 
1940: 437; Cairns, 1941: 96; Pound, 1959: 266; Radin, 1982: 957; Ellerman, 
1988: Iwai, 1999: 587; Davies and Naffine, 2001: 24; Trahan, 2008: 9).
249 
As 
Blackstone (1766: 16, emphasis in original) wrote, the fact that “the objects 
of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons,” 
cannot be disputed, and the classical aphorism attributed to Gaius, that law 
pertains to persons, things, and actions, remains true today. Arguably, since 
persons and things are basic categories of what Smith (2004: 8ff) has called 
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 The distinction was present in the Code of Hammurabi, one of the oldest written 
codes of law in recorded history (see VerSteeg, 2000: 65ff).  
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law’s “ontological inventories,” decisions concerning who or what counts as 
a “person” from the legal point of view have profound implications.250     
The term “person” derives from the Latin persona meaning “actor’s 
mask.”251 This is why the Roman lawyer found it suitable to denote the 
subject of civil rights and duties. As Hallis (1930: xix) explained, a person 
“was one who could be a party in a legal dispute, one who could, so to speak, 
act in a legal drama” (see also Thorburn, 1917: 308; Duff, 1938: 3ff; Fuller, 
1967: 19; Derham, 1958: 12ff; Stoljar, 1973: 5; Hollis, 1985: 219; Teichman, 
1985: 177; Poole, 1996: 39).
252
 Accordingly, legal persons were the actors 
that courts gave legal standing to as dramatis personae. Not all human 
beings, however, had legal standing. In early Roman civil law, for instance, 
“a slave was a res” (Buckland, 1908: 3; see also Watson, 1967: 173), a thing 
that was owned, rather than a persona, and therefore did not have the right to 
own property or initiate any legal actions. Although in late Roman law slaves 
acquired some limited rights (see Johnston, 1999: 43), it was clear that they 
were not persons in the then legally meaningful sense of possessing freedom, 
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 The legal mind, as Vining (1978: 143) observed, will always look to “the persons 
that populate the legal world.” It follows, to use MacCormick’s (2007: 77) words, that it is 
difficult to gain “an understanding of law and how it works” without some “reflection on 
the idea of a person.” 
251
 According to Dejnožka (2007: 45-46), the term “person” could refer to the mask 
worn by an actor, the actor behind the mask, or the actor-in-the-mask.  
252
 Closely related to the notion of person was the the concept of capacitas that 
referred to “a status conferred upon citizens for the purpose of enabling them to participate 
in the economic life of the policy” (Deakin, 2006: 318). 
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citizenship or family rights (see Stein, 1999: 19; 2007: 22; Mousourakis, 
2007: 118). This conception of personhood as legal identity based on social 
status is not confined to the distant past but is central to any discussion of 
legal personality (see Pound, 1959: 262ff).
253
    
The original accent on the social face that each member of society 
wears in a legal or public forum, that List and Pettit (2011: 171) call the 
“performative conception of personhood,” contrasts with the definition of the 
person as an “individual substance of a rational nature” given in the sixth 
century by the theologian Boethius (cited by Marshall, 1950: 472; see also 
Hallis, 1930: xx; Teichman, 1985: 175).
254
 In fact, as Groarke (2010: 299) 
observed, “the most striking philosophical feature of the Boethian person is 
that the private and the public components of the person are separated from 
each other.” A comparable position can be found in Locke’s (1975 [1690]: 
335-336) claim that “person stands for … a thinking, intelligent being,” and 
that “consciousness makes personal identity” not only at any point in time 
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 Significantly, over the course of the nineteenth century, the abolition of slavery 
(1833 in the British Empire and 1865 in the United States) and the abolition of coverture for 
married women (1880s in the United Kingdom and the United Sta tes) both involved the 
acquisition of separate legal personality. Before their emancipation, these categories of 
human beings could not own property or be parties to contracts in their own right. In 
addition, the legal personality of various groups of foreigners also had to be progressively 
defined in each jurisdiction (see Mark, 2001: 8647).  
254
 This definition was endorsed by Aquinas in the thirteenth century, giving it 
“almost authoritative standing” (List and Pettit, 2011: 171), precisely at the time of 
Innocent IV’s famous definition of the corporation as a persona ficta. In other words, 
Innocent was denying that the corporation could be a Boethian person.  
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but also over time (see Davis, 2003: 5-6).
255
 Although Locke also argued that 
“person … is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit” that 
“belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law” (Locke, 1975 [1690]: 
346), he was less concerned with the legal practices of ascribing actions and 
their merit to specific individuals than with the conditions under which these 
practices would make sense at all (see Poole, 1996: 40).  
Distinguishing the “metaphysical notion” of the person as a conscious, 
rational agent from the “moral notion” of the person as an accountable agent 
possessing rights and responsibilities, Dennett (1976: 176ff) proceeded to 
examine the conditions under which the two notions overlap. Clearly, he 
pointed out, there are “conditions that exempt human beings from 
personhood, or at least some very important elements of personhood” 
(Dennett, 1976: 175).
256
 Indeed, the rights and duties of several categories of 
human beings that are not in full possession of their mental capacities are 
drastically diminished. Hence, infants, minors, the mentally disabled and 
those declared insane normally cannot be parties to contracts, make legally 
binding decisions by themselves or be held fully accountable for their actions 
(see Honoré, 1999: 17-18; Moore, 2000: 843; Cane, 2002: 143ff). Of course, 
this is not to deny that even when their actions cannot be imputed to them for 
these valid reasons, all human beings are “persons” not only in common 
                                                 
255
 Like the Boethian person, Locke’s person is an autonomous and private being, 
confined within a “first-person world” (Davis, 2003: 6). 
256
 This led Dennett (1976: 190) to conclude that “the concept of a person is … 
inescapably normative or idealized.”  
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parlance but also in the broad Kantian sense of “ends in themselves, i.e., as 
something that may not be used merely as means” (Kant, 2002 [1785]: 46).257 
These considerations reveal that there are three notions of personhood 
that need to be carefully considered in any discussion of legal personality.
258
 
First, there is the ordinary language view that “person” and “human being” 
are interchangeable or co-extensive (see Teichman, 1985: 177). This belief is 
consistent with the broad Kantian sense, and is axiomatic in discussions of 
“human rights” in which the fact that human beings are the “natural” subjects 
of rights from birth onwards by the mere fact of being born human, 
irrespective of considerations regarding their mental or physical state, is 
taken for granted (see Naffine, 2003: 361; Ohlin, 2005: 234; Chwaszcza, 
2010: 333).
259
 For proponents of this approach, the quality of personhood is 
not attributed by law to human beings (see Beitz, 2009: 52-53). On the 
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 As opposed to the thing, for Kant the person is a “rational being” (Kant, 2002 
[1785]: 46), namely “a subject who is capable of having his actions imputed to him” (Kant, 
1887 [1796]: 31-32). Elsewhere, Kant pointed out that “a person cannot be property and so 
cannot be a thing that can be owned, for it is impossible to be a person and a thing, a 
proprietor and the property” (cited in Davies and Naffine, 2001: 2).  
258
 A useful discussion of these three types is provided by Naffine (2003: 349ff; 
2004: 626ff). See also Davies and Naffine (2001: 57ff). In the same vein, Barker (1934: 
lxiii-lxiv) distinguished three notions of personhood. 
259
 More precisely, Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by the United Nations in 1948, stating that “everyone has the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law,” is intended to ensure that  every human being is 
treated as a subject rather than an object of law in every jurisdiction (see Jayawickrama, 
2003: 595-596).  
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contrary, as natural law theorists have long argued, positive law is 
subordinated, to quote Del Vecchio (1920: 132-133), to the law “which has 
its foundation in human nature” (see also Finnis,  1980: 23ff; George, 1992: 
32ff). As Finnis (2000: 11ff) has emphasized, human beings always have 
ontological, explanatory and moral “priority.”  
As if to illustrate the long-standing dispute between natural law and 
legal positivism, most if not all jurisdictions clearly distinguish between the 
human being and the “responsible subject” (Naffine, 2004: 628). In fact, 
many actual legal rules concerning property, contract, standing, 
accountability, and so on, rely on this second view of the person, even though 
this more restrictive definition allows only a subset of human beings – those 
of a certain age and in sufficient possession of their faculties  – to be fully 
admitted into the legal realm.
260 A person thus defined is truly a “moral agent 
[that] can be both morally and legally accountable for his action because his 
actions are guided by reason: he knows what he is doing and still chooses to 
act as he does” (Naffine, 2003: 362). The intuitively appealing link between 
moral responsibility, free will and agency, that Frankfurt (1969: 829) called 
“the principle of alternate possibilities,” has led many to see in the 
responsible subject the “ideal legal actor” (Naffine, 2009: 67) or the “default 
legal person” (Blumenthal, 2007: 1138).  
                                                 
260
 Although all humans may have some human rights (such as the right to life) from 
birth onwards, a human being is not born with civil rights and legal capacities (see 
McHugh, 1992: 458). Legal personality is acquired by degree: the typical adult becomes a 
full-blown legal person “by acquiring rights, powers, and duties, which gather 
cumulatively” (Tur, 1987: 123) over time.  
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Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of the firm’s legal 
personality is due to the tendency to address the matter with only these two, 
all too often conflated, definitions of personhood in mind. The inclination to 
frame the debate exclusively in terms of what Rovane (1998: 136) appositely 
calls “human-size persons” has obscured the fact that there is a third and 
more useful possibility. When the term “person” is defined in line with its 
original meaning as “mask” worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that “it 
is [only] the legally-endowed capacity to attract legal relations, and hence 
bear rights and duties, which defines the person” (Naffine, 2003: 366; see 
also Naffine, 2009: 30).
261
 Accordingly, this definition severs the misleading 
link between the flesh-and-blood human being and the legal person (Naffine, 
2003: 350; 2004: 626).
262
 Properly understood, as Tur (1987: 121) explained, 
the concept of legal personality is “wholly formal” (see also Kocourek, 1927: 
292; Heilman, 1927: 204; Smith, 1928: 293-294; Rutledge, 1929: 351; 
Nékám, 1938: 26; Lawson, 1957: 915; Derham, 1958: 5; Pound, 1959: 261), 
with the implication that legal persons may be “of as many kinds as the law 
pleases” (Salmond, 1902: 344; see also Pollock, 1911b: 110-111).  
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 From this perspective, Kelsen (1945: 99) defined the legal person as a “point of 
imputation” of rights and duties that arise in legal relations (see also Kelsen, 1992 [1934]: 
50), while Kocourek (1927: 57) claimed that “legal persons … in a scientific sense are 
conceptual points of reference” in the analysis of legal relations, and by which law adjusts 
human interests (see also Kocourek, 1922: 517; Warren, 1929: 841ff). This was essentially 
Freund’s (1897: 81) view. 
262
 The link between personhood and the will theory of rights is also usefully severed.  
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This is the conception of the legal person that opens the gate to the 
legal realm to candidates that would otherwise be excluded.
263
 On this view, 
there is no essential difference between the legal personality attributed under 
certain conditions to human beings and the legal personality attributed under 
different conditions to groups of human beings or organizations such as 
firms. In both cases, legal personality is not “natural” if this term is taken to 
mean “pre-legal,” as some of Maitland’s followers had pointed out (see 
Salmond, 1902; Brown, 1905; Carr, 1905; Geldart, 1911).
264
 Like the legal 
realm itself, legal personality is always “artificial,” to paraphrase Machen 
(1911: 17), but this does not mean that it is “fictitious” (see also Dewey, 
1926: 655, n1; Smith, 1928: 293; Fuller, 1967: 13; Dejnožka, 2007: 7).265 
Adopting this view does not imply that the attribution of legal personality to 
any inanimate thing, animal or association of human beings is wholly 
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 Alongside firms of various types, this includes idols, temples, ships, foundations, 
municipalities, states, regional organizations, and international organizations (see Duff, 
1927; Smith, 1928; Wolff, 1938; Aufricht, 1943; McDougal, Burke and Vlasic, 1960; Frug, 
1980; Collier, 1992; Tiunov, 1993; Paasivirta, 1997; Panico, 2012). Further extensions to 
trees, animals, species, artificial intelligences, computers, and electronic agents have been 
proposed (see Stone, 1972; Varner, 1987; Solum, 1992; Allen and Waddison, 1996; 
Teubner, 2006). 
264
 Dewey (1926: 657) and Barker (1934: lxxvi) also made this point. In Deakin’s 
(2012a: 115-116) words, “it is no more a ‘fiction’ to assign legal personality to 
organisational structures than it is to grant it to natural persons.”  
265
 As Koessler (1949: 449) put it, “speculations about the reality or unreality of 
corporate personality … have no more sense than speculations about the reality or unreality 
of the conception of property or of other established institutions of a legal nature.”  
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unproblematic.
266
 But it does create the conditions in which a discussion of 
these issues is possible without the undesirable emotional associations that 
often plague the debate.  
The history of corporate theory is replete with examples of emotionally-
charged and often politically-motivated uses of the notion of personhood. In 
fact, a recurring aspect of past and present disputes is that both proponents 
and opponents of corporate regulation have ably exploited the ambiguity of 
the term “person,” and have used the strategy of equivocation to justify their 
normative agendas.
267
 As a result, to quote Dewey (1926: 670), “the doctrine 
that true personality resides only in the ‘natural’ person has been worked in 
opposed directions.” Indeed, the view that “corporations are not persons” lies 
at the foundations of Nader’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s protection of 
big business and his related call for standards of corporate behavior (see 
Nader, Green and Seligman, 1976a: 183; 1976b: 207; Nader and Meyer, 
1988: 31; Nader and Weissman, 2010: 19). At the same time, however, it is 
precisely the argument that the “personalization of the firm … is seriously 
misleading,” as Jensen and Meckling (1976: 311) put it, that is mobilized to 
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 An interesting feature of the currently unresolved debate surrounding animal 
rights is that the protagonists hold contrasting views of legal personality. Whereas Wise 
(2004: 25ff) and others argue that at least some highly evolved animals should be formally 
recognized as legal persons, precisely because they are (or seem to come close to) sentient 
beings, opponents claim that the only legitimate legal persons are human beings (e.g., 
Epstein, 2004: 151).     
267
 In a related deliberately ambiguous argument Jensen and Meckling (1976: 306, 
n.6; 1978: 36; see also Meckling and Jensen, 1977: 41) claimed that all rights, particularly 
property rights, are “human rights.”  
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dismiss Nader’s proposals by members of the anti-regulatory law and 
economics movement (e.g., Hessen, 1976a: 14; 1979b: 40ff; Fischel, 1982a: 
1273; Klein, 1982: 1523).
268
 
Strikingly, both sides of this debate claim that firms are legal fictions, 
yet both sides appear to accuse the other of upholding the exact opposite, that 
is, of falling prey to the reification illusion. Of course, neither side comes 
anywhere near to accepting the Gierkean idea of the corporate “real person,” 
defined as a “psycho-spiritual living unity” with a will of its own (Gierke, 
1935 [1902]: 152). There is something suspicious about Gierke’s theory 
because it transforms what could in some respects be deemed as an 
interesting analogy between associations and human beings into something 
more. It is one thing to claim that when the bond of association is strong a 
group of human beings can be properly described as a singular decision-
making unit. It is quite another to argue that the group is physically a living 
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 As Flynn (1987: 137) explained, concepts such as corporate personality can be 
“manipulated as devices to hide and give effect to underlying ideological preferences.” 
Samuels (1987: 115ff) similarly argued that a case can be made for the fact alternative 
conceptions of corporate personality express the changing belief systems that accompany 
the transformation of the power structure of the economy. See Millon (2001: 51ff) for a 
more detailed discussion of what Smith (2001: 69) has appropriately called the 
“opportunistic use of the idea of corporate personality.” A conspicuous illustration was 
recently provided in the United States following Citizens United, where the unprecedented 
yet misguided grassroots campaign to “abolish corporate personhood” (e.g., 
https://movetoamend.org) intensified when Romney, implicitly referring to the view 
associated with Jensen and Meckling, commented in August 2011 that “corporations are 
people too” (see http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/politics/12romney.html).  
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unit (see Barker, 1934: xxix).
269
 From this point of view, Gierke clearly 
commited what Ryle (1949: 16ff) famously called a “category mistake.”270 
Although Maitland was generally more careful in his formulations, his claim 
that “if n men unite themselves in an organised body, jurisprudence, unless it 
wishes to pulverize the group, must see n + 1 persons” (Maitland, 1905: 198), 
did little to resolve the ambiguities of the corporate personality controversy.  
These and other misunderstandings can be avoided if the notion of 
personhood is disassociated from both the flesh-and-blood human being and 
the will theory of rights, and the original sense of the term is adopted. When 
the law treats the firm as a “person” nothing more than the fact that the firm 
has a point of imputation for rights and duties that arise in legal relations 
should be implied. It is important to understand, as Dewey (1926: 656) 
explained, that 
what “person” signifies in popular speech, or in 
psychology, or in philosophy or morals, [is] as 
irrelevant, to employ an exaggerated simile, as it would 
be to argue that because a wine is called “dry,” it has 
the properties of dry solids; or that, because it does not 
have those properties, wine cannot possibly be “dry.” 
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 The attempt to literally endow the group with life was, as Teubner (1988: 134) put 
it, “Gierke’s cardinal error.” Indeed, “to live or not to live … cannot be the question, the 
keystone to the nature of juristic personality” (Wolff, 1938: 504).   
270
 A category mistake can involve presenting a thing as being of certain kind when 
in actual fact it belongs to another, or attributing a property to something that the thing it is 
attributed to logically cannot have.  
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Obviously, “dry” as applied to a particular wine has the 
kind of meaning, and only the kind of meaning, which it 
has when applied to the class of beverages in general. 
Why should not the same sort of thing hold of the use of 
“person” in law? 
Perhaps, as Nékám (1938: 67) suggested, the typical use of the idea of 
personality to refer to a legally-endowed subject of rights and duties is 
inappropriate, and “the term legal entity is much better” (Nékám , 1938: 
70).
271
 Or perhaps, as Pound (1959: 261) similarly argued, the expression 
“legal unit” is preferable since legal persons are ultimately the “units of the 
legal order.”272 Whatever the label, the key point to acknowledge is that only 
the more formal view of the nature of legal persons is broad enough to 
accommodate the large variety of cases to be found in the real world. It 
follows that the adoption of this meaning of personhood, that helps “describe 
with simplicity and accuracy all the relevant phenomena of the legal system” 
(Nékám, 1938: 70), is inevitable. This broad definition is compatible with the 
fact that who or what is regarded as a legal person, and the number and 
quality of the rights and duties thus recognized, depend on the “changing 
evaluation of the given community” (Nékám, 1938: 116). This historical 
contingency equally characterizes human beings and firms.  
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 Hansmann and Kraakman (2000: 439) made a related point. See also Hansmann, 
Kraakman and Squire (2006: 1338, n8). 
272
 In the same vein, Fuller (1967: 14) observed that the term “legal subject” may be 
preferable. 
 199 
6.2 The firm, the market and the law 
This thesis has argued that in light of the basic principle to be found in any 
jurisdiction that only legal persons may own property and have the capacity 
to contract, and the implication that legally enforceable contracts can only 
exist between legal persons, it is something of a paradox that legal 
personality is absent from the dominant narrative in the contractual theory of 
the firm. Indeed, many of the things that theorists of the firm purport to 
explain simply cannot be accounted for when legal persons missing: without 
the device of legal personality, firms would not be able to own and pledge 
assets, raise finance, contract with one another, merge, and act in other 
market-like ways, not to mention access the legal system in the case of a 
dispute. It follows that a theory of the firm that overlooks theses  elementary 
institutional facts about the firm is like Hamlet without the Prince. Not 
surprisingly, it was argued, Holmström (1999: 75) found himself unable to 
account for “one of the most significant and robust empirical regularities to 
be explained by any theory of the firm,” namely that “economic  contracts are 
made with firms, not their employees or owners.” 
As we have seen, Holmström’s puzzle stems from the erroneous 
assumption that the efficiency-enhancing central contractual agent, identified 
by Coase as a core feature of the firm, is a flesh-and-blood human being or a 
group of such human beings, rather than the separate legal entity in which 
ownership rights over assets used in production are vested, and in whose 
name contracts are made. This mistaken assumption was inherited from 
Coase (1937) himself, and characterizes later stylized accounts of the 
emergence and development of the firm in a market economy (e.g., Alchian 
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and Demsetz, 1972; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
On this view, the most basic firm involves an entrepreneur,  who owns or 
controls access to the assets used in production, holds residual claim rights to 
the net value of the joint output, and is the only common signatory of a set of 
contracts with employees, suppliers, customers, and other agents. The 
subsequent separation of ownership and control merely means that managers, 
who are also employees, control access to the assets and play the role of the 
central contractual agent, acting in the entrepreneur’s name. This setup 
makes it difficult to come to terms with the significant and robust empirical 
regularity highlighted by Holmström.   
Unaware of this problem, theorists of the firm have concentrated on 
Coase’s second claim, but a consensus regarding the boundaries the firm was 
never reached. In fact, the organizational anonymity problem, or the apparent 
irrelevance of the institutional setting for contracting originally identified by 
Holmström and Tirole (1989: 69) in Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) story, was 
never solved in a satisfactory manner, even after the notion of asset 
specificity had fundamentally transformed the theory of the firm narrative. 
As Holmström (1999: 87) argued, the same problem cropped up in the Hart 
and Moore (1990) view of the firm, and it is equally clear that the issue was 
far from resolved in Rajan and Zingales (1998) account of the human-capital 
intensive firm. In all of these cases, there is no obvious way to determine 
whether a given contractual relation is inside or outside the firm, or whether 
it involves one or two firms, as Cheung (1983: 17) put it. From this point of 
view, Williamson’s (1991a) discussion of discrete structural alternatives, that 
highlights the different dispute-resolution mechanisms available to 
contracting parties in different institutional settings, is the only theory of the 
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firm that tackles the organizational anonymity problem head-on. 
Significantly, Williamson appealed to legal concepts and practices.  
However, Williamson stopped short of including legal personality in his 
account, even though it is precisely because firms have standing in courts as 
singular parties (see Iacobucci and Triantis, 2007: 524) that the notion of 
forbearance contributes to an understanding of firm boundaries. Since all 
forms of market and hybrid governance structures always involve at least two 
distinct legal persons, contrary to the unified governance structure of the 
firm, legal personality can more generally help identify the distribution of 
transactions. As we have seen, the benefits of including the firm’s legal 
entity status in the theory of the firm narrative are evident, and the implicit 
recognition of this fact can be found scattered in the literature. Importantly, 
as Demsetz (1997: 429) pointed out, a case can be made for the fact that the 
continuity and integrity of the firm are enhanced when the firm itself owns 
the assets used in production. This fits Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) argument 
about the efficiency-enhancing properties of third party ownership if, as Blair 
(1999: 85) has argued, the third party owner is viewed as none other than the 
separate entity created for the firm by the legal system.   
Since legal personality is clearly a transaction cost-reducing device (see 
Spulber, 2009a: 63ff) that is one of those “features of the economic system so 
obvious that … they have tended to be overlooked,” to paraphrase Coase 
(1992: 713), the thesis set out to investigate the reasons behind this state of 
affairs. Alongside the widespread view among economists that firms can be 
defined with little or no reference to law (e.g., Cheung, 1983; Alchian, 1984; 
Demsetz, 1988; Williamson, 1990a; Rajan and Zingales, 2001), based on the 
equally pervasive belief that “legal concepts … are ‘fictions’ which are liable 
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to conceal the true nature of the [economic] forces at work” (Deakin, 2012b: 
344), the lasting influence of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) ambiguous 
dismissal of legal personality was identified as the principal impediment to 
its inclusion in the theory of the firm narrative. Indeed, their portrayal of the 
“personalization” of the firm as a misleading legal fiction that fuels 
nonsensical talk of the firm’s objectives and responsibilities (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 311) has had a damaging effect.  
In order to reveal just how misguided and overblown this warning about 
the reification illusion actually was, Jensen and Meckling’s discussion was 
contextualised in the 1970s debate on how to tame the giant corporation (see 
Nader, Green and Seligman, 1976). Nader and other critics of big business 
claimed that corporate features such as legal personality were state-created 
privileges, and that this justified the state’s regulation of corporate rights and 
duties by imposing standards of socially responsible corporate behavior. 
Jensen and Meckling targeted this view when they emphasized the 
contractual essence of the firm, the specific features of which had “survived 
the market test against potential alternatives” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 
357), and the fact that all rights were “human rights” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976: 307, n.6; 1978: 32). Their arguments provided a theory of the firm 
foundation and a rallying rhetoric for members of the anti-regulatory 
corporate law and economics movement developed in Manne’s footsteps 
(e.g., Hessen, 1979a; Posner and Scott, 1980; Fischel, 1982a; Klein, 1982; 
Baysinger and Butler 1985a), who picked up and amplified the explicit link 
between legal personality, the reification illusion and inefficient state 
involvement in private business.  
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Accordingly, if legal personality is to be rehabilitated, this link, that 
reflects a normative agenda rather than undeniable institutional facts, needs 
to be severed. In view of showing that the notion of legal personality need  
not imply anthropomorphism and state regulation of business, the debate was 
put into historical perspective. The thesis examined the corporate personality 
controversy of the past, demonstrating that although corporate personality 
was indeed widely perceived to be a concession of state powers throughout 
most of its tortuous history, particularly before the liberalization of 
incorporation laws in the late nineteenth century, very few corporate theorists 
fell prey to the anthropomorphic fallacies that Jensen and Meckling presented 
as inevitable. If one excludes Gierke’s (1900) talk of “real corporate 
personality,” and some of Maitland’s (1905) more ambiguous statements, 
most corporate theorists discussed in this thesis generally avoided category 
mistakes of this kind, even when they advocated some kind of state 
regulation in response to abuses of corporate power that accompanied the rise 
of big business at the turn of the twentieth century.   
The clear view that emerged in Britain and America, as discussions 
focused not only on the nature of corporations but also on the practical 
implications of the extension of legal personality to previously 
unincorporated associations such as partnerships and trade unions, was that 
corporations were neither state concessions nor merely private contracts 
(e.g., Davis, 1897; Freund, 1897; Williams, 1899; Pepper, 1901; Brown, 
1905; Geldart, 1911; Machen, 1911; Laski, 1916a). It became increasingly 
acknowledged that dubious anthropomorphic statements stemmed from the 
traditional will theory of rights, and could readily be avoided by appealing to 
an interest theory of rights (see Salmond, 1902; Gray, 1909). As soon as 
rights were separated from volition, it became clear that the notion of 
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corporate rights and duties was no more “abnormal and illogical,” as Freund 
(1897: 48) put it in what could properly be considered as the first rational 
study of the value of corporate law, than individual rights and duties. In both 
cases, as Freund (1897: 81) argued, the term “person” denotes nothing more 
than a distinctive party to legal relations.  
When personhood is defined in line with its original meaning, that is, 
when the other senses of the term, those derived from ordinary language or 
psychology or morals, are set aside as irrelevant following Dewey’s (1926: 
656) recommendation, it is easy to see that a discussion of the value of legal 
personality, without any emotionally-charged and politically-motivated 
equivocations, becomes possible. From this point of view, contrary to some 
of his contemporaries who attempted to avoid the notion of corporate 
personality for the same misguided reasons as Jensen and Meckling (e.g., 
Morawetz, 1882; Taylor, 1884; Trapnell, 1897; Clark and Marshall, 1901; 
Purdy, 1905), Freund identified the separation of control and interest 
uniquely achieved by the assignment of legal personality as the principal 
service rendered by the legal system to an association of resources owners 
seeking to make a joint surplus. By creating a “property-holding body” 
(Freund, 1897: 9) entirely distinct from all the human beings involved, and 
by attributing undivided control over this property to a governing body 
whose position cannot be revoked, the law provides “security both against 
outsiders and against defection on the part of the members” (Freund, 1897: 
22) that cannot be otherwise reliably achieved. Different legal forms support 
different degrees of security, but separation of control and interest is 
common to all these forms. 
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By emphasizing the neglected benefits of entity status, to borrow 
Blair’s (2004) expression, Freund demonstrated that substance could not be 
easily divorced from form, anticipating some of the recent work in this area 
(e.g., Blair and Stout, 1999; Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000a). Taken 
together, these ideas can be used to rehabilitate the notion of legal 
personality, and reverse the tendency to downplay or ignore the role of law in 
constituting and defining the firm (see Behrens, 1985; Franke, 1987; Masten, 
1988; Hodgson, 2002). Arguably, the “legal-economic nexus” discussed by 
Samuels (1989), namely the fundamental “interrelations between legal and 
economic processes” (Samuels, 2007: 4), cannot be ignored. Given that it is 
difficult to understand the institutional structure of production without 
acknowledging, as Coase (1992: 717-718) put it, that “the legal system will 
have a profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in 
certain respects be said to control it” (see also Coase, 1988a: 10), it is clear 
that a legally-grounded view of the firm must take into account “what is 
known empirically of the way legal systems constitute and regulate the 
business enterprise” (Deakin, 2012b: 347-348).  
From this perspective, whether it is set up by a single entrepreneur or 
by an association of resource owners, it is clear that the firm comes into 
existence following a registration or incorporation procedure, and becomes 
fully operational with the acquisition of legal personality, namely the legally 
endowed capacity for property, contract and litigation that allows what is 
fundamentally a specialized economic undertaking “to rank as a unit in the 
legal scheme,” as Carr (1905: 185) put it. The constitutive procedure that 
creates a singular point of imputation for rights and duties, entirely distinct 
from all of the human beings involved, that acts as a “nexus for contracts” 
(Hansmann, 2013: 892, emphasis in original) literally carrying the 
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organizational framework of the firm (see Schanze, 2006; Deakin, 2012a), is 
truly what Spulber (2009a: 152) described as a “foundational shift.” The 
value of operating as a legal entity lies in the separation that it introduces 
between the assets locked-in to guarantee the firm’s contractual 
commitments, and the human beings involved. This allows the firm’s 
commitments to survive changes in the firm’s membership. Armed with this 
device, the firm’s founders can pledge assets, raise finance and do business 
in the firm’s own name, such that some even thrive. 
A legally-grounded view of the firm must recognize, as Deakin (2009: 
41) observed, that “many of the rules relating to the business enterprise … 
are statutory in origin.” This fact points to the limitations of theories of the 
firm based entirely on the “lens of contract” and the corresponding “private 
ordering” framework (see Williamson, 2002a; 2002b). That this framework 
has generated numerous insights is undeniable, but this has come at the  cost 
of underplaying the role of statutory law and the state more generally in the 
emergence and rise of the firm in history. This is remarkably clear when it 
comes to the issue of legal personality. Market forces and network 
externalities play an important role in the diffusion and adoption dynamics of 
the institutional arrangements defining the firm, but this does not mean that 
the legislator’s role can be explained away or otherwise ignored. Indeed, 
considerations of “public ordering” are needed from both the analytical and 
historical perspectives to account for the “emergence of new organizational 
species” (Pagano, 2011: 379; see also Pagano, 2010: 121ff; 2012: 1272) such 
as firms. Hence the idea that “in the beginning there were markets” 
(Williamson, 1975: 20) should not be accorded more weight than it deserves.  
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Although it is true that some elements of entity shielding, such as an 
order of priority in bankruptcy, had been achieved by some unincorporated 
associations before the corresponding legislation and the common 
availability of the corporate form (see Lamoreaux, 1995; Getzler and 
Macnair, 2005), it is equally true that legislation enacted over the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries standardized varied business practices, 
significantly reducing the transaction costs involved in undertaking business 
operations at a larger scale and over greater distances. These changes in the 
institutional environment created favorable conditions for the accumulation 
of the specific assets that came to define advanced industrial economies (see 
Blair, 2003; Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire, 2006; Lamoreaux and 
Rosenthal, 2006). Thanks to the “institutional glue” (Gindis, 2007: 279; 
2009: 40) provided by legal entity status and other complementary 
institutions, increasingly bigger and far-reaching things did not fall apart; 
their centers held with ever-increasing amounts of locked-in capital. 
The firm’s expansion through vertical integration depends on “make-or-
buy” decisions that contribute, as theorists of the firm have long argued, to 
the definition of firm boundaries. Nonetheless, the presentation of firms and 
markets as substitutes is misleading because it encourages the conflation of 
markets and market transactions. Market transactions are events and relations 
between firms and other economic actors, as Simon’s (1991: 27) “visitor 
from Mars” would concur. Markets, however, are not reducible to market 
transactions since they are organized systems of property rights exchange 
(see Hodgson, 2002, 2008a, 2008b) in which some of the most important 
actors are firms. The legal structure that is essential for markets relies on the 
institutional fact that firms are singular legal entities that can hold property 
and act in certain market-like ways (e.g., engage in market transactions, 
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compete, merge). It is clear, from this perspective, that the difference 
between the firm and the market is a difference in kind rather than in degree 
(see Gindis, 2009: 41). There is no continuum between firms and markets. 
Far from being substitutes, firms and markets are complementary institutions 
of capitalism.  
A working definition of the firm can now be suggested. The firm is 
neither a coalition of owners nor a collection of assets but a profit -seeking 
specialized production unit set up for the sale of goods or services, and 
endowed by law with the capacity to act as a singular legal person. This 
definition emphasizes both the economic entity that creates the surplus and 
the legal medium through which it acts, recognizing that without the device 
of legal personality most if not all of the firm’s activities would be difficult 
to sustain, if possible at all. Significantly, employment relations are not 
essential to this definition of the firm that is compatible with a variety of 
rationales for the firm’s existence, including besides transaction cost 
explanations those based on uncertainty, cognition and knowledge (see 
Hodgson, 2004b). The definition is broad enough to encompass all the 
observed types of firm, whether they are entrepreneurial or managerial, 
capitalist or socialist, nonhuman asset-intensive or human capital-intensive. 
At the same time it is narrow enough to exclude specialized production units 
that are not legally recognized, including illegal organizations, but also more 
complex organizational forms such as conglomerates, strategic alliances, 
supplier networks, all of which involve multiple firms. Arguably, it is 
“realistic” in the sense advocated by Coase (1937: 386) in that it corresponds 
to what is meant by the firm in the real world. 
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6.3 Future research 
The preceding considerations raise a number of additional research questions, 
only a few of which are very briefly outlined here. A first set of issues has to 
do with the extension or domain of applicability of the definition of the fi rm 
suggested above. Specifically, given the particular emphasis placed on 
registration or incorporation, that is, given the view that a specialized 
economic undertaking only really becomes a fully operational firm once it is 
legally recognized, it seems that the definition is not applicable in the so-
called “informal economy,” particularly in developing countries. Inevitably, 
this evokes concerns about not only the correctness of the definition but also 
about its usefulness. Of course, similar worries can be raised about any 
definition, and certainly reservations of this kind have been highlighted 
regarding other definitions of the firm. Indeed, these issues were at the heart 
of Hodgson’s (1998c: 24ff) discussion of the “Coasean tangle,” namely the 
lack of clarity regarding the historically specificity of the firm in Coase’s 
work (see also Hodgson, 2001a: 258ff).  
There is a sense in which the legally-grounded view of the firm offered 
here does not suffer from this weakness. The objection that the definition 
lacks applicability in settings where the rule of law is absent or dysfunctional 
merely specifies the definition’s relevance in space and time. Nevertheless, 
the interesting issue to research is the transition from informality to 
formality. This question is meaningful from both the historical and 
contemporary perspectives. In recent times, the focus of reforms in the 
developing world has moved “from getting prices right to getting institut ions 
right” (Rodrik, 2008: 100), based on the belief that development policies 
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should help entrepreneurs “formalize” their operations . The argument is that 
by facilitating access to property registries (see De Soto, 2000; Trebilcock 
and Veel, 2008), company registries (see Arruñada, 2010, 2012), and the like, 
formalization provides verifiable information that helps underpin the sort of 
credible commitments that are needed to foster the growth and development 
of firms. Of course, as North, Wallis and Weingast (2009: 150) put it, certain 
“doorstep conditions” must be satisfied for the transformation of personal 
exchange into impersonal exchange to actually work.  
The investigation of these conditions from both the theoretical and 
empirical points of view is likely to be promising, provided that it avoids 
some of the sweeping assumptions made in the “legal origins” literature (e.g., 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2003; La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), namely the idea that common 
law systems are more conducive to business and market institutions than civil 
law systems. As Deakin (2009: 60) has pointed out, specific legal institutions 
are not “predetermined by the legacy of legal origin,” and the emergence of 
corporate law principles is no exception to this rule (see also Guinnane, 
Lamoreaux, Harris and Rosenthal, 2006: 2ff; Milhaupt and Pistor, 2008: 
21ff). In fact, judging by the experience of developed economies, it always 
involves a complex process of transplantations and adaptations. This process 
can be more or less successful, and will hinge on the degree of institutional 
complementarity with other bodies of law, including contact law, tort law, 
bankruptcy law, competition law, employment law, patent law, and so on.  
From a conceptual point of view, the principle that institutional 
complementarities are important has been firmly established, and many of the 
consequences have been spelled out (e.g., Pagano, 1991, 1992; Pagano and 
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Rowthorn, 1994; Aoki, 1994, 2001; Boyer, 2005). From a more applied point 
of view, although numerous specific complementarities involving various 
legal rules related to firms and their political environments have been 
examined (e.g., Pagano and Rossi, 2004; Crouch et al., 2005; Deakin, 2009; 
Aoki, 2010), much more remains to be done. An important but under-
researched topic is the co-evolution of and complementarities between 
corporate personality and patent law. The crucial change that coincided with 
the rise of big business at the turn of the twentieth century, namely the 
appropriation of employee inventions by their corporate employers, has been 
well documented from a historical point of view (see Cherensky, 1993; 
Merges, 1999; Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 2007; Fisk, 2009; Coriat and 
Weinstein, 2012), but more specific analytical frameworks that can help 
capture the multiple institutional equilibria between entity shielding rules and 
patent ownership rules can be usefully developed. Arguably, Pagano’s (2007) 
discussion of the institutional complementarities between positions, rights 
and duties can used as a stepping stone in this direction.  
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